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Michel Foucault

Hermeneutics of the subject

Self-care and self-discovery

In what symbols of thought were subject and truth united in Western antiquity? There is a central concept to begin to consider this issue: epimeleia/cura sui ("care of oneself"). Until now, the problem of the subject and his knowledge sounded differently: according to the Delphic Oracle, “know thyself.” However, the call to self-knowledge has always been accompanied by the requirement to “show care for yourself.” There is a relationship of dependence between these two types of requirements: self-knowledge is only a special case of self-care, only its specific application. Epimeleia is a philosophical principle prevalent in Greek, Hellenistic and Roman thought. This type of philosophical thinking is embodied in the teachings of Socrates, who talks to people on the streets and addresses young people in gymnasiums with one question: do you take care of yourself? (Which implies giving up some more profitable types activities, for example, waging war or performing government duties.) One should take care of oneself not only because this is a condition for access to philosophical life in the full and precise meaning of the word. Below I will try to show that the principle according to which it is necessary to take care of oneself is generally the basis of rational behavior in any form of active life that strives to meet the principle of spiritual rationality. The concept of epimeleia existed right up to Christianity, where it is found again in the Alexandrian spiritual tradition, both in the form of the concept of care in Philo and Plotinus, and in the form of the Christian asceticism of Gregory of Nyssa: in his treatise “On Virginity,” self-care begins with celibacy, understood as a way out of marriage. In the concept of epimeleia, the following aspects should be distinguished: - firstly, there is the theme of a certain general attitude, a peculiar manner of looking at the world, acting, entering into relationships with other people. Epimeleia is everything: a certain attitude towards oneself, towards others, towards everything in the world; - secondly, epimeleia seauton is a kind of form of attention, gaze. Taking care of yourself means switching your gaze, transferring it from the external, surrounding world to others, etc. on yourself. Self-care involves a kind of observation of what you think and what is happening inside your thoughts; - thirdly, epimeleia also always means a certain way of action carried out by the subject in relation to himself, namely, the action by which he takes care of himself, changes, purifies, transforms (transforme) and transforms (transfigure) himself. To achieve this result, a set of practical skills is required, acquired through large quantity exercises that will have a long-term perspective in the history of Western culture, philosophy, morality and spiritual life. These include: meditation techniques, techniques for remembering the past, techniques for studying consciousness, techniques for monitoring any ideas as they appear in consciousness. Finally, the concept of epimeleia contains a set of laws that determine the mode of existence of the subject, his relationship to the environment, certain forms of reflection, which, thanks to their own characteristics, make this concept an exceptional phenomenon not only in the history of ideas, but also in the history of subjectivity itself, or, if you like, stories practical applications subjectivity. Why has Western philosophy chosen self-knowledge over self-care? In my opinion, epimeleia is presented as something melancholic, accompanied by negative connotations, unable to give the whole society a positive morality. On the contrary, in antiquity this concept always had a positive meaning - it formed the basis of the strictest moral systems of the West. Christianity, which, like any religion, does not have its own morality, is nourished by precisely this tradition. Thus, there is a paradox: the injunction to take care of oneself for us means rather selfishness or withdrawal into oneself: on the contrary, for many centuries it has been fundamental principle such strictly observed moral standards as ep

structure of the Code, on a different basis, adapted to new conditions, placed in the context of the universal ethics of non-egoism, either under the guise of Christian renunciation of oneself, or, in the modern interpretation, under the guise of obligations towards others, be it an individual, a community of people or an entire Class. As a result of this paradox, self-care has been neglected. On the one hand, Christianity has integrated into its morality of non-selfishness the spiritual requirement to take care of oneself. On the other hand, the deepest reason for this inattention is found in the history of truth itself. Cartesianism again shifted the emphasis to self-knowledge and turned it into the main path to comprehending truth.

Philosophy and spirituality.

What makes us believe that truth exists? Let us call philosophy that form of thought that tries not so much to recognize where the truth is and where the lie is, but rather to comprehend what makes us believe that truth and lies exist and can exist. Let us call philosophy a form of thought that asks the question of what allows the subject to comprehend the truth, that form of thought that seeks to determine the conditions and ultimate possibilities for the subject to comprehend the truth. If this is called philosophy, then, I believe, spirituality can be called that search, that practical activities, that experience through which the subject carries out in himself the transformations necessary to comprehend the truth. Then spirituality can be called the totality of these searches, practical skills and experience, which should be purification, asceticism, renunciation, turning the gaze inward, a change in being, representing - not for consciousness, but for the subject himself, for his being - the price which he must pay to comprehend the truth. There are three characteristics of spirituality:

1. Possession of truth is not an inalienable right of the subject. To know it, he must himself transform into something else. His existence is at stake: the price of comprehending the truth is the conversion of the subject.

2. Truth cannot exist without conversion or transformation of the subject. This transformation is carried out: a) by the movement of love, through which the subject loses his status; b) his work on himself, which should allow him to gain the ability to comprehend the truth: the movement of asceticism.

3. The result of comprehending the truth is its return to the subject. Truth is what illuminates the subject. From the point of view of spiritual experience, truth is not actually a kind of reward to the subject for his cognitive act and is not given to him simply as the completion of this act. Truth is what illuminates the subject, what gives him peace of mind. In short, in truth itself, in its knowledge, there is something that allows the subject himself to be realized, that realizes his very being.

