The FSB noisily announced the detention of its former colleagues, Alexey Smirnov and Alexey Mikhailenko, who, according to investigators, were involved in illegal telephone wiretapping and surveillance of high-ranking officials and metropolitan businessmen. At the same time, special forces raided the main office of the Belgan private security company, where during the search they allegedly found listening equipment, details of telephone conversations (billings) and a large sum of money. In turn, a representative of the Investigative Committee said that employees of the technical centers of MTS OJSC and VimpelCom OJSC are also involved in the criminal case, allegedly transferring copies of SMS messages and personal data of citizens to Smirnov and Mikhailenko. Novaya tried to figure out what is behind this scandal.

The FSB press release does not say who exactly was being surveilled. However, according to sources close to security forces, recently Smirnov and Mikhailenko allegedly “on the order of one millionaire senator worked closely with their immediate circle former governor Gromov’s Moscow region and Moscow connections of the head of the Krasnodar region - Tkachev.” Our other source, on the contrary, stated that “both Alexei did not get involved in politics and worked exclusively for businessmen, their wives and mistresses”

Little is known about Alexey Smirnov: he served in the FSB OPU (operational search department - that is, just surveillance and wiretapping) and after his dismissal he went into the security business. Alexey Mikhailenko was born in Moscow in 1974, graduated from the FSB Academy and worked “in his specialty.” During his service, he sometimes used cover documents in the name of Leonid Goncharenko. After resigning, he founded a commercial company and provided consulting services to businessmen.

As stated in the Investigative Committee, Smirnov and Mikhailenko hired employees of the Belgan private security company, based in Mnevniki, to spy on officials. This private security company was founded in 1997 by former military and security officers Valery Gankov, Grigory Beletsky, Roman Kosyrev, Evgeny Sergeev and Sergey Gribanenkov. For example, Mr. Gankov served in army intelligence, then in the 9th Directorate of the KGB (protection of senior officials), and then worked in the security service of Panasonic.

On the website of the Belgan private security company, it is not without pride that they provided protection for “representatives of the government of Vietnam, relatives and children of the presidents of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Yanukovych), and the number of large clients includes the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rublevo-Uspensky Medical and Health Complex "Administrative Department of the President of the Russian Federation (village Zhukovka, Gorki-6, village Maslovo, Uspenskoye, Petrovo-Dalnee)." However, the UDP was quick to disavow such an “acquaintance,” declaring that the protection of government facilities is carried out exclusively by the FSO.

Soldiers of the Belgan private security company have been included in police reports more than once. 2001: employees of the 3rd company of the traffic police department of the South-Western Administrative Inspectorate detained security guard Stepan K., who was found to be in possession of 1 gram of heroin. 2003: security guard Alexey B. stabbed citizen Tsymbala in a drunken quarrel. And in 2006, Alexander Yudin, who was guarding the office of the Two Capitals bank, late at night let three unknown people in, mistaking them for management. As a result, the poor security guard and the bank employee were severely beaten, tied with tape, and financial institution They took out more than 1 million rubles.

Very saturated market

As you know, according to the law in our country, only the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, FSO, SVR, GRU, FSIN, FSKN and customs have the right to conduct operational investigative activities. In practice, everything is different: you can hire professional “stompers” and buy special equipment using advertisements on the Internet.

Here, for example: “We will provide assistance to wealthy people: personal security, cargo escort, personal security driver (possible with a Ministry of Internal Affairs certificate), special measures to tap phones. The staff consists of former and current employees of special forces, officers on special assignments of the government of the Russian Federation. Alexey ******@mail.ru.”

In addition, large companies and banks have their own security services, equipped with the latest special equipment. Plus, they have entire departments of active security officials on their payroll. All kinds of private security companies founded by former police officers and FSB officers are not far behind. Their operational capabilities are quite comparable to official structures, and they often work much more efficiently. And most importantly - cheaper.

