Towers from 34 different factories. History of creation

Beginning in 1931, the Red Army received wheeled-tracked high-speed tanks of the BT type (BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, etc.), created on the basis of the experimental American M1931 tank designed by Walter Christie. These tanks were intended to equip independent tank and mechanized formations. Taking into account the experience accumulated in the operation and combat operations of serial and experimental tanks of the BT series, the Main Armored Directorate (GABTU) in 1937, the tank design bureau of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant (KhPZ) named after. The Comintern (plant No. 183) issued the task of designing a new wheeled-tracked tank capable of replacing BT tanks in the future, which later received the index A-20. Detailed design began at the end of 1937 in the design department headed by M.I. Koshkin, preliminary work was carried out under the leadership of A. Firsov, who was repressed in 1937. New tank it was planned to arm it with a 45 mm tank gun and install 30 mm armor protection. The tank was to use a V-2 diesel engine as a power plant, which was supposed to reduce the tank's vulnerability to enemy fire and reduce the fire hazard of the vehicle. Unlike the BT-7, which had one drive wheel on each side, the A-20 tank had to have three drive wheels on each side due to the vehicle’s weight increasing to 18 tons. This complicated and made the design of the machine heavier.

Experienced tank A-20. Future prototype of the T-34 medium tank

Work on tank diesel in the Soviet Union began in the early 30s on the basis of aviation in the oil engines department of the Central Institute of Aviation Engines, headed by A.D. Charomsky, and at the Ukrainian Research Institute of Internal Combustion Engines, headed by Ya. M. Mayer. Subsequently, the Kharkov plant was involved in work on the engine. As a result of work at plant No. 75 in 1934, the high-speed diesel engine BD-2 was created, the main design solutions of the engine were laid down by designer Ya.E. Vikhman, the department was headed by K.F. Chelpan. Tank diesel differed from aviation diesel in the ability to operate mainly in variable modes, with an unsteady load and frequent access to certain rotation speeds, in the presence of dust, and increased resistance to the air inlet and exhaust gases. In March 1935, two BT-5 tanks with BD-2 diesel engines were demonstrated to the top leadership of the Soviet Union in the Kremlin, where they received a positive assessment. Subsequently, with the assistance of CIAN employees G.P. Chupakhin and M.P. Poddubny, the design of BD-2 diesel engines was finalized at plant No. 183 and in December 1936 they were installed on the BT-7 tank and passed field tests. In 1937, in connection with the introduction of letter designations for military products, the BD-2 engine was assigned the index B-2.

The design of this engine included many progressive solutions - direct fuel injection, stamped aluminum piston, 4 valves in each cylinder, load-bearing power studs, cast aluminum head, etc. In 1939, the new B-2 diesel engine passed 100-hour state tests and in December it was accepted for serial production. In 1939, diesel production was separated into an independent plant No. 75, which was headed by D.E. Kochetkov and T.P. Chupakhin, I.Ya. Trashutin was appointed head of the design bureau. The first production tank equipped with a V-2 diesel engine was the BT-7M, which went into production in 1939. Due to the complexity of the design of the A-20 wheeled-tracked tank, the design bureau of the N183 plant began developing an initiative version of a purely tracked tank with projectile-proof armor . At the same time, the design of the vehicle was sharply simplified, its weight was significantly reduced, which made it possible to further increase the armor protection of the tank and strengthen the armament. Initially, this was not done to ensure that both cars had the same weight and were tested under equal conditions.

On May 4, 1938, at a meeting of the USSR Defense Committee, the project of the A-20 wheeled-tracked tank was considered. The hull of this tank was given a rational shape; it was welded from rolled armor plates, the turret was welded in a conical shape. Based on the results of the consideration of the project, a desire was expressed to develop and manufacture a similar, but better armored tank on the “purely” tracked A-32, the development of which was carried out at plant N 183 on its own initiative, taking into account experience combat use tanks in the Spanish Civil War and the design of tanks with anti-ballistic armor.

Experimental tank A-32

In connection with the strengthening of anti-tank artillery in 1936, work began on the creation of the world's first tanks with shell-resistant armor. The first domestic tank with shell-resistant armor was the T-46-5 (object 11), created in 1938 at the Leningrad Experimental Engineering Plant named after Kirov (plant No. 185). The tank, with a combat weight of 22 tons, had 60 mm armor protection and a cast turret.
In the summer of 1938, the technical projects of both tanks - the ordered A-20 and the initiative A-32 - were completed. Their consideration took place in August at the Main Military Council. Most of the military leaders present strongly defended the wheeled-tracked tank, and the general opinion of the council was clearly in favor of the A-20. At this time, according to the memoirs of Ya.I. Baran, I.V. Stalin intervened and proposed, along with the development of the A-20 tank, to develop and build an initiative version of the A-32 in order to conduct comparative tests of both vehicles.

At the end of 1938, both projects were approved by the Main Military Council. The urgent development of drawings for both tanks required the involvement of hundreds of specialists; therefore, at the beginning of 1939, all tank bureaus of the N183 plant were united into a single design bureau, creating, as M.I. Koshkin put it, “a powerful design fist.” At the same time, all experimental workshops were merged into one. M.I. Koshkin was appointed chief designer of the united design bureau, his deputies were A.A. Morozov, N.A. Kucherenko, A.V. Kolesnikov and V.M. Doroshenko. In May 1939, prototypes of the A-20 and A-32 were manufactured and presented for testing. V.N. Chernyaev was appointed Chairman of the State Testing Commission.