From the point of view of spiritual experience, the act of cognition in itself and as such could never provide the comprehension of truth, if it were not prepared, accompanied, duplicated, completed by a certain transformation of the subject - not an individual, but the subject itself in its being as a subject. Gnosis is, ultimately, what always strives to move (transf е rer), transfer (transposer) into the cognitive act itself the conditions, forms and consequences of spiritual experience. We can say schematically that since antiquity the philosophical question “How to comprehend the truth?” and the practice of spirituality as a necessary transformation of the subject’s being, which will allow him to comprehend the truth, are two problems that belong to the same topic and therefore they cannot be considered in isolation from each other. And, with the exception of Aristotle, for whom spirituality did not play such a significant role, the main question of philosophy, understood as the question of spirituality, was the following: what are the transformations carried out in the being of the subject necessary to comprehend the truth? Several centuries later, on the day when the postulate was formulated that knowledge is the only way to the comprehension of truth, at the Cartesian moment in history, thought and the history of truth entered the modern period of development. In other words, I believe that modern history truth begins from the moment when knowledge, and knowledge alone, becomes the only way to comprehend the truth, i.e. this countdown begins from the moment when a philosopher or scientist, or simply a person trying to find the truth, becomes able to understand to himself through only acts of cognition, when nothing else is required from him - neither modification nor change of his being. From this moment we can assume that the subject is capable of knowing the truth - with two reservations, internal in relation to knowledge and external in relation to the individual. From the moment when being is no longer subject to revision by the need to comprehend truth, we enter a new era of the relationship between subjectivity and truth. In the modern era, truth is no longer able to serve as the salvation of the subject. Knowledge accumulates in the objective social process. The subject influences the truth, but the truth no longer influences the subject. The connection between access to truth and the demand for transformation of the subject and his being by himself was finally broken, and truth began to represent an autonomous development of knowledge. One should not look for traces of this gap in science - they are in theology. This conflict is not between spirituality and science, but between spirituality and faith (theology). However, even Spinoza, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel and Nietzsche still show traces of the structure of this spirituality, which was imbued with the question: how should the subject transform in order to open the path to truth? (This is precisely the meaning of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.) Marxism and psychoanalysis alike reveal the fundamental problems associated with the concept of epimeleia.

Politics and self-care.

Three phases of development of the concept of epimeleia can be distinguished: 1) Socratic-Platonic: the emergence of the concept of epimeleia in philosophy; 2) the golden age of self-care and culture of one’s “I” (1st and 2nd centuries BC); 3) the transition from philosophical pagan asceticism to Christian asceticism (IV and V centuries AD). First phase (see primarily Plato's Alcibiades). Taking care of oneself was an affirmation of a form of existence that was associated with a certain political privilege: if we entrust all material concerns to others, it is only with the goal of being able to take care of ourselves. The social, political, economic privileges of this group, in solidarity with the Spartan aristocracy, manifested themselves in the form of “we need to take care of ourselves and, in order to have this opportunity, we entrust our work to others.” Socrates is the one who seeks to transform Alcibiades' status, his original supremacy, into political action, into effective leadership of other people. The need for care and self-care is associated with the exercise of power. It is a consequence of the status position of power and, therefore, there is a transition from status to power. Self-care is implied and derived from the desire to exercise political power over other people. It is impossible to lead others, it is impossible to transform one's privileges into political influence over others, into rational action, without taking care of oneself. Self-care occupies an intermediate position between political privilege and political action; This is where the concept of epimeleia arises. 3 1 January 3, 1982 Chresis and the soul-subject You can ask two important issues: A. What am I myself (as an object of care)? b. How can caring for yourself lead to the ability to manage others? Let's turn first to the issue of self-care. What does it mean to take care of yourself? From Plato's Alcibiades, one can isolate a global theory of self-care, according to which it is impossible to comprehend the truth without having a certain practical skill or even a whole system of practical skills. These skills are of a very specific nature; they transform the subject’s mode of existence and determine it in the process of transformation. This is a philosophical theme that subsequently gave rise to numerous procedures that are more or less ritualized in nature. The idea of the need for a certain technology for dealing with one’s “I” in order to comprehend the truth was known to the Greeks even before Plato. 1) practice of spiritual concentration; 2) the practice of hermitage - anachoresis: visible absence; 3) practice of patience: one must be able to endure suffering. Plato in “Alcibiades” borrows old motives and ensures their technical continuity: I am obliged to take care of myself in order to become capable of managing other people and the polis (city-state); therefore, self-care must become an art, a techne, a skill that would enable one person to lead others. Let us now consider the problem of our “I” (heautou). Taking care of yourself is the same as taking care of your soul: I am my soul. When we state that Socrates is talking to Alcibiades, what does this mean? This means that Socrates uses a certain language. This simple example is of great importance, since the question posed is a question about the subject. Socrates speaks to Alcibiades: what is the intended subject when we mean this speech activity of Socrates in relation to Alcibiades? Consequently, the point is to make a distinction in speech activity that will allow one to isolate and highlight the subject of this activity and the totality of elements, words, noises that make it up and allow it to be realized. In other words, it is necessary to identify the subject in its immutability. A subject is something that uses certain means in order to do something. The body performs some action only insofar as there is a certain element that uses it. This element cannot be the body itself, it can only be the soul. The subject of all this bodily, instrumental, linguistic activity

because she is the subject of action, since she moves the body, acts through her tools, etc. Using the expression chresis, Plato wants to indicate that the subject’s relationship to his means is not simply instrumental in nature (chrestai - to use; the noun chresis denotes a certain type of relationship to another person). By using the verb chrestai and the noun chresis, Plato actually seeks to designate not some instrumental relationship of the soul to the rest of the world or to the body, but rather a peculiar passion of a transcendental nature that the subject experiences for everything that is his surroundings, to the objects at his disposal, as well as to other people with whom he enters into relationships, to his body and, finally, to you yourself. So when Plato uses a concept to designate the “I” that needs to be cared for, he is not discovering a soul-essence, but a soul-subject.