For example, the mother of Sergei P., a hostage taken in 2007, said the following:

— When the bandits got in touch and announced a ransom, I went to Petrovka 38, but there they told me that they didn’t have any the necessary equipment, no material resources, and announced an unrealistic price. Then I contacted the FSB. And at Lubyanka they also began to hint to me that I needed to pay 50 thousand dollars for a special vehicle capable of detecting criminals. And then I went to a private investigator. He honestly said how much everything would cost, that among the bandits there were probably employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, and he soon identified them. Of course, it wasn't cheap. But the main thing is that the son survived!

Another story will soon be heard in court. I mean Lieutenant Colonel Pavlyuchenkov, the head of the 4th department of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate (operational search service), who, according to investigators, involved his current and former employees in spying on future victims of killers. The employees did not hide in their testimony that they very often engaged in “hack work”: the fee was $100 per hour of observation. Now Pavlyuchenkov has been charged in the case of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, and he is also testifying in the murder of Paul Klebnikov. Even earlier, in 2008, a criminal case against Pavlyuchenkov’s subordinate, an employee of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate Lebedev, was separated into separate proceedings for abuse of official authority.

Sometimes private detectives capable of wiretapping telephone conversations and conduct external surveillance, they are attracted by the security forces themselves, who are waging internecine wars.

In this regard, we can recall the sensational criminal case on the “Three Pillars” (furniture smuggling) and Chinese contraband that arrived at the warehouse of military unit 54729 (FSB UMTO). Then, on Putin’s instructions, Lieutenant General of the FSKN Alexander Bulbov began identifying corrupt security officers, who involved in the operation the former deputy head of the 4th department of the FSKN, Alexander Gusev, who at that time was working as a private detective. Apparently, Gusev collected significant incriminating evidence on the Lubyanka generals, since he was soon arrested by FSB officers.

Consequence of high competition

As for the versions of the arrest of Smirnov and Mikhailenko and the search in the Belgan private security company, opinions among our experts were divided. Some believe that another war has begun between security structures for a place in the sun, and the initiator must be looked for among competitors with strong ties to the FSB. Other experts do not rule out that the security forces are pretty tired of private detectives who cut prices for clients, and “now they will be under full pressure.” Still others believe that the arrests were made thanks to the testimony of the same Dmitry Pavlyuchenkov, who made a deal with the investigation and now earns additional “bonuses”, since there is, perhaps, no more knowledgeable person in this market. Still others recall the loud scandal involving wiretapping of conversations between Moscow pimps and elite prostitutes who discussed their relationships with high-ranking officials: then the recordings ended up on the Internet ( see Novaya publication “Vasi Agency”), and many of the clients mentioned in them became very angry and demanded to find the culprits...

“Novaya” contacted the founder of the private security company “Belgan” Valery Gankov, this is what he replied: “The attack on us is connected with a serious tender. Everything else on TV is editing. Money and equipment are found from others and shown. We had a search on July 12. There are no complaints. The hype is because of our clients. And sue NTV as much as you want (we show what they give)! Draw conclusions. I have a reputation and 17 years of work behind me.”

Be that as it may, there is an intensification of competition in this specific market, divided between current and former employees of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies.

The scouts' bread is bitter - in ordinary life they are deprived of almost all benefits, because they cannot disclose their affiliation with the police. A scout cannot even get a certificate for housing and communal services benefits.

Interest in “toptuns”, “outdoors”, “seven” - this secret service has many official and slang names - has never faded in society, since its creation. Precisely because it is secret, and the forbidden fruit is sweet. In addition, everything classified and mysterious is sure to be surrounded by incredible rumors, which also fuel the curiosity of the people. Recently, people have probably heard about outdoor surveillance even in the most remote Ukrainian village in connection with a monstrous crime - the brutal murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze - which is accused of former employees of the GUKP (Main Directorate of Criminal Search) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular, its chief, General Alexey Pukach and his subordinates. What kind of people work there - are they all murderers or ordinary hard workers, without whom the search for criminals is unthinkable? How do they live and serve? “Today,” despite certain difficulties, we were able to meet with current employees of the secret “seven” (they call themselves intelligence officers), who shed light on these issues. At the same time, we suggest making an excursion into the history of the creation of this service back in Tsarist Russia and we will trace its formation through the USSR to the present day in independent Ukraine.