With a similar mass and preservation of the main technical solutions, adopted in the A-20 project, this version had enhanced armor protection (30 mm instead of 25 mm for the A-20). Later, the 45-mm cannon on the A-32 was replaced by a 76-mm L-10 cannon with a 26-caliber barrel, which began to be installed on T-28 tanks in 1938. The tests carried out confirmed the high performance of the new tanks. At the same time, the lack of advantages of the wheeled-tracked A-20 in terms of speed was revealed (the maximum speed of both vehicles was 65 km/h), and the superiority of the A-32 in armor protection and armament was supported not only by the significantly lower labor intensity of production, but also by the presence of a reserve to increase the mass of the tank. The commission found it difficult to name any one sample for further work. The commission found it difficult to name any one option for further work. As a result, the conclusion stated that both tanks had successfully passed the tests and the question of choosing one was up in the air. Even M.I. Koshkin’s attempt to resolve it with the command of the Automotive Tank Directorate was unsuccessful. In September 1939, a general display of tank equipment was organized for the command of the Red Army at a training ground near Moscow, which became a turning point in the fate of the A-32 tank. Preference was given to the A-32, which, after modifications to further enhance armor protection and structural strength, was successfully tested in the fall of 1939.

The A-32 high-speed tank had a welded hull made of rolled armor plates, which had rational angles of inclination, and a welded turret with inclined side plates. The tank was equipped with a 45mm tank gun of the 1934 model and a coaxial DT machine gun; the DT machine gun was installed in the front plate of the hull. For observation from the tank, two periscopes and three slits with glass blocks were installed. The A-32 tank, like the A-20, was equipped with a four-stroke twelve-cylinder V-shaped diesel engine B-2 liquid cooled. The mechanical power transmission of the tank consisted of a multi-disc main dry friction clutch (steel on steel), a four-speed gearbox with spur gears and movable gear shift carriages, multi-disc dry friction side clutches (steel on steel) and single-row final drives. The caterpillar mover had 5 large-diameter road wheels per side with rubber tires, the drive wheel was rear-mounted, with six rollers for securing to the ridges of the tracks. The A-32 tank used a worm mechanism for tensioning the track chains and a large-link chain consisting of ridge and smooth tracks, which were arranged in series. The tank had an individual suspension with coil springs, which were located in the side niches of the hull. The electrical equipment of the A-32 was made according to a single-wire circuit with a rated supply voltage of 12 and 24 V. For internal communication, a TPU-2 tank intercom was used.

In the fall of 1939, the experimental A-32 tank was modernized, its weight was increased to 24 tons, reinforcement of armor protection was simulated by hanging additional cargo, and it was equipped with a 76.2 mm L-10 tank gun created at the Leningrad Kirov Plant.
On December 19, 1939, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a Resolution on the production of two prototypes of a tracked tank based on the A-32 with an armor thickness of 45 mm and a 76 mm tank gun. This tank later received the index T-34 (A-34). The thickness of the T-34 armor was increased to 45 mm, a 76-mm L-11 cannon with a 30.5-caliber barrel was installed, and the weight increased to 26 tons. When releasing drawings of the vehicle, special attention was paid to further simplifying the design of the vehicles. In this, the design bureau was greatly assisted by specialists from the technological bureau headed by S.V. Ratinov and the Stalingrad Tractor Plant; the joint interaction of designers and technologists made it possible to create a technologically advanced design suitable for mass production. The production of two experimental T-34s began at plant N 183 in January 1940. On March 5, 1940, two experimental T-34s left the plant for the first time and made a run along the route Kharkov - Moscow, M.I. Koshkin took part in the run. On March 17, the cars were demonstrated in the Kremlin to the country's top leadership. After the vehicles were shown on Ivanovskaya Square in the Kremlin, their field tests began. The T-34 tank was subjected to tests for armor resistance; it was fired at directly with high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. In June 1940, both tanks were sent to the destroyed Mannerheim Line to overcome real anti-tank obstacles, and then through Minsk and Kyiv to their home plant in Kharkov. On March 31, a decision was signed by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on serial production of the tank at the N183 plant. By the end of the year it was planned to produce 200 T-34 tanks. In July, the plan was increased to 600 units: KhPZ was supposed to produce 500, and the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) - 100 T-34 tanks. But serial production of the T-34 tank proceeded with glitches, in particular because the test site specialists gave negative feedback about the car, which was included in the GABTU test report. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G. Kulik, who approved the GABTU report, practically suspended the production and acceptance of T-34 tanks. As a result, by September 15, 1940, only three production copies were produced. After the tank was modified based on the test site's comments, the T-34 went into production and by January 1, 1940, KhPZ produced 115 vehicles.

In September 1940, KhPZ produced the first production tank. However, the results of ground tests of the T-34 were considered unsatisfactory by the GABTU, and production and acceptance of the tank was stopped. Only with with great difficulty The People's Commissariat of Medium Engineering, which by that time was in charge of tank production, managed to resume acceptance of the T-34, reducing the warranty mileage to 1000 km. The production plan for T-34 tanks in 1940 was not fulfilled: KhPZ delivered only 115 vehicles, and STZ - none.
A.A. Morozov, who took over the leadership of the KhPZ Design Bureau after the death of M.I. Koshkin (died September 26, 1940), managed not only to overcome the problems that arose, but also to increase its firepower by equipping the tank with the F-34 cannon, which was significantly superior to the L-34 cannon. eleven. The production of the T-34 also increased significantly - in the first half of 1941, two factories produced 1,110 vehicles.
The T-34 tank became an outstanding achievement of domestic tank building. It was distinguished by its reliable design, high technology, strong weapons, powerful armor and good mobility. For the creation of the tank, M.I. Koshkin (posthumously), A.A. Morozov and N.A. Kucherenko were awarded the USSR State Prize.

If you carefully study the history of creation military equipment Yes, if you superimpose it on the general history of those years, then the entire history of those years becomes more convex, voluminous and integral. Because in the history of the creation of weapons, in dates and documents, sometimes all the fuss, right up to the betrayal of one’s country in those years, is better visible. If you look at the biographies of those who created the weapons of Victory, and those who filled the army with rubbish under the Tukhachevskys, you will get an interesting picture. Before 1937, there were often specialists from the old, “pre-revolutionary” school, with “real higher education”, about the “loss” of which “debunkers of Stalinism” are so moaning today. And after that - young people, Komsomol members, “directors of confectionery factories.” These were already “Stalinist specialists” who, after the war, also created nuclear missile weapons.