Dietetics, economics, erotica as self-realization of the subject

There are three types of activities that superficially resemble self-care: the activities of a doctor, a home owner, and a lover. 1. Does a doctor show concern for himself if, being sick, he treats himself using all his knowledge in the field of medicine in relation to himself? No, because he cares not so much about himself, that is, about his soul-subject, but about his body. Thus, there must be various goals and objects present here. There is also a difference between the techne of the doctor, who applies his knowledge to himself, and the lechne, which should allow the individual to take care of himself, that is, of his soul, which acts as a subject. 2. Does the father of the family and the owner take care of himself when he cares about the welfare of his loved ones and strives to increase his wealth? No, because he cares not about himself, but about what belongs to him. 3. A similar answer will be in the case of a lover. You should not take care of your loved one’s body because it is beautiful: on the contrary, you should take care of his soul as the subject of his actions, since this soul uses his body and its capabilities. In Alcibiades, Socrates is looking for nothing less than a way to demonstrate his concern for himself. Self-care is impossible without a mentor. And the position of the mentor himself is determined by concern for the kind of self-care his ward shows. The mentor is the one who cares about the care that the subject shows towards himself. Love for a student is expressed in the ability to take care of the care that he shows for himself. By showing disinterested love for the young man, the mentor gives a principle and example of the care that the young man should exercise in relation to himself as a subject. Here are three main lines of evolution of the concept of care: dietetics (the connection between care and the basic mode of existence of the body and soul), economics (the connection between self-care and social activities) and eroticism (the connection between self-care and loving relationships). Dietetics, economics and erotica act as spheres of self-realization of the subject. Body, environment, home - erotica, economics, dietetics - these are the three large areas where in that era the subject’s self-realization takes place with a constant transition from one type of activity to another. The need to maintain a certain dietary regime forces a person to engage in agricultural work, harvest, etc., i.e., move to the economy, which, in turn, determines intra-family relationships and is inevitably associated with problems of love. Self-realization of the subject presupposes a new ethics in verbal relations with other people.

Divine Self-Knowledge

The self-care framework contains three references to the call to “know thyself” from the Oracle of Delphi (gnothi seauton). First of all: to begin to take care of yourself, Alcibiades must ask the question “who am I?” Then, self-knowledge as a methodological rule: to which “I” does the subject of self-care belong? And finally, this reference appears clearly: self-care must appear in self-knowledge as an answer to the question: what does self-care consist of? It may be noted that as soon as the field of application of “self-care” was discovered and as soon as “I” was defined as “soul”, this entire field thus opened was blocked by the principle “know thyself”. This can be seen as the invasion of gnothi seauton into the space opened by “self-care.” Self-knowledge and “self-care” are intertwined with each other; there is a mutual resonance between them, and one of these elements should not be neglected to the detriment of the other. How can you know yourself? What is self-knowledge? We are guided by the principle that in order to take care of yourself, you must first know yourself. To know yourself, you need to look closely at the element identical to your “I”, look at it, since it itself is the principle of knowledge (savoir) and knowledge (connaissance), i.e. is divine. Thus, one should peer into a particle of the deity in order to know oneself, one should know the divine in order to know oneself. The movement of self-knowledge leads to wisdom. From the moment the soul acquires wisdom, it will be able to distinguish true from false: it will know how to behave, and thus it will be able to govern. “Caring for yourself” and “caring for justice” are essentially the same thing. There is a triple relationship of “self-care” in political, pedagogical and erotic activity. 1. Taking care of oneself is not only the privilege of rulers, but also a requirement made of them. However, the duty to take care of oneself also has a broader meaning - it is significant for all people, but with the following restrictions: a) “take care of oneself” is said only to people with cultural and economic opportunities, the educated elite (actual division); b) this phrase is said only to people who are able to stand out from the crowd (self-care has no place in everyday practice: this is a property of the moral elite - an imposed division). 2. Pedagogy suffers from insufficiency. Self-care should be manifested in all the little things, which pedagogy cannot guarantee; You should take care of yourself throughout your life - the development of maturity. Young people must prepare for adulthood, and adults for old age, which is the end of life. 3. The erotic feeling of young men will tend to disappear. These three aspects are subject to constant variations that will constitute the post-Platonic period of the history of "self-care". Alcibiades presents a typically Platonic solution to this problem, its purely Platonic form, and not a general history of “self-care.” The understanding of self-care in the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition is characterized, firstly, by the fact that “self-care" takes its form and its completion in self-knowledge, which is, if not the only, then at least an absolutely sovereign form in relation to To her; secondly, by the fact that self-knowledge as the highest and independent expression of one’s “I” provides access to the truth, and precisely to it; finally, the comprehension of truth allows at the same time to recognize the existence of the divine principle in oneself. To know oneself, to know the divine principle, to recognize it in oneself - this, I believe, is fundamental in the Platonic and Neoplatonic form of “self-care”. One of the conditions for access to truth in Plato’s teaching is the attitude towards oneself and the divine; the attitude towards oneself acts as a manifestation of the divine principle and the attitude towards the divine for one’s “I”.

Self-care as healing for the soul

Self-realization: from ignorance (as a field of reference) to criticism (of oneself, others, the world, etc.). Education represents the framework of the individual in the face of events. Self-realization ceases to be an urgent necessity against the background of ignorance (Alcibiades), which itself is unaware of its existence; self-realization becomes necessary against the background of mistakes, against the background of bad habits, against the background of all kinds of deformations and dependencies that have become habitual and ingrained, from which one must free oneself and shake oneself off. It is more about correction, about liberation, rather than about the formation of knowledge. It is in this direction that self-realization will develop, which seems very significant. Even if a person fails to “correct” in his youth, this can always be achieved at a more mature age. Even if we are bent over, there are various means to help us “straighten up,” to correct ourselves, to become what we should have become and what we never were. To become again what a person has never been before is, I think, one of the main elements, one of the main themes of self-realization. The first consequence of the chronological movement of “self-care” - from the end of adolescence to the adult period of life - is a critical attitude towards self-realization. The second consequence will be a distinct and pronounced convergence of self-realization and healing. Self-realization is intended as an act of healing, as a therapeutic agent. Therapists are in a relationship between caring for a person and caring for their soul. There is an obvious interdependence between philosophy and medicine, between the practice of the soul and the practice of the body. (Epictetus considered his philosophical school a hospital for the soul.)

Attitude towards oneself now acts as a task of self-realization. This task is the ultimate goal of life and at the same time self-realization is a rare form of existence. Self-realization is the ultimate goal of any person’s life, a form of existence for only some. We have here a form devoid of such a large transhistorical category as salvation. However, the problem of treating the other person as a mediator needs to be resolved. The Other is necessary in the process of self-realization in order for the form that this self-realization defines to actually reach its object, that is, its “I”. The other is necessary for self-realization to reach the “I” at which it is aimed. This is the main formula. There are three types of mastery, three types of skill - techne, three types of attitude towards another, necessary for the formation of a young man. 1. Lead by Example: The example of great men and the power of tradition shape the pattern of behavior. 2. Instruction by knowledge: transfer of knowledge, behavior and principles. 3. Instruction in difficulty: mastery of getting out of a difficult situation, Socratic techne. These three types of mastery rest on a certain play of ignorance and memory. Ignorance is unable to go beyond its own limits, and memory is needed to make the transition from ignorance to knowledge (a transition that is always carried out through another person). The subject should strive not for some kind of knowledge to replace his ignorance, but to acquire the status of a subject, which he never had before. The non-subject should be given the status of a subject, which is determined by the completeness of his relationship to his “I”. One must create oneself as a subject, and another must intervene in this process. This topic seems to me quite important both in the entire history of self-realization and, in general view, in the history of the problem of subjectivity in the West. From now on, the mentor acts as the executor of the transformation of the individual and in his formation as a subject.