The scout lives under a legend, only his closest relatives know about his true profession - mother, father, wife (otherwise how to explain absences of a day or more, night work etc.). For everyone else, an intelligence officer is anyone, but not a policeman. Engineer, manager, trader—he has documents to match this legend. If a scout feels that for some reason he has messed up with his legend, he is obliged to immediately report to management and the legend, along with the documents, will be immediately changed.

"CUCKOOS". There was a case when a scout went on maternity leave and sat at home for a year. She didn’t get along very well with her neighbors, scandals arose from time to time, and the police were called. And in the midst of another scandal, the intelligence officer lost her temper and began shouting that she was a secret police officer! The employees of the district department reported to the management of the outdoor surveillance, they had to “put out the fire”, tell the neighbors that, they say, what kind of secret employee is there, yes, she once worked in the police, but was fired a long time ago... Somehow this story was hushed up.

Scouts go to work according to a certain schedule to a secret point carefully disguised as an ordinary institution. There are several of them around the city. Sometimes they are called “cuckoos”, from the abbreviation “KK” - safe house. Apart from intelligence officers, only the head of the regional police department and his deputy, the curator of the criminal unit, know about the existence of “cuckoos” and their location. Decoding "KK" is a huge emergency! Scouts come to the “point” from home in their own clothes. And there, on the “cuckoo”, he has a so-called “operational wardrobe”. For all occasions and for all seasons: raincoats, jackets, jackets, etc.

When entering service, an intelligence officer receives the necessary special equipment depending on the assignment. He should always have 2-3 cover legends ready, supported by documents. Everything that a visual surveillance officer observes must be recorded. video photo and audio equipment. All actions and connections of the object are documented. If the connection is separated, it must be picked up and brought either to an address, or to work, etc. All this is then transferred to the initiator of the development (security investigators, Organized Crime Control Department, etc.). If the subject calls from a machine, the employee must stand in such a way as to record where he is calling. If he messed up, then he calls after the object to a specific address and indicates which address in the report. Then it is not difficult to determine where the previous call was. The scouts have service weapons, but they are issued only in extreme cases, in order to avoid emergency situations. It happened that out of boredom, waiting for an object for many hours, young intelligence officers began to play with weapons, and there were tragic cases.
From the reconnaissance officers, the head of the unit makes up teams (crews), which include a team leader, a driver and two or three visual observation officers. Drivers undergo extreme driving courses and must know the city very well. They are always in the carriage driving. Crew members must understand each other every word and gesture. It is not always possible to convey something over the radio, then conventional gestures are used.

ROOMS. The vehicles have operational cover numbers. There are drive-in numbers (with them the car enters and leaves the “point”), and there are working ones. The car left the point, in a secluded place they changed their registration numbers to work ones and drove on. There can be several pairs of such numbers. Other camouflage elements are also used: fishing rods, trunk, spoilers and much more, which is enough for your imagination. If the police car is slowed down by a traffic cop (and you often have to break the rules so as not to lose the subject), then it does not stop. A second or third car may stop, they will show you the cover documents (threats or Organized Crime Control), they will explain that this is how it should be. If a traffic cop is too principled and threatens to write a report, they tell him: write it! And they report to their management, who “puts out the fire.” But the intelligence officers are not deciphered. However, there are also traffic police chases. Once in Kyiv, traffic cops, seeing a police car, decided that car thieves were rushing. They handed it over to their colleagues, who blocked the road and blocked the passage of the police vehicle. They began to inspect and found cover numbers and special equipment. And for some reason the senior officer of the outdoor surveillance team was confused and did not report to the base on time. Then I had to disentangle this story (although every operational vehicle has a special ticket, which says that no one has the right to inspect the vehicle and crew). But the traffic cops then decided that it was fake. There was a scandal.