With knowledge from educational institutions“Stalinist” education system, without currying favor with the West, they created the “Great Epoch”. In the same aviation, all the designers, except, probably, Tupolev and Polikarpov, received their education in Soviet schools - Yakovlev, Ilyushin, Lavochkin... . And their planes won the war. In the development of small arms, “continuity” has been preserved. The Russian weapons school of Fedorov, Tokarev, Degtyarev was continued by the Simonovs, Sudaevs, and Kalashnikovs. By the way, for some reason no one “repressed” the old “specialists” in small arms during the “terrible Stalinist times”. They all went to prison, but somehow these guys got out? Or maybe because gunsmiths and shooters simply did not write denunciations against each other? How the same rocket designers wrote denunciations against each other.

The designers of the BT and T-26 tanks, “specialists” of the old school, simply remade and modernized licensed American Christie and English Vickers. They also created strange three- and five-turret tanks T-28 and T-35 (“similar” to the English M-III model of ’32), with the same armor as light tanks and wedges. But the T-34 and KV with ISami were created by people already from the Soviet school, and these tanks determined the future development of the entire world tank building. Now the West and the whole world “copied” our tanks. And the “Stalinist specialists” did it.

"T-34"

Let's return to some myths associated with the weapon of Victory. In Soviet times, a fairy tale appeared that in 1939, Komsomol designers M.I. Koshkin, having received an order from the People's Commissariat of Defense for the production of a medium, wheeled-tracked tank, with projectile-proof armor and a 45 mm cannon, managed to “secretly” and “semi-legally” » also produce a tracked version of a similar vehicle, with thicker armor and a 76 mm T-34 cannon. But in fact, at the beginning of September 1938, the commission of the ABTU of the Red Army, chaired by military engineer 1st rank Ya.L. Skvirsky ordered plant N 183 to develop and manufacture one version of a wheeled-tracked tank (A-20) with a 45-mm cannon and two tracked tanks with 76-mm cannons. Those. this was an order to the plant from the state represented by the Auto Armor Tank Directorate of the Red Army.

On the one hand, this myth was launched in order to hide the trace of the “Tukhachevsky case” in the history of the T-34. On the other hand, they indirectly showed the inertia and backwardness of Stalin’s “favorites”, the “red horsemen” Voroshilov and Budyonny, who allegedly advocated the creation of “cavalry” tanks of the BT type. And at the same time they kicked Stalin, who “hindered” the development of the Red Army by listening to his “favorites” and not the “great strategists” of the Tukhachevskys.

In the books of M. Baryatinsky “T-34. The best tank of the Second World War" and "T-34 in battle" it is said that in 1937 the Kharkov Locomotive Plant, where since January 37 the chief designer of one of the three tank design bureaus (KB-190) was M.I. Koshkin, the task was set to develop modifications of the same BT-7. A light and wheeled-tracked tank, made under license from the American Christie. The tank is absolutely dead-end, with no prospects for either increasing the thickness of the armor or increasing the caliber of the gun. Koshkin began to resist and disrupted this work, arguing that it was necessary to develop a more powerful, but easier to manufacture and operate, medium tank on a caterpillar track, with non-tractor type road wheels like the (“medium”) T-28. A fundamentally new tank is needed, and not try to endlessly “modernize” the same light armored vehicles, trying to make a “medium” one out of them.

Strange as it may seem, Koshkin was not imprisoned or shot for “sabotage” and disruption of government orders in that same “terrible 1937”. Koshkin also “disrupted” the work on developing a modification of the BT tank - BT-IS, which was carried out at the same plant by a group of adjuncts of the VAMM named after. Stalin, 3rd rank military engineer A.Ya. Dick, assigned to the Koshkin Design Bureau at KhPZ. Apparently Koshkin found competent “patrons” in the People’s Commissariat of Medium Engineering? Or did he initially act on orders from above? It seems that there was a behind-the-scenes struggle between supporters of the eternal “modernization” of light armored vehicles (and in fact, marking time and a waste of “people’s” public funds) and supporters of a fundamentally new (breakthrough) middle-class tank, different from monsters with three turrets, type T -28.

As a result, on Sept. The 37th KhPZ was proposed to produce by 1939 samples of the same wheeled-tracked type tank BT-20, with “reinforced” armor compared to the BT-7 by as much as 3-5 mm and heavier by a whole ton. (This tank, like the BT-IS, differed from the BT-7 only in the appearance of the hull, it had inclined sheets of frontal and side armor, it already looked “from afar” like the future thirty-four, but the propulsion unit remained the same, wheeled and tracked) .

For this purpose, a separate reinforced design bureau was formed at KhPZ, headed by A.Ya. Dikom, subordinate directly to the chief engineer of the plant. They seconded more than 40 military graduate students from VAMM and ABTU, and attracted plant designers headed by A.A. Morozov. Koshkin was not in this design bureau (apparently he himself refused to work with a wheeled-tracked vehicle, or was he removed?)

The rest of the story is dark. After this design bureau ceased to exist in November 1937, and a wave of arrests of “saboteurs and saboteurs” took place throughout the plant, right up to the director of the plant I.P. Bondarenko, chief engineer, chief metallurgist, head of the diesel department and other specialists, M.I. Koshkin, together with the new management of the plant, is organizing a new design bureau. With almost the same composition of designers. It would be nice to look through those criminal cases. But as a result of such a strange purge from “enemies of the people” at the plant, which received a government order for a new tank, work on technical project This BT-20 was disrupted for a month and a half.