Stultitia and true ox

Stultitia represents the other pole of self-realization (see: Seneca). To get out of a state of ignorance, you need to turn to “self-care”. Ignorance corresponds to a state of ill health; it is described as the worst state a person can be in before he turns to philosophy and self-realization. What does stultus, stultitia mean? 1. Openness to outside influences, absolutely uncritical perception of ideas. This means mixing the objective content of ideas with sensations and all kinds of subjective elements. 2. Stultus is one who is scattered in time, who allows himself to be carried away, who does nothing, who lets his life take its course, who does not direct his will towards any goal. His life flows unconsciously and weakly. This is someone who endlessly changes his life. As a result of this openness, the individual, to whom we apply the epithet stultus, is not able to want properly. His will is not free, it does not always express its desires, it is not absolute. To will freely means not really to depend on any idea, event, or inclination; to want in an absolute sense does not mean to strive to possess different things at the same time (for example, to lead a quiet lifestyle and to be famous); to want always implies a desire that lacks inertia and laziness. This state is the opposite of the state of stultitia, which is nothing more than a limited, relative, fragmentary, changeable will. What is the true object of the true will? Without a doubt, it is one’s own “I”. This is what man always longs for, absolutely and freely; “I” is something that cannot be changed. But stultus does not thirst for itself. The state of stultitia is characterized by disconnection, inconsistency of the will and one’s “I”, their non-belonging to each other. To come out of this state means to act in such a way as to desire one’s “I”, to desire oneself, to strive for oneself as the only object that can be desired freely, unconditionally, always. However, it is obvious that stultitia is not capable of desiring this object, since it is characterized precisely by the absence of desire. The individual himself cannot escape from the state of stultitia to the extent that it is determined by this non-relation to himself. To create oneself as an object, to acquire the ability to polarize one’s will, capable of appearing as an object, as a free and constant goal towards which this will is directed, is possible only through the mediation of another person. An intermediary is needed between man stultus and man sapiens. Or in other words: between a person who does not want his own “I”, and one who has achieved the art of managing himself, possessing himself, drawing pleasure from himself - which is the true goal of sapientia - the intervention of another is necessary, since, structurally, the will inherent in stultitia cannot desire to take care of the Self. In this regard, self-care requires the presence, inclusion, and intervention of another.

Philosopher as mediator

The other is neither an educator nor a teacher in the field of memory. This is not about educare ("educate"), but about educere ("bring out"). This other, located between the subject and his “I”, is the philosopher, who serves as a guide for all people regarding things that correspond to their nature. Only philosophers can say how one should behave: they alone know how to govern other people and those who themselves want to lead. Philosophy is the basic practice of management. This is precisely the main disagreement between philosophy and rhetoric as it arose and manifested itself in that era. Rhetoric is the collection and analysis of means by which one can influence others verbally. Philosophy is a set of principles and practical skills that a person has at his disposal or makes available to others in order to be able to properly care for himself or for others. The profession of a philosopher loses its professional significance as it becomes more significant. The more a person needs an adviser for himself, the more often in the process of self-realization he is forced to resort to the help of another, and, consequently, the more the philosophy is established. Along with this, the purely philosophical function of the philosopher will gradually lose its significance, and the philosopher himself will more and more turn into a life adviser who, for any reason - regarding private life, family relations, political activity - will recommend different general models than those could have been offered, for example, by Plato or Aristotle, and advice suitable for each specific situation. Philosophers really integrate into casual look life. The practice of mind control (see Pliny) became a social practice. It was developed among people who, in fact, were not specialists in this field. There is a whole tendency to practice, disseminate, develop the self-realization of the subject even outside existing philosophical institutions, outside the philosophy of the philosopher as such. There is a desire to turn self-realization into a certain type of relationship between individuals, to present it as a kind of principle, control over a person by other people, formation, development, establishment for a person of a certain relationship to himself, which will find a fulcrum, its mediation in another a person - not necessarily a professional philosopher - although, of course, it is necessary to go through philosophy and have some philosophical concepts. The figure and function of the mentor are called into question here. This figure of the mentor, if it does not disappear completely, is, in any case, gradually overwhelmed, surrounded, and competed with by the self-realization of the subject, which is at the same time a social practice. And self-realization merges with social practice, or, if you like, with the establishment of such a relationship of one’s “I” with oneself, which is closely intertwined with the relationship between “I” and another person (see: Seneca.

Three points can be highlighted here. 1. Self-knowledge serves as an introduction to philosophy (“Alcibiades”). The privilege of “know thyself” as a philosophical basis; as a predominant form of self-care. 2. Self-knowledge serves as an introduction to politics (“Gorgias”). 3. Self-knowledge serves as an introduction to catharsis (“Phaedo”). In Plato's teaching, the connection between caring for oneself and caring for others is established in three ways. Self-knowledge represents one aspect, one element, the basic form - but only a form - of the fundamental and universal requirement to take care of oneself. (Neoplatonism will turn this problem around.) a) By taking care of himself, a person will be able to take care of others. There is a connection of finality between caring for oneself and caring for others. I take care of myself so that I can take care of others; I will practice on myself what the Neoplatonists call catharsis, in order to become a political subject, that is, a person who knows what politics is and, therefore, is able to govern. b) Secondly, there is a connection of reciprocity, since by taking care of myself, by practicing purification by catharsis in the Platonic sense, I do good - as I desire - to the polis of which I am at the head. Thus, if, by taking care of myself, I ensure the salvation and prosperity of my fellow citizens, then this prosperity returns to me, since I will enjoy all the benefits to the extent that I myself am integral part this policy. Consequently, in saving the state, self-care finds its reward and its guarantee. A person finds his salvation to the extent that the state finds it, and to the extent that the state was allowed to be saved by showing concern for itself. This dependence can equally be found in the expanded construction of “State Impact”. c) Finally, the third after the connection of finality and reciprocity is a connection that can be defined as participation in the essence, since only by taking care of itself, experiencing purification by catharsis, the soul reveals what it is and what it knows, or, more precisely, what she follows. Thus, she reveals both her essence and her knowledge. She reveals what she is and what she has contemplated in the form of memory. In this way, she can rise to the contemplation of truths that make it possible to recreate the state order with all justice. Thus, there are three types of connection between politics and catharsis: the connection of finality in the techne of politics; the bond of reciprocity in the form of the state; connection of participation in the form of reminiscence.