A MAJOR PASSION FOR THE LOTTERY. A contract murder in Kyiv was revealed. The threat was on the trail of the suspect, but they could not find him. Intelligence was brought in, and it took control of several addresses where the suspect or his connections were likely to appear. On the second day, such a connection appeared in one of the addresses. It was a man (the criminal investigation department distributed photos of possible friends of the suspect to the street, he was also there), who came to the address, stayed for half an hour and left. Of course, they traced him to the place where he lives. He was there until the evening, then he bought food at the market and went to the address of the alleged killer. Soon he came out empty-handed and returned to his place. And so for several days in a row, I brought food to the apartment once a day. But the operatives still weren’t sure that there was a killer there, so they decided to keep an eye on him. And we must pay tribute to the attentiveness of the scout, who once contacted the post office and noticed how he bought a whole pack of Sportloto tickets. When management was informed about this, it turned out that the murder suspect was simply obsessed with this game. So he's in the address! It was decided to capture the killer, which is what the capture group did.

HOW "NARUZHKA" HAD SEX Quite a few women work in outdoor advertising. They often have to pretend to be prostitutes. Once they caught a group of pimps. The scouts found a “sauna with massage” from an advertisement in the newspaper and went there together with a technical service employee. He installed a miniature video camera and microphone in the rest room. The next day the scouts came again and demanded the girls. “This moment,” they were told, and the pimp went to the “point” to pick up the girls. And NN employees were already working there under the guise of prostitutes. The pimp tried to pick them up, but they made an excuse, saying they were waiting for a client. Then he took the other two and rushed to the sauna. And the “girls” gave the appropriate signal... All this was documented, as well as further actions in the bathhouse. There, intelligence officers had to work live with prostitutes, that is, use them for their intended purpose, knowing that this was being filmed. But we managed. Then, when the management watched this film, they laughed, they say, here any porn fades... And the money was handed over to the pimp on record, and to be convincing, they asked to extend the time and paid again... In a word, the evidence turned out to be “iron”, the matter went well to court.

HOW A SCOUT MENDED FENCES FOR A BOTTLE AND A SNACK AND FOUND A MERCEDES The criminals, dressed in the uniforms of traffic police officers, took cars with keys and documents right on the streets of Kyiv. The driver was simply thrown out of the car, got behind the wheel and was driven away. The threat was traced to one of the groups. It was established that the last Mercedes-320 (big-eyed), which was taken from Bazhana Avenue in Kyiv, was hidden by the bandits in one of the villages not far from the capital. But in which house it was necessary to establish. We connected intelligence. But in the village everyone knows each other and any stranger will immediately alert the bandits. They decided to send an employee there under the guise of a “shabashnik”, ready for a table and a couple of hryvnias to do any work. He didn’t shave for a week, didn’t wash, put on a kirzachi and a sweatshirt, took a wooden box with tools and went to the village. I walked around for several days, repaired fences and roofs, and gradually asked questions and learned about the life of the villagers. So I found out that a certain grandmother lives in one of the farmsteads, to whom her grandson from Kiev has recently been visiting often. And she usually comes in the evening or at night, in different cars, and with friends... Moreover, the villagers said that in the barn A large black car has been parked in this courtyard for several days. The employee (what he was doing is called an “operational installation”) conveyed this information to the criminal investigation officers in a pre-agreed manner (allegedly a chance meeting in a local pub). And they... again set the task for the “stompers” to monitor the compound in order to take the whole gang. For three days the scouts lay in the weeds, feeding mosquitoes. During this time, they made sure that the Mercedes was definitely there (he once left the courtyard for an hour while the future buyer was inspecting it). And then the whole gang arrived, the outdoor surveillance alerted the capture group and the operation was completed. The scouts went home to wash and shave...

MICROPHONE IN A BURNED LOG Somehow it became known that in a certain place on the banks of the Dnieper there would be a “strelka” of the now deceased Prince (one of the leaders of an organized crime group in Kyiv) with other bandits. "Naruzhka" visited there in advance, determined the area, and placed scouts at three points. Two of them pretended to be fishermen, and another group of girls lit a fire and grilled shish kebab. But the task was not just to observe, but to find out what they would talk about at the switch. Then the technician worked - he managed to insert an audio bookmark into... a charred log in the place of the arrow. The log lay there for itself, they didn’t touch it - once it was burnt, whoever needed it, they burned it whole. And the intelligence officers who were barbecuing recorded the entire conversation, which greatly helped the detectives in the future to prevent the crime and send some of the bandits to jail.