The project was nevertheless approved by the ABTU and considered at a meeting of the Defense Committee on approximately March 30, 1938, in the minutes of which they wrote: “The proposal of Comrade Pavlov (the head of the ABTU and the future commander of the ZapOVO in June 41) to recognize the creation of a tracked tank by the N183 plant appropriate with reinforced armor in the frontal part up to 30 mm. The tank turret should be adapted to accommodate a 76-mm gun...”

However, on May 13, 1938, the head of the ABTU, D. G. Pavlov, approved the updated performance characteristics of the same wheeled-tracked BT-20, albeit with thicker armor and increased angles of inclination of the hull and turret. The mass of the tank increased to 16.5 tons and it finally became “average”.

Koshkin, it seems, did not stop fighting for a tracked version of the medium tank all this time, and in August 1938 the USSR Defense Committee adopted a resolution “On the Tank Weapon System”, which stated that by July 1939 it was necessary to develop models of tanks with a gun and armor and mobility must fully meet the conditions of a future war. And it was then, in September 1938, that KhPZ received the task of developing two new models. One wheeled-tracked A-20, and a tracked version of the A-20G. The frontal armor of these vehicles was still 20 mm. At the beginning of 1939, all three factory tank design bureaus were merged into one, and M.I. Koshkin became the chief designer. Within three (!) months, by May 1939, the first samples were ready. By August 23, 1939, the tanks had passed factory and field tests. The A-20G was called A-32, and its side armor was already 30 mm, and this was the very “amateur performance” of Koshkin’s team. The A-32 also differed from the A-20 in having a wider track, a hull width of 15 cm, and had one more road wheel, which meant it had a weight reserve. Moreover, due to the absence of mechanisms and drives on the tank for movement on wheels located along the sides, the weight of the A-32 differed from the weight of the A-20 by only a ton. The A-32 completed the required test run on tracks of 3121 km, and the A-20 2931 km (plus another 1308 km on wheels).

On September 23, 1939, these samples were shown at the Kubinka training ground. Voroshilov K.E. was present. - People's Commissar of Defense, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Voznesensky, Pavlov D.G. - head of ABTU, and tank designers. New KV, SMK, T-100, and modernized BT-7M, T-26 were also tested and presented. Based on the test results, and due to the fact that the A-32 had a weight reserve and already had sides 30 mm thick, it was proposed to increase the frontal armor of the A-32 to 45 mm. The factory hastily began assembling new T-32s with reinforced armor. The track and body of these vehicles have become even wider. And on December 19, 1939, the Decree of the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 443ss was already issued “On the adoption of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery tractors and their production in 1940” by the Red Army, in which the name T-34 appeared.

Already in January-February 1940, the first two T-34 vehicles were assembled and factory tests immediately began (one had the hatch of the mechanic’s forward-facing cabin above his head, and the other had the hatch in front of the mechanic). And a government show in the Kremlin for Stalin had already been scheduled for March 17 (!). However, due to frequent breakdowns of the same new diesel engines, the tanks did not have time to reach the required 3,000 km.

Then there was the story of transporting these tracked samples to Moscow under their own power in March 1940, with breakdowns and repairs along the way to one of the tanks. But on the morning of March 17, tanks stood on Ivanovskaya Square in the Kremlin. Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Beria and others approached them. The head of the ABTU, D.G. Pavlov, presented the cars to Stalin. After demonstration runs along the paving stones, the tanks stopped in the same place. The leader liked the tanks, and he gave the command to provide the necessary assistance to the plant to eliminate the shortcomings of the tanks, which were persistently pointed out to him by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments G.I. Kulik and the head of ABTU D.G. Pavlov. At the same time, Pavlov very boldly told Stalin: “We will pay dearly for the production of insufficiently combat-ready vehicles.”

After the demonstration to Stalin, the tanks were fired at at the training ground from a 45-mm cannon (the main caliber of anti-tank artillery of those years in all European countries) from 100 meters and “the dummy remained intact,” the armor survived and the engine did not stall. This was on the 20th of March 1940. On March 31, there was a meeting with People's Commissar Voroshilov with Kulik, Pavlov, Likhachev (People's Commissar of Medium Engineering), Koshkin, and a protocol was signed on the production of the T-34 (with a hatch in the front plate in front of the driver) in series, in Kharkov and at STZ , for the production of 600 T-34s in 1940. It was decided to eliminate the shortcomings during production. But in the fall of the same 1940, two T-IIIs purchased in Germany were tested in Kubinka. And although, after comparative tests, the T-34 was superior to the German tank in armament (37 mm versus 76 mm for the T-34) and armor protection, but in terms of comfort, engine noise, smoothness, and even speed on gravel roads, it LOST!?!

GABTU D.G. Pavlova presented a report on comparative tests to Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments, Marshal G.I. Kulik. That report approved and suspended the production and acceptance of the T-34 until “all the shortcomings” were eliminated (how honest and principled our generals were then!). K.E. intervened. Voroshilov: “Continue to make cars, hand them over to the army. Factory mileage should be limited to 1000 km...” (that same “stupid horseman”). At the same time, everyone knew that the war would not happen today or tomorrow. Months were spent. Pavlov was a member of the country’s military council, but he was a very “principled officer.” Maybe for this “courage and integrity” Stalin agreed with the appointment of the hero of the Soviet Union D.G. Pavlov to the “main” district—ZapOVO? But the way Pavlov boldly and principledly commanded in this district, surrendering Minsk on the fifth day, has already become a fact of history. At the same time, Pavlov himself was a professional tank driver, fought with tanks in Spain, and received a Hero of the Soviet Union award for this war. His proposal to create a tracked tank with projectile-proof armor and install a 76 mm cannon on this tank (the caliber of heavy tank guns of those years!) was even recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the CO at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in March 1938, two years before. That is, Pavlov should have understood better than others what kind of tank was in front of him. And it was this man who did everything in his power to disrupt the acceptance of this tank for service.