Self-care as an end in itself

If we move back to the era that I took as my starting point, i.e. 1st and 1st centuries. AD, there will be a clear gap between caring for oneself and caring for others. This is obviously one of the most important phenomena in the history of self-realization of the subject and, perhaps, in the history of ancient culture in general; in any case, the phenomenon of turning self-care into an end in itself seems to be very significant, while caring for others is not necessarily the final goal and indicator for assessing self-care. The self that is cared for is no longer one element among others. It no longer serves as a connecting link, one of the stages, an element of transition to something else, be it the state or other people. “I” becomes the final and only goal of self-care. There is a simultaneous absolutization of the “I” as an object of self-care and the transformation of this “I” into an end in itself through the “I” itself in a practice called self-care. Consequently, this practice cannot in any way be considered a preliminary stage leading to caring for others. This is an activity focused only on one’s own “I”, this is an activity that finds its completion and satisfaction - in the exact sense of the word - only in one’s “I”, that is, in the activity itself carried out in relation to oneself. A person takes care of himself for himself, and it is in this that self-care receives its reward. In caring for oneself, a person is his own object, becomes an end in itself. In other words, there is simultaneously an absolutization of the “I” as an object of care and the transformation of this “I” into an end in itself through the “I” itself in a practice called self-care. In a word, caring for oneself, which in Plato quite obviously addressed the problem of the state, other people, politeia, appears at first glance, at least in the period in question - the 1st and 2nd centuries. AD - as if closed on itself. An end in itself has important consequences for philosophy. The art of living and the art of being oneself are becoming more and more clearly identified. What knowledge indicates how one should live? This question will gradually be absorbed by another question: what needs to be done in order for the “I” to become and remain what it should be? Philosophy as the problem of searching for truth is absorbed by spirituality as the transformation of the subject by himself. How must I transform my Self in order to gain access to the truth? (A matter of conversion, metanoia.) An end in itself has equally significant consequences for various lifestyles and individual experiences. There is a genuine flowering of the culture of one’s “I”. Culture refers to a certain sum of values arranged in a certain sequence and hierarchically organized. These values are universal, but at the same time accessible only to some; a person can gain them only by sacrificing his life and following certain rules of behavior. Methods and techniques for acquiring these values are also organized in a certain order and form that area of knowledge that controls and transforms human behavior.

Salvation concept

There is a technical aspect to the concept of saving oneself and others. 1. Salvation allows you to move from death to life, etc. This is a binary system: salvation is between life and death, between mortality and immortality; this is a transition from evil to good, from this world to another. Salvation is a weapon of transition. 2. Salvation is associated with the drama of a historical or metahistorical event, with temporality and eternity. 3. Rescue is a complex operation; salvation of oneself is carried out with the assistance of another. The idea of salvation belongs to religion, or at least is influenced by it. However, despite this, the concept of salvation effectively functions as a philosophical concept within philosophy itself. Salvation appears as the goal of philosophical practice and life. The verb sautseia (“to save”) [[Obvious mistake. Correct: sodzesthai. - F.K.]] has several meanings. A person who is saved is one who is in a state of anxiety, resistance, self-control and independence in relation to his “I”, which allows him to fend off all the blows of fate. Equally, to be saved means to escape threatening coercion and to be restored to one's rights, to regain one's freedom and one's authenticity. To save yourself means to maintain yourself in a stable state that nothing can disturb, no matter what events happen around you. And finally, “to be saved” means: to gain those benefits that a person did not have at the beginning of the path, to benefit, to take advantage of a kind of service that he provides to himself. “To be saved” means to ensure oneself happiness, peace of mind, equanimity. Thus, you see that "to be saved" has a positive meaning and is not associated with the drama of events, which makes you move from the negative to the positive meaning of the categories of salvation; the concept of salvation is associated with nothing other than life itself. In this concept of salvation, which is found in Hellenistic and Roman texts, there is no reference to such things as death and immortality or the next world. One is not saved in relation to some dramatic event. “Save” serves as a designation for activities that are carried out throughout life and the only performer which is the subject itself. And if, ultimately, this activity of self-salvation leads to a certain result, which is its goal, then this result is that, thanks to salvation, a person becomes inaccessible to misfortune, anxiety, everything that can penetrate the soul from - for all kinds of accidents, events of the outside world, etc. And, having reached the final goal, the object of salvation, a person no longer needs anyone or anything. Two large themes - on the one hand, the theme of ataraxia - the absence of excitement, and on the other, the theme of autarky, self-sufficiency, thanks to which a person does not need anything except himself - represent two forms in which the activity of “salvation”, which lasted all his life, receives rewards. Thus, salvation is a continuous activity carried out by the subject in relation to himself and finding its reward in a certain relation of the subject to himself; this attitude is defined by the absence of anxiety and a sense of satisfaction that does not need anything other than itself. In a word, we can say that salvation is a form of attitude towards oneself - vigilant, continuous and complete at the same time - closing in on oneself. Man saves himself for his own sake and through himself in order to find himself. In this "salvation", which I would call Hellenistic and Roman, the "I", the doer, the object, the instrument is ultimate goal salvation. Obviously, this understanding of salvation is extremely far from salvation through the state in Plato; such an understanding is also far from religious salvation correlated with binary system, with the drama of events, with an attitude towards another, which in Christianity implies a renunciation of oneself. Salvation, on the contrary, ensures acceptance of oneself, merging with one’s “I”, which is indissoluble in time and is carried out throughout the entire

From Plato to Descartes

Starting with Plato (Alcibiades), the following question is posed: “At what cost is truth comprehended?” This price is contained in the subject itself in the form of a question: “What work should I do on myself? How should I transform myself? What changes in my being must I make in order to comprehend the truth? The fundamental principle is that the subject as such, left to himself, is incapable of perceiving truth. He will be able to comprehend it only if he performs a whole series of operations, transformations and modifications on himself that will make him capable of perceiving the truth.