HOW TO BECOME A "STOPTOON" Today, the operational service recruits people who have necessarily served in the army or graduated from a university with a military department. The National University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also has a faculty that trains intelligence officers. On operational work Only officers are used; sergeants may also be employed in auxiliary positions. A police officer working in another service can also become a “stomper,” the report writes, the candidate is studied from all sides, and given the go-ahead. The applicant announces to everyone that he is resigning from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they compose a legend for him, under which he continues to live. Age is usually up to 30 years, but there may be exceptions for especially valuable personnel.

HOW THE SCOUTS-CHECKISTS mercilessly beat up the Americans The “security officers” have always had and now have their own “outdoor traffic.” This is what he told for “Today” former employee KGB of the USSR. In the 70s, a photo exhibition of Americans was held in Novosibirsk, which was very rare at that time. Especially in a city where there is a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences and many closed institutions. The Americans were given several routes along which (and only) they could travel. At first it was like that. And then they began to visit other places. Then the KGB outdoor surveillance (she drove them all the time) received a command - if they catch the guests outside the route, mercilessly... beat them! That's what they did. They really beat me mercilessly, even ending up in hospitals, blaming them on hooligans. Two or three were “trapped”; the rest realized that safety was guaranteed only on the routes. The scouts themselves beat us, they didn’t involve anyone in this matter - the guys there were hefty and prepared.
It happened like that. The object “gored” the outside by spinning, trying to throw off its tail... Then a scout approached him in the metro (this was already in Kyiv) and said: “If you don’t stop spinning, I’ll push you and you’ll crash onto the rails. By accident! Do you understand?” He replied that he understood everything. Then the scout increased the pressure: “Now go home and tell me when you go out so that we don’t hang around there all night. We are people too.” The object got scared and agreed...

FROM INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDUCTING EXTERNAL SURVEILLANCE
It is unacceptable to go to a DV event wearing new, unworn shoes. It is necessary to take care of the availability of food and drinks, first aid medical care, documents, etc. Sometimes in the process of conducting NV it can be quite difficult to leave the car for reasons of camouflage to meet natural needs; in such a case, it is advisable to have a vessel with a wide neck and a tight-fitting lid.
To conduct surveillance, people are used with unmemorable faces typical of the area, who do not have characteristic features for identification: scars, warts or moles. The most effective age is from 25 to 50 years.
The car should be neutral in color and not stand out in traffic or in the parking lot. In urban conditions, the most unforgettable color of vehicles is gray or beige, and besides, at night, cars of similar colors blend very well into the general background. In summer in areas with big amount For green spaces, it is advisable to use cars of dark green and dark blue colors. As a last resort, it is permissible to use vehicles in calm pastel colors. It is in no way acceptable to use AT products in red, orange, yellow, white and similar colors, as well as “fashionable” tones for a given season. It is necessary to get rid of non-removable car decorations. The AT product used must be clean and free of dents, and there must be no scratches or dents on the body. The use of vehicles with putty stains is strictly prohibited.

FROM THE ROYAL CHANCELLERY OF SECRET SEARCH CASES - TO THE DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL SERVICES OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF UKRAINE

The first investigative agency in Russia was the Preobrazhensky Prikaz created in 1697 by Peter the Great, which was engaged in political investigation. Soon his activities expanded to the prosecution of criminals. In 1730, the Order was reorganized into the Office of Secret Investigative Affairs. In 1746, a Special Expedition was created to deal with villains and robbers.