But in fact, M.I. Koshkin is not the father of the T-34. Rather, he is his “stepfather” or “cousin” father. Koshkin began his career as a tank designer at the Kirov plant, in the design bureau of medium and heavy tanks. In this design bureau he worked on “medium” tanks T-28, T-29 with bulletproof armor. The T-29 already differed from the T-28 in the type of chassis, rollers and experimental torsion bar suspension instead of spring suspension. Then this type of suspension (torsion bars) was used on heavy tanks “KV” and “IS”. Then Koshkin was transferred to Kharkov, to the design bureau of light tanks, and apparently with the prospect of starting work on the design of “medium” ones, but on the basis of the light “BT”. He had to fulfill the army's order, making the light wheeled-tracked tank BT-20 (A-20), to ensure that at least on its basis he could make a tracked version of this vehicle - the A-20G, and bring it to that same T-34 . Born from blueprints for a light tank, the T-34 had problems with “crowding” in the tank and other shortcomings. Also from the light BT, Koshkin got the chassis (on some T-34s they even installed rollers from the BT tank, although they were already of the required design) and spring suspension. Almost in parallel with the “creation and modernization” of the T-34, Koshkin also designed another medium tank, the T-34M, which had other chassis rollers, similar to the rollers from heavy KVs, with a torsion bar suspension rather than a spring one (an example of the “universalization” of tank production , which the Germans later used with might and main in the production of their tanks during the War), a more spacious hexagonal turret with a commander’s cupola (it was later installed on the T-34 in ’42). This tank was even approved by the Defense Committee in January 1941. In May 1941, fifty of these turrets were already manufactured at the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant, the first armored hulls, rollers, and torsion bar suspension were manufactured (the “suspension from BT” remained on the T-34). But they never made an engine for it. But the outbreak of the war put an end to this model. Although the Koshkinskoye Design Bureau was intensively developing a new, “native” T-34M tank, a “better” one, the outbreak of the War required the expansion of the machines already put on the assembly line, those that exist. And then throughout the war there was constant modification and improvement of the T-34. Its modernization was carried out at every plant where the T-34 was assembled, constantly striving to reduce the cost of the tank. But still, the emphasis was placed, first of all, on increasing the number of tanks produced and throwing them into battle, especially in the fall and winter of 1941. “Comfort” was dealt with later.

In 1942, the “Koshkinites” again tried to offer the army a new medium tank to replace the T-34 (which had a bunch of “disadvantages”), the T-43, with a chassis already similar to the T-34 chassis, but with a different hull and a larger turret, with the prospect of installing guns of larger caliber. But Stalin simply banned work on this tank, giving the command all efforts to improve the existing T-34. Baryatinsky is surprised by this decision. Like, if A.A. Morozov, who became chief designer after Koshkin, "named" the new tank "Joseph Stalin", like Kotin and Dukhov, who created the new tank "IS" to replace the "KV", then Stalin would probably have given permission for the production of the T-43. It was as if Stalin was a red-haired maiden, thrilled by such flattery. At the same time, Baryatinsky himself cites the results of the tests carried out and the conclusions of the commissions on the medium T-43, still with the same 76 mm gun, and variants of the medium T-34 with thicker armor and a longer 76 mm gun. It still turned out that when meeting with the heavy “Panthers” and “Tigers”, which appeared already in 1942, this did not give anything. To fight the German “menagerie” on equal terms, a completely new heavy tank of a similar class and preferably with a more powerful gun was needed. And on the already existing and used T-34, it was easier and cheaper to install a new turret from the T-43 with an 85 mm cannon to fight the Pz-IV main tank and other armored vehicles. Therefore, Stalin agreed to replace the heavy KVs with similar, but more powerful ISs, but did not allow the replacement of medium T-34s with medium T-43s, since this did not give anything in principle, but led to unnecessary costs. This is the path the Germans had to take. They spent time and money on developing completely new “supertanks” (which Hitler strongly opposed before the War and what he did during the war), without being able to endlessly modernize their already existing Pz-III, Pz-IV. And the story of using “universal” rollers for tanks continued, but only after the War. After the T-34 there were T-44, T-54, T-55, which had one type of single-row roller. The design bureaus of heavy tanks with double-row rollers in the Urals created the T-62. The design bureau in Kharkov, where the “Koshkinites” returned after the War, led by Morozov, created the T-64 also with two rows of rollers, as they wanted back in 1941, on the T-34M.

So the story with the T-34 is just an example of the foresight of its creators, who laid a huge foundation for future modernizations, without significant costs, at the main base of the tank. And also, an example of wisdom and economic calculation the head of the country, choosing between the good and the “best” (which is sometimes the enemy of the good). And it did not allow designers to be “distracted” by promising, but at that moment ruinous for the country, samples. This is what Stalin spoke to designer A.A. Morozov: “You have created a good car (T-43). But currently our army already has a good T-34 tank. Now the task is to improve its combat qualities and increase production. Until the plant and design bureau fulfill these requirements of the active army, it is necessary to prohibit the diversion of designers to new developments.” Then you will make your own wonderful tank. And now the front needs the T-34.

Similar decisions were made after the war, with the copying of the next American “flying fortress” B-29. When Tupolev announced that he had a ready-made design for his two-fin long-range bomber, the “dropout seminarian” ordered to simply copy the already flying B-29. This gave time gain in the race for survival with America. And then we’ll somehow sort out “copyrights” and our new planes. So the TU-4 appeared quite quickly, and Tupolev’s designers began designing jet machines. Or the story of how Korolev, at a reception with Stalin, tried to dream about flying to Mars. But the “close-minded Leader” did not appreciate the dreams of the Great Designer and forbade him to even think about astronautics and spaceships!

When different authors They are trying to use such examples to show, to put it mildly, the “short-sightedness” of the tyrant who stifled the flight of thought of our designers new technology(tanks, planes, missiles), then it would not hurt them to simultaneously give comments about in what economic condition the country was at that moment. And what would happen to the country if, instead of working on a rocket with a “bomb,” Korolev would be busy with a flight to Mars. Would the Americans give our designers time for this “flight of thought”?