Taking Plato’s dialogue “Alcibiades” (Alcibiades I) as the starting point of analysis, Michel Foucault, in a published course of lectures, examines the ancient “culture of the self” of the 1st-11th centuries. n. as a philosophical asceticism, or an ensemble of practices formed under the sign of the ancient imperative of “self-care.” The long-range aim of such an installation is the complete “genealogy” of the new European subject, restored within the framework of Foucault’s declared “critical ontology of ourselves.” We are talking about the history of a subject who constitutes himself to a much greater extent, by resorting to the appropriate techniques of himself, sanctioned by a particular culture, than is constituted by the techniques of the master (Power) or discursive techniques (Knowledge), in connection with which the question of our current situation is - it is not a problem of liberation, but a practice of freedom.

Instead of a preface

Michel Foucault taught at the Collège de France from January 1971 until his death in June 1984, with the exception of 1977, when he took advantage of the year's leave granted to every professor every seven years. His department was called “History of Systems of Thought.”

It was created on November 30, 1969 on the initiative of Jules Vuillemin and by decision of the general meeting of teachers of the College de France to replace the department of “History of Philosophical Thought”, which was headed by Jean Hyppolite until his death. April 12, 1970 same general meeting elected Michel Foucault as professor of the new department.

Studying at the College de France is subject to special rules. During the year, the teacher is required to work 26 teaching hours, no more than half of which can be seminar classes.

Every year he must present the results of his own research, each time updating the content of his lectures. Anyone can attend lectures and classes, and there is no requirement to enroll in these courses or complete a final written paper. A teacher also cannot deprive anyone of the right to attend his lectures.4 The statutes of the College de France state that teachers deal not with students, but with listeners.

Michel Foucault's lectures were given on Wednesdays from the beginning of January to the end of March. The audience, quite large, consisted of students, teachers, specialists, simply interested people, among whom there were many foreigners. The listeners occupied two amphitheaters of the Collège de France at once. Michel Foucault often complained about the distance that this created between him and his “public” and that the lecture form of the course limited the possibilities of communication.5 He dreamed of a seminar that would create conditions for truly collaboration. And he tried to do something like that. IN last years At the end of his lectures, he spent a lot of time answering questions from the audience.

This is how the Nouveau Observer-Vatsr correspondent Gérard Petitjean described the atmosphere of his lectures in 1975: “Foucault enters the arena, as if he throws himself into water, quickly, decisively, steps over someone’s legs, gets to his chair, pushes the microphones apart, to put the papers, he takes off his jacket, lights the lamp and, without hesitation, begins. A loud, impressive voice booming through amplifiers is the only concession to modernity in the dimly lit room, illuminated by bulbs hidden in marble shells. For three hundred seats there are five hundred people, crowded together, filling the slightest available space […] No oratorical techniques. Everything is transparent and extremely effective. Any improvisation is excluded. Foucault has twelve hours to explain in public lectures the meaning of the work he has done over the past year. Therefore, his speech is extremely condensed, like a covered page of a letter that has to be written in the margins - there is so much more to be said. Quarter past seven. Foucault falls silent. Listeners rush to his table. Not to talk to him, but to turn off the tape recorders. No questions asked. In this noisy crowd, Foucault is all alone.” And here is what Foucault himself said about this: “We should discuss what was said. Sometimes, when a lecture is not going well, a trifle, one question, is enough for everything to fall into place. But it is never asked. In France, any crowd of people makes any substantive conversation impossible. And since there is no feedback, it is more like theater. I am in front of them like an actor or an acrobat. And when you stop talking, there is a feeling of complete loneliness...”

Lecture January 6, 1982 First hour

This year I would like to offer you the following order of work:

a two-hour lecture (from 9:15 to 11:15) with a short break of a few minutes after the first hour so that you can take a break, leave if you get bored, and I would rest a little. I will try to make these watches as different from each other as possible; let's say, let the first half, or at least one of the parts of the lecture, be more theoretical and general, and in the second hour we can do something like an explanation of the texts with all the obvious obstacles and difficulties associated with our placement, with the distribution of texts, with because it is unknown how many people will come, etc. But, in the end, why not try. If things don’t work out, next year, and maybe even this year, we’ll find another form. And arrive at 9; Is 15 too early? Nothing? Well, then it's easier for you than for me.

Last year I tried to think historically about the relationship between subjectivity and truth.

And to study this problem, as a primary example, a kind of reflective surface, if you like, I chose the question of the regime of sexual behavior and pleasures in antiquity, the regime, as you remember, aphrodisia, “love affairs”, as it developed and was described in the first centuries AD.

A regime that, it seems to me, is, among other things, interesting because it is in it, and not at all in the morality called Christian, and especially not in Judeo-Christian morality, that the skeleton, the framework of the future modern European sexual morality is found.

This year I would like to move somewhat away from this specific example and material directly related to aphrodisia and forms of sexual behavior; I'd like to keep this one specific example for the sake of a broader formulation of the question “subject and truth”. Let me clarify: I am in no way inclined to eliminate the historical context in which I tried to consider the question of the relationship between subjectivity and truth, but I would like to pose it in a much more general form. The question that I would like to tackle this year is this: in what form of history (dans quelle forme d'histoire) is the relationship established in the West between these two elements, which ordinary practice, the usual historical analysis passes by - between the “subject” and "truth"?

So, as a starting point, I would take a concept about which, I remember, I already said something last year.