FILERS, "VARTA", "SEVEN". In 1866, a search department was created at the office of the St. Petersburg mayor, which marked the beginning of the activities of the criminal investigative police. Soon such branches were created in other large cities, including Kiev. And in 1908, the Law of the Russian Empire “On the organization of the investigative unit” was adopted, which legislated the creation of the investigative police. In political investigation, the Moscow Security Department was a pioneer, where back in 1894 a “flying detachment” of spies (“spies”) was formed.
In Ukraine, after the collapse of the Russian Empire and Hetman Pavel Skoropadsky came to power, they began to build their own law enforcement system. In particular, the Department of State Warfare was created under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had police (including investigative) functions. Then, in 1919, the Soviet government issued a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR "On the organization of criminal investigation." And in 1922, the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR approved the Instructions for organizing secret agents in criminal investigation institutions. There was already talk about intelligence (in particular, the positions of... make-up artists were even introduced in its apparatus).
In 1938, intelligence apparatus was removed from the criminal investigation department and the third special department of the NKVD of the USSR was formed from them. In 1946, the NKVD became the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but third special departments existed within the ministry until 1954. Then they were eliminated, and the intelligence apparatus was transferred to the criminal investigation departments. There were two main tasks (as today): external (visual) observation and operational installation (who, what, where) of observation objects and their connections. The intelligence apparatus bore the official name of the seventh directorates, divisions, and branches of the relevant bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, hence their slang name “seven.”

WHO COULD BE A FILE
From the instructions for organizing external (surveillance) surveillance of the late 19th - early 20th centuries:
— For external observation (filer) service, combat reserve lower ranks are selected, preferably non-commissioned officer rank, no older than 30 years...
— Persons of Polish and Jewish nationality cannot be agents...
— A police officer must behave secretly, avoid making acquaintances, especially in the place where he is quartered, so that they don’t know that he serves in the Department...
- Under no circumstances should the spies know persons who are secret employees, and vice versa.

"LOADER", "WORKER", "WEIGHTER"... Under the Union of Scouts, they were called “loaders”, and the one who was being watched was called “cargo” (however, he became such if he was detained and handed over to the detectives). “Worker” is a visual surveillance employee, “weigher” is an employee of the operational installation (establishes the data of the person being monitored). Now in Ukraine digital designation is used. For example, the senior signal to the scout was “64,” which means “take a photo of the object.” And so on. This code, if everything is fine, works for a year. If there is a puncture, they change it more often. And each scout has a digital call sign; everyone in the brigade knows what his comrade’s call sign is.

OPERATIONAL SERVICE. After Ukraine gained independence, criminal intelligence agencies were regulated in their activities by the Law of Ukraine “On Operational-Investigative Activities”, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in 1992, as well as departmental (secret) orders and instructions. From the same year, these bodies were called criminal search units (in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Main Directorate of the Communist Party, then the Department of the Communist Party). More recently, it has become the Department of Operational Services within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

Anatomy of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate

The Moscow Central Internal Affairs Directorate is shaking. Either the police leadership is forced to justify the actions of their wards from the riot police, or it turns out that President Medvedev himself has to deal with the history of Road accident on Leninsky Prospect of the capital, in which two women died. It becomes known that motorists were used as “human shields”, unsuccessfully trying to catch the criminal. Someone is fired, someone is declared “incompletely fit for duty.” But perhaps it’s not just individual bad police officers, maybe the system itself is flawed and “cosmetic repairs” won’t do anything? What is this system called "Ministry of the Interior", The New Times I found out using the example of one of the largest departments - the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate.

It’s not news: in any bureaucratic structure, the most important people are those who are close to the body, in this case, to the body of the chief Moscow policeman Major General Vladimir Kolokoltsev, who headed the Moscow Central Internal Affairs Directorate in September 2009.