Apparently, it is in the extreme simplicity of the design that lies the secret of the popularity of this combat vehicle among both tankers and production workers. It was a Russian tank, for the Russian army and Russian industry, maximally adapted to our conditions of production and operation. And only Russians could fight on it! It is not for nothing that they say: “What is good for a Russian is death for a German.” The Thirty-Four forgave what was not forgiven, for example, for all their merits, Lend-Lease combat vehicles. It was impossible to approach them with a sledgehammer and a crowbar, or to straighten any part with a blow of a boot.

One more circumstance should be taken into account. In the minds of most people, the T-34 and T-34-85 tanks are not separated. With the latter we broke into Berlin and Prague; it was produced even after the end of the war, was in service until the mid-1970s, and was supplied to dozens of countries around the world. In the vast majority of cases, it is the T-34-85 that stands on pedestals. The halo of his fame spread to his much less successful predecessor.

Supplement to the magazine "MODEL CONSTRUCTION"

Production of T-34 and T-34-85 in the USSR

Sections of this page:

1 . Including two prototypes

2. According to other sources, 2536 tanks. The table includes the most frequently occurring number

3. According to other sources, 354 tanks

4 . According to other sources, 3606 tanks

5 . According to other sources, 452 tanks. The number was taken from the plant’s report as the most reliable

6. According to other sources, 1198 tanks.

The production of medium tanks T-34 and T-34-85 deserves special mention. Too much contradictory information has been published so far, too many inconsistencies are found in the figures. During the war years, double accounting was carried out, in the full sense of the word - factories handed over tanks “for assembly”, the army accepted them “for battle”. Vehicles manufactured, for example, at the end of 1942, could be accepted by military acceptance at the beginning of 1943 and end up in two different annual reports. It is known that in 1940, 115 T-34 tanks were produced, but the army accepted only 97! And so on ad infinitum... However, let's turn to the numbers and try to analyze them. First, let's look at the T-34 tank, produced from 1940 to 1944.

It is enough to compare the data in the tables to understand that they contain obvious discrepancies both in the annual production of tanks and in the total number. Moreover, with the exception of 1940, all the numbers in table 2 are greater than in table 1. What's the matter? Apparently - in the compilers of these reports.

Table 1 is compiled on the basis of the “Certificate on the production of tanks by industrial plants from 1.01.41 to 1.01.44” (TsAMO, f. 38, d. 663) and the book “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”, that is, based on military calculations. Table 2 uses “Reference data from the People’s Commissariat of the Tank Industry of the USSR for 1941-1945 on the production of armored vehicles” and data from factories. At the same time, it is clear that certain results of military representatives’ calculations have clearly “crept” into Table 2, for example, the number of tanks produced by ChKZ in 1943. By the way, if instead of 3594 for ChKZ we put 3606, and for plant No. 174 we take 1198, then we get 15,696 tanks, which coincides with the data in Table 1!

This table shows data for 1944 and 1945 only. The T-34-85 commander and OT-34-85 tanks were not produced in 1946.

When comparing the data from the two tables, a discrepancy in the number of tanks produced in 1944 is visible. And this despite the fact that the tables are compiled according to the most frequently occurring and most reliable data. In a number of sources you can find other figures for 1945: 6208, 2655 and 1540 tanks, respectively. However, these numbers reflect the production of tanks for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1945, that is, approximately until the end of World War II.

Discrepancies in the numbers do not make it possible to absolutely accurately indicate the number of T-34 and T-34-85 tanks produced from 1940 to 1946. This number ranges from 61,293 to 61,382 units.

Speaking about the production of tanks, it was impossible to ignore their most important and complex components - the gun and the engine. It should be taken into account that the guns mentioned in Table 5, and diesel engines in Table 6, were installed not only on the T-34 and T-34-85, but also on other tanks.

The T-34 tank was created on the basis of the experimental medium A-32 and entered service in December 1939. The design of the thirty-four marks a qualitative leap in domestic and global tank building. For the first time, the vehicle organically combines projectile-proof armor, powerful weapons and a reliable chassis. Projectile protection is ensured not only by the use of thick rolled armor plates, but also by their rational inclination. In this case, the sheets were connected using the method manual welding, which was replaced by automatic welding during production. The tank was armed with a 76.2 mm L-11 cannon, which was soon replaced by the more powerful F-32 cannon, and then the F-34. Thus, in terms of armament, it corresponded to the KV-1 heavy tank.

High mobility was ensured by a powerful diesel engine and wide tracks. The high manufacturability of the design made it possible to establish serial production of the T-34 at seven machine-building plants with different equipment. During the Great Patriotic War Along with increasing the number of tanks produced, the task of improving their design and simplifying manufacturing technology was solved. The original welded and cast turret designs, which were difficult to manufacture, were replaced by a simpler cast hex turret. Increasing engine life was achieved by creating highly efficient air cleaners, improving the lubrication system and introducing an all-mode regulator. The replacement of the main clutch with a more advanced one and the introduction of a five-speed gearbox instead of a four-speed one contributed to an increase in the average speed. More durable tracks and cast road wheels improve the reliability of the undercarriage. Thus, the reliability of the tank as a whole was increased while the labor intensity of manufacturing was reduced. In total, more than 52 thousand T-34 tanks were produced during the war, which took part in all battles.

History of the creation of the T-34 tank

On October 13, 1937, the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after the Comintern (plant No. 183) was issued tactical and technical requirements for the design and manufacture of a new wheeled-tracked tank BT-20. To accomplish this task, by decision of the 8th Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry, a special design bureau was created at the plant, subordinate directly to the chief engineer. It received the factory designation A-20. During its design, another tank was developed, almost identical to the A-20 in terms of weight and size characteristics. Its main difference was the absence of a wheel drive.