So, I would like to linger a little during this first hour on the question of the relationship between epimeleia heautou (self-care) and gnothi seauton (know thyself). Regarding “know thyself,” I would like to make a first and very simple point, based on research carried out by historians and archaeologists. This is what needs to be firmly remembered: this saying, which took on a form so expressive and bright - gnothi seauton - and carved on the stones of the temple, no doubt, at first did not have the meaning with which it was given later. You, of course, know the famous text of Epic-tsta (we will return to it), where he says that this inscription, gnothi seauton, was made there, in the very middle of the inhabited world.

Let's not dwell on this. I would now like to do other things that are closer to the topic that interests me. Whatever meaning may actually be given and corresponded in the cult of Apollo to the Delphic injunction “know thyself,” the indisputable fact, it seems to me, is that when this Delphic injunction, this very gnothi seauton, appears in philosophy, in philosophical thinking , this, as is known, is connected with the figure of Socrates. Xenophon testifies to this in his Memoirs,

Reasoning

1. From the very beginning of the lectures, according to the words addressed to the listeners, you feel the moment of presence and get great pleasure about meeting the culture of thinking, the culture of philosophizing, and then the culture of research.

I think that posing the question of how truth is given to a subject, and what truth means for the existence of the emergence (even “unfolding,” pardon the Russian language) of the subject allows us to enter productive directions in the development of philosophy. In place of the theme of the crisis of science and culture, spiritual apocalypse, humanitarian catastrophe, death of the subject, M. Foucault puts forward new possibilities of Western culture and science through the productive problematization of the subject, the result of which is the possibility of creating a subject for which truth becomes not so much the result of a method of cognition, but the result of a method of changing oneself.

In this sense, M. Foucault finally destroys the paradigm of the “subject - object” link, without which modern science cannot imagine the very existence of the subject. In this sense, the subject has died here. M. Foucault returns to the subject, as such, as an actor. In this sense, there is not a subject of cognition, but a subject of activity (care). And here it is important for me to understand how the principle of “self-care” and the principle of activity are connected?

It is important to note that the theme of the existence (manifestation) of the subject echoes the thoughts of M. Mamardashvili in the Kantian Variations. In this regard, it can be assumed that these are the directions of movement of the modern practice of philosophy.

2. And this is not trivial, M. Foucault essentially formulates his own understanding of the subject as the point at which a person turns to himself through activity and reflection. It is very important that the subject is not identified with a person, or his position in relation to other external positions. This is the point that a person occupies in order to turn towards himself, and this turn is possible only through reflection of activity.

3. Acquaintance with a summary of the main theses of the lectures given by M. Foucault in 1991 (issue of Socio-Logos) prompted me to think about the relationship between education and self-care. In one of the first works on tutoring, developing this idea, I believed that the basis of tutoring is “self-care.” A selection of quotes from one lecture allows us to conclude that M. Foucault is extending this thread of understanding of education and the role of the teacher. Foucault here uses the concept of teacher in the sense of a teacher-philosopher, like Socrates, who posed the question: how do you take care of yourself? And in this sense, this is a teacher who does not teach how to take care of yourself in the sense of instructions, knowledge, but this is a teacher who cares about your care. IN modern education This is the position, in my opinion, that a tutor should take.

4. M. Foucault points out that it is as a result of taking care of oneself that a person gains individuality. But at the same time, one important condition is put forward here - in order to become an individual, you need to change, and in order to change, you need to break out of the captivity of everyday life in which most people are immersed. On the one hand, this means that there must be time for this, and on the other hand, it means effort, exorbitant effort. And only the moral elite is capable of this. In this sense, the elite takes on tasks that the majority, immersed in the routine of everyday life, cannot solve.

5. In youth, self-care is intended to prepare for life, to find yourself and act in accordance with the truth. As you age, taking care of yourself helps you prepare to leave this world.

As we grow older, self-care acquires remedial techniques. And here again the demands of changing oneself, making oneself such as one has never been before are emphasized. In the remark “catch up with yourself,” it seems to me that the emphasis on action is once again emphasized. It is important not only for others to see themselves, it is important to catch up with this vision."

6. The practice of being an old man seems to be something that is determined by age, biological aging, but at the same time it is the culture of old age. It is not for nothing that in Russian Orthodox culture you can become an elder at any age. In this sense, the completion of the formation of oneself as a subject of life. The practice of old age includes three important components: 1) renunciation of desires (any external sources of joy, pleasure); 2) refusal of political life (public life, which involves the conclusion of alliances, struggle, power); 3) gaining independence from everything external (in fact, this includes the first two. At the same moment, awareness, a complete understanding of who you are, becomes important. Does this mean that by becoming an old man, a person completes his development? I think not. Foucault just shows that new opportunities for development are opening up, which are important to use. Development lies in the fact that you have to make yourself an old man. In relation to professional development, I would note that old age does not indicate that one must leave the world and live only by natural needs. I think that this is precisely the acquisition of a genuine expert position, in which there is neither material interest (the source of joy), nor the desire to have power, gaining independence and at the same time full awareness of yourself and what you are doing. Organizations that today, in pursuit of labor productivity, place emphasis on young personnel and displace older people are losing a valuable resource. We need to help people become old, cultivate old age, use it for development and decision-making, training and development of personnel, innovative developments and projects (oddly enough)

7. M. Foucault’s approach correlates with SMD, with his idea of activity, the object of activity as sociotechnical and in this sense artificial-natural. In this regard we're talking about not about the law, but about the principle, the fundamental position. In general, the socio-humanities sciences deal not so much with laws, but with principles. However, if in SMD, the naturalization of objects of activity is associated with the use of natural science methods in the social and humanities, M. Foucault connects the search for the law to which activity with legal practice is subject to subordination, which is generally characteristic of M. Foucault’s position in relation to power structures. In the fact that the principle of activity is perceived as a legal norm, there is a certain heuristic point for discussing the norms of activity, their place and role in activity.

8. I think this is an important thesis, also important in the fact that in this group three components are mixed in different proportions - cult (religious, ideological), therapeutic (physical), cognitive. At the same time, it is important to understand that a sect, as a sociocultural phenomenon, can pose a threat to both the individual and society. In this regard, it is important to present a modern image of a group engaged in the practice of self-care, including in the format of online communities. In this regard, professional online communities can be viewed as self-care groups.