As a result, on May 4, 1938, at a meeting of the USSR Defense Committee, two projects were presented: the A-20 wheeled-tracked tank and the A-32 tracked tank. In August, both of them were considered at a meeting of the Main Military Council, and were approved in the first half next year made in metal.

According to its technical data and appearance The A-32 tank differed slightly from the A-20. It turned out to be 1 ton heavier (combat weight - 19 tons), had the same overall dimensions and shape of the hull and turret. It was similar power point- diesel V-2. The main differences were the absence of a wheel drive, armor thickness (30 mm instead of 25 mm for the A-20), a 76 mm cannon (a 45 mm was initially installed on the first model), and the presence of five road wheels on one side in the chassis.

Joint tests of both vehicles were carried out in July - August 1939 at a training ground in Kharkov and revealed their similarities tactical and technical characteristics, primarily dynamic. Maximum speed combat vehicles on tracks was the same - 65 km/h; average speeds are also approximately equal, and the operational speeds of the A-20 tank on wheels and tracks did not differ significantly. Based on the test results, it was concluded that the A-32, which had a reserve for increasing mass, would be advisable to protect with more powerful armor, correspondingly increasing the strength of individual parts. The new tank received the designation A-34.

In October - November 1939, tests were carried out on two A-32 vehicles, loaded with 6830 kg (up to the weight of the A-34). Based on these tests, on December 19, the A-34 tank was adopted by the Red Army under the designation T-34. Officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense almost until the very beginning of the war did not have a strong opinion about the T-34 tank, which had already been put into service. The management of plant No. 183 did not agree with the customer’s opinion and appealed this decision to the headquarters and the People’s Commissariat, proposing to continue production and provide the army with T-34 tanks with corrections and a warranty mileage reduced to 1000 km (from 3000). K.E. Voroshilov put an end to the dispute by agreeing with the opinion of the plant. However main drawback, noted in the report of the NIBT Polygon specialists - the crowding was never corrected.

In its original form, the T-34 tank produced in 1940 was very different high quality processing of armor surfaces. In wartime, they had to be sacrificed for the sake of mass production of a combat vehicle. Initial production plan for 1940, it envisaged the production of 150 serial T-34s, but already in June this number increased to 600. Moreover, production was supposed to be launched both at Plant No. 183 and at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ), which was supposed to produce 100 vehicles. However, this plan turned out to be far from reality: by September 15, 1940, only 3 production tanks were produced at KhPZ, and the Stalingrad T-34 tanks left the factory workshops only in 1941.

The first three production vehicles in November-December 1940 underwent intensive testing by shooting and running along the Kharkov-Kubinka-Smolensk-Kyiv-Kharkov route. The tests were carried out by officers of the NIBT Test Site. They identified so many design flaws that they doubted the combat effectiveness of the vehicles being tested. GABTU presented a negative report. In addition to the fact that the armor plates were installed at large angles of inclination, the thickness of the armor of the T-34 tank produced in 1940 was superior to most medium-sized vehicles of that time. One of the main shortcomings was the short-barreled L-11 cannon.

L-11 gun mask	F-34 gun mask

Second prototype A-34

Throwing bottles of burning gasoline onto the engine hatch of a tank.

Initially, the tank was equipped with a 76-mm L-11 cannon with a barrel length of 30.5 calibers, and starting in February 1941, along with the L-11, a 76-mm F-34 cannon with a barrel length of 41 calibers was installed. However, the changes affected only the armor mask of the swinging part of the gun. By the end of the summer of 1941, T-34 tanks were produced only with the F-34 cannon, which was produced at plant No. 92 in Gorky. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, by decree of the State Defense Committee No. 1, the Krasnoye Sormovo plant (plant No. 112 of the People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry) was connected to the production of T-34 tanks. At the same time, the Sormovichi team was allowed to install aircraft parts brought from Kharkov on their tanks.

Thus, in the fall of 1941, the only major manufacturer T-34 tanks remained at STZ. At the same time, they tried to launch the production of the maximum possible number of components in Stalingrad. The armored steel came from the Red October plant, the armored hulls were welded at the Stalingrad Shipyard (plant No. 264), and the guns were supplied by the Barrikady plant. Thus, an almost complete production cycle was organized in the city. The situation was the same in Gorky and Nizhny Tagil.

It should be noted that each manufacturer made some changes and additions to the design of the vehicle in accordance with its technological capabilities, so T-34 tanks from different factories had their own characteristic appearance.

In total, during this time, 35,312 T-34 tanks were manufactured, including 1,170 flamethrower tanks.

There is a table of T-34 production, which differs slightly in the number of tanks produced.

The Soviet medium tank T-34 was and remains a legend. Not only is it the most produced tank of World War II, with 84,000 built (for comparison, Sherman tanks were built at about 48,966), but it is also one of the longest-serving tanks built of all time.

Many T-34s are still in storage in Asia and Africa, some saw active use during the 1990s (for example, in the Yugoslav wars from 1991 to 1999). They were part of countless armored forces around the world from the fifties to the eighties.

Creation

The basic design was first tested in 1938 on the A-32, having originated in the BT-7, which in turn was an evolution of the American Christie tank.

The chief engineer, Mikhail Koshkin, promised Stalin to replace the BT series with a better and more versatile tank.

He had to have the following features:

• hull with sloped armor;
• powerful and unpretentious V-12 diesel engine, less sensitive to fuel quality and operating conditions than high-octane gasoline engines;
• long range;
• less fire hazard than BT-5 and BT-7, which showed their flammability during the Soviet-Japanese War in Manchuria.

The first prototype was an improved A-32 with thicker armor. He successfully completed his tests in Kubinka, after which his design was simplified for mass production. All this happened already at the beginning of 1939, during the rearmament of the USSR.

The first two prototypes took part in a run from their factory in Kharkov to Moscow and back in 1940, under the patronage of Sergei Ordzhonikidze. From April to May they were exposed a large number difficult tests, traveling a total of about 2000 km from Kharkov to the Mannerheim line in Finland and back to the factory via Moscow.

Design

The sloped armor was an excellent solution and allowed it to withstand many hits while still being of acceptable thickness and weight.

After completion of development and testing, the new series of tank was equipped with the final version of the 76.2 mm gun and became the basis for the creation of all subsequent versions until 1944. It was known as the T-34-76, and, after replacing the gun and turret, as the T-34-85.

Christie's coil spring suspension was adapted to front-line conditions, as were the V12 diesels along with the gearbox and clutch. The 10-RT-26 radio was replaced by the 9-RM model, the tracks were slightly expanded. The frontal armor shape was slightly simplified to facilitate mass production, as were many other elements.

The T-34 was equipped with a variety of hatches and turrets throughout its long life, but almost all variants were equipped with railings on top of the hull, which allowed Soviet infantry to move around on the tank, compensating for the lack of vehicles.

However, none of the T-34s were ever equipped with anti-aircraft weapons, which is why many were lost to Ju-87 Stuka attacks.

Combat use

Once at the front, the T-34 had no analogues in the world. This was made possible by combining speed, armor and weapons into a magic triangle.

The first version of the T-34-76 came as an unpleasant surprise to the arrogant German troops in 1941 when it began to enter service en masse. The Germans had nothing comparable.

Not only was the T-34 able to handle mud and snow with its wide tracks, but it also had the perfect combination of thick sloped armor, an effective gun, good speed and endurance.

In addition, the machine turned out to be very reliable, durable and easy to manufacture and maintain. The winner of the industrial war and a significant leap in tank building in general.

The first combat clashes in July 1941 proved that no German equipment could hit the T-34 with certainty. To the disappointment of the German officers, their shots simply bounced off these heavily armored vehicles.

The sloped armor turned out to be very effective, which compensated for the not very successful gun with a relatively low projectile speed, which was roughly comparable to the armament of the Pz-3 and Pz-4 of its time.

The thirty-four diesel engine was not afraid of any weather; the wide tracks were ideal for any conditions, both for autumn thaw and snow in winter.

The T-34 was also easier to produce than its German competitors, which is why many German units found their enemies simply invincible.

Of course, it was possible to stop an individual tank with a precise shot between the track and the wheel, or destroy it completely, but there were too many of them. And even the new 88 mm German guns calmly penetrating from a distance did not save the situation.

At the end of 1942, supplies began to arrive at the front. a new version, with minor modifications to increase crew comfort and improve visibility around. The 76 mm gun received incendiary shells, which it could fire just as well as conventional armor-piercing shells. They were fatal to all enemy tanks except the latest, most heavily armored versions of the Pz-IV.

German response

Operating in conjunction with the slow but practically invulnerable KV-1, the T-34 swept away everything in its path. But the German command, as in France, rose to the occasion, and, thanks to the well-coordinated actions of the Ju-87 Stuka, together with the use of new 88 mm guns, was able to prevent the USSR tank army from destroying and sweeping away its troops.

The new German heavy Tiger was superior to the Soviet T-34 in protection and firepower, but was too expensive and unreliable. The need for a cheaper and more widespread medium tank with a powerful gun and a very high speed the flight of the projectile gave impetus to the birth of such a machine as the Panther.

During the Moscow winter campaign and, later, in Stalingrad, T-34s were widely used for the first time and pushed through the defenses. German tanks could not stand the cold weather. The rubber from the rollers peeled off, the engines often refused to start and required gradual warming up, for which there was no time, machine guns often jammed, and the tanks themselves were practically unable to move, since due to the narrow tracks of the Pz-3 and Pz-4 they literally fell into the snow and couldn't move.

In addition, difficult weather conditions made any air support impossible, thus depriving the armored forces of any meaningful assistance from the Luftwaffe. However, the new Panther proved to be a deadly opponent for the T-34 at long ranges, as it easily penetrated its armor from great distances, while remaining virtually invulnerable to return fire.

But it was not technology, but tactics and mass participation that turned out to be the basis in the decisive battle on the Kursk Bulge, when the Panthers and Tigers, invulnerable from afar, were struck by thousands of T-34s striking at close range from all sides. Just like the Shermans, many T-34s were sacrificed so that others could close in on the enemy and strike at vulnerable points at close range.

Flaws

The T-34 was not as ideal a tank as it seemed to the Germans at that time. Low-quality assembly, unreliable and failing parts, many other defects caused by very difficult production conditions and low-skilled personnel, low crew skills, and command errors led to large losses in each division equipped with the T-34. In some of them, non-combat losses were almost greater than combat losses, taking away more than half of the combat units due to technical problems.

Diesels were very sensitive to dust and sand, while the first versions of their filters were characterized by low efficiency, which led to frequent breakdowns. The gearbox and clutch often caused strong vibrations, jammed during shifts, and even sometimes collapsed.

It was quite common to see a tank carrying spare gears and other parts wherever possible, for example, between additional fuel tanks, next to a tarpaulin, a shovel, an ax, a tow rope and, of course, spare sections of tracks.

The T-34s that have become a familiar sight, moving quickly with platoons on their hulls, actually covered very short distances, or even did it for pure propaganda. Poor material support made such a use of the T-34, at least at first, extremely irrational.

The conveyors, due to the rapid advance of the German army, were moved far to the east, to the Dzerzhinsky Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, which later received the name "Tankograd", where they were far from Better conditions for work, for example, production began in the open air, even before a roof was created over it. But until the end of 1942, most large production production remained in the eastern part of Stalingrad. From there, the T-34s went into battle almost from the factory gates.

Epilogue

Armor, firepower, ergonomics were inferior to serial enemy Tigers and Panthers and experimental monsters like Mouse, but mass production and manufacturability were at the highest level.

Despite this, the Soviet medium tank T-34 is a legendary vehicle that has rightfully become a symbol of victory in the Great Patriotic War.

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