These words made me think about a lot. In our modern culture We are accustomed to very quickly incorporating what we hear into our speeches, making other people’s words and thoughts our own, or even worse, evaluating and discussing the words of others. We blurt out the contents.There should be a pause after listening, silence... Don't rush to turn other people's words into your own speech. It is important that in education the skill of “pause of understanding” is formed.

Foucault argues that listening must be taught, and this is where the formation of the subject begins. That is With the subject manifests itself not when he begins to speak (he is a chatterbox), but when he consciously listens. Listening training occupied an important place in the educational practices of antiquity. In the modern world, with an avalanche of information falling on a person, continuous broadcasting, speaking (chatter), learning to listen becomes much more relevant.

Reading and writing are the path to yourself. It’s not for nothing that today, many researchers come to the conclusion that quiet, solitary reading and writing (writing down one’s own thoughts) have the same effect as meditation. Reading and writing as practices of reflection - meditation, self-focus, or, as M. Foucault writes, self-care.

Today we study so little the speech of a teacher (teacher, pedagogue, manager, personnel manager, etc.), what it should be. The teacher always claims the right to own the truth and the right to broadcast it. What the teacher says is always true. This is the nature of the teaching profession. However, this is a test for those who become teachers. Does the teacher always use his speech for its intended purpose? Isn't there too much in speech that is random, not thought through, not experienced?The teacher’s speech should not be reactive, it should only be proactive, calling for knowledge, action, and self-improvement.

M. Foucault here returns to the topic that occupied him in the previous period - the topic of power. However, here power is considered in the context of the genesis of the subject, and comes to the problem of manifestation of the phenomenon of power. It is noteworthy that M. Foucault shows thatanger is a phenomenon of power. When applied to management and teaching, this idea provides opportunities for discussion of the following. No matter how much you hold back your anger, it’s not just about self-control, but also about the very possibility of exercising power. Means,To stop anger, or not to fall into anger, self-control alone is not enough, you need to change the content, form and method of power. For me, this is how delegation becomes. The impossibility of exercising power means that those who become dependent on your power discover their boundaries and require a revision of their powers. So then we need to discuss with him issues of authority, what he can and wants, and what can be delegated.

The subject is the one who turns the truth on himself. The truth cannot be attributed to the external, it can only be what excites your soul, what gives it to you, for your soul, for your awareness.

Instead of a preface

It was created on November 30, 1969 on the initiative of Jules Vuillemin and by decision of the general meeting of teachers of the College de France to replace the department of “History of Philosophical Thought”, which was headed by Jean Hyppolite until his death. On April 12, 1970, the same general meeting elected Michel Foucault as professor of the new department. He was forty-three years old. On December 2, 1970, Michel Foucault gave his inaugural lecture.

Studying at the College de France is subject to special rules. During the year, the teacher is required to work 26 teaching hours, no more than half of which can be seminar classes. Every year he must present the results of his own research, each time updating the content of his lectures. Anyone can attend lectures and classes, and there is no requirement to enroll in these courses or complete a final written paper. A teacher also cannot deprive anyone of the right to attend his lectures.4 The statutes of the College de France state that teachers deal not with students, but with listeners.

Michel Foucault's lectures were given on Wednesdays from the beginning of January to the end of March. The audience, quite large, consisted of students, teachers, specialists, simply interested people, among whom there were many foreigners. The listeners occupied two amphitheaters of the Collège de France at once. Michel Foucault often complained about the distance this created between him and his “public” and that the lecture form of the course limited the possibilities of communication.5 He dreamed of a seminar that would create conditions for truly collaborative work. And he tried to do something like that. In recent years, after lectures, he spent a lot of time answering questions from audience members.

Michel Foucault approached his teaching as a researcher: he scouted out the plots of a future book, raised the virgin soil of new problems, formulating them, rather, as an invitation to possible colleagues for cooperation. This is why courses at the College de France do not replicate published books. And these are not their sketches, even if the topics are common. His lectures have their own status. Among Michel Foucault's “philosophical acts,” they are distinguished by the special nature of their discourse. They unfold in a very special way the project of a certain genealogy of the relationship between knowledge and power, according to which his work has been carried out since the early 1970s, contrary to the archeology of discursive formations that had prevailed until then.

In addition, the lectures were in one way or another in touch with modernity; their listeners were not only fascinated by the story unfolding week after week, not only captivated by the rigor of the presentation - they shed light on today's issues. Foucault's art lay in his ability to combine modernity with history. He could talk about Nietzsche or Aristotle, nineteenth-century psychiatric examination or Christian ministry, and it would help the listener to better understand our times and the events he was witnessing. The impression that Michel Foucault's lectures made was due to his rare combination of scholarly erudition, personal involvement and ability to work on facts.

* * *

The seventies were the time of distribution and improvement of cassette tape recorders; Michel Foucault's desk was very soon filled with them. This is how his lectures (and some seminars) have been preserved.

This edition is based on public performance Michel Foucault. The written version reproduces the oral version as closely as possible.” We would be happy to leave everything as it is. But the translation of spoken language into written language requires the intervention of the publisher; You can’t do without, at a minimum, punctuation marks and paragraphs. But we have always adhered to the principle: the closest proximity of the printed text to the lecture given.

Where it seemed necessary, repetitions and clauses were eliminated, interrupted phrases were filled in, and incorrect constructions were corrected.

Ellipses in angle brackets indicate that the entry is illegible. When a phrase is not clear, a suggested reconstruction or addition is given in square brackets.

The notes under the asterisk at the bottom of the page contain important excerpts from the notes used by Michel Foucault, which differ from the tape recording.

Quotations have been checked and references to the texts used are provided in the notes. The critical apparatus concerns only the clarification of dark places and some allusions, the clarification of controversial details.

To make reading easier, each lecture is preceded by a list of the main topics.

The text of the lecture courses complements them “ Summary”, published in the “Yearbook of the Collège de France”. As a rule, Michel Foucault compiled these summaries in June, shortly after the end of the course. For him, this was an occasion to look back at what he had done and clarify the goals and objectives of the course. Now his resume gives the best picture of them.

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