["Department K of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate": Service "P" was created in the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of 1986 to ensure radio-electronic security of operational services from eavesdropping, illegal collection of information, interception of radio frequencies, etc.
[…] in the city of Moscow, a specialized unit was created - Directorate “R” of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate, the main activity of which was the prevention, suppression and detection of computer crimes; crimes related to illegal trafficking of radio-electronic and special technical equipment; crimes in the field of telecommunications, and other crimes committed using high technology.
In connection with numerous reorganizations, Directorate “R” of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate was renamed into UBPSVT of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate (Department for Combating Crimes in the Sphere of High Technologies), then into 1 ORCH KM of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Directorate (Operational-search unit of the criminal police) . Currently, “Department K of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate” is a code name, and the unit to which the functions of Directorate “R” have been transferred is part of the Main Department of Internal Affairs for the city of Moscow. - Insert K.ru]

The 2nd ORCh fights against the possession and sale of weapons. At one time, the 6th department developed the Kingisepp criminal group famous authority Sergei Finagin, specializing in contract killings and firearms trafficking. Finagin has been detained and an investigation is underway. This case threatens to become high-profile: several businessmen, employees of private security companies were involved in the criminal enterprise, and some leads even reached former security officers from the 15th Directorate of the KGB. 3rd part - detectives: deals with solving robberies and robberies. 4th - solving high-profile burglaries, thefts and robberies. In 2003, investigators from this unit, within two days, solved the robbery of the wife of the head of the Federal Migration Service, Konstantin Romodanovsky. They were also looking for the “burglars” who paid a visit to the homes of Anatoly Chubais and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin. There is also a 5th operational-search unit, whose employees fight fraudsters, “swindlers” and false generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB and Ministry of Defense. After the defeat of the Organized Crime Control Department, many of their employees were transferred to the criminal investigation department and two more ORCh were formed: the 6th part fights drugs, the 7th fights organized crime. In general, CIDs are workhorses who earn taxpayers’ money with their sweat and blood.

Secret Directorates

Next in the “secret” hierarchy is the Department of Special Technical Measures (USTM). Its employees provide technical support for the work of their colleagues from the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department and other detective units. They organize wiretapping of telephone conversations, collection of information from technical communication channels, and covert video and audio surveillance. Loud scandals have not spared this elite department either. In 2007, FSB officers detained the deputy head of the department, Mikhail Yanykin. According to investigators, Yanykin and his colleagues tapped phones at the request of entrepreneurs. During searches in Yanykin's office it was found a large number of printouts of illegal wiretaps and 300 thousand rubles, the origin of which the policeman could not explain. True, there is another version: the security officers simply removed their competitors through “commercial” wiretapping.

Another secret unit is the Center for Operational Investigative Information (CORI), a data bank that collects operational information necessary for the work of various services of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate. In addition, employees of this unit carry out all sorts of checks to establish criminal connections, for example, they “break through” candidates for the positions of judges, heads of city hall committees, heads of the Internal Affairs Directorate, Department of Internal Affairs, or candidates for deputies. TsORI employees have not been involved in high-profile scandals, although updated police databases appear on the shelves of radio markets from time to time. Rumor has it that the sword of cuts may not bypass this unit either. It would be nice if the dismissed employees did not take secret bases with them.

mission Impossible

Criminal business of employees of an elite police unit - surveillance of private individuals by order

Drawing by Alexey Merinov.

Before the revolution they were called filers. Then - trampling. They themselves liked it better beautiful word"scouts".

Police intelligence indeed has a lot in common with classical intelligence. The same secrecy, absolute closeness.

The majority of outdoor surveillance employees work almost like illegal immigrants. They are hidden so deeply that even their relatives sometimes find out about their place of service only after dismissal.

The operational search bureau (as “naruzhka” is now called) is a kind of state within a state. It is fenced off not only from the outside world, but also from its own colleagues. Even own safety The Ministry of Internal Affairs does not have access here: it deals with internal counterintelligence issues special department in the structure of the bureau. It is subordinated directly to the head of the OPB, which, of course, does not contribute to much truth-seeking.

The task of reconnaissance is, first of all, external surveillance, in other words, surveillance: from a specific addressee to a full range of operational search activities. Few people know that the OPB has one of the most powerful analytical centers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

However, journalists rarely write about this service. The specific nature of the bureau is not conducive to publicity. Secrecy here is at every step: from staffing to the location of facilities.

It is not surprising that the scandal that shook the bureau has been kept secret to this day: they professionally know how to keep their mouths shut...

* * *

…On February 2, in the southwest of the capital, as a result of a special operation by the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ own security, 8 active and 8 retired employees of the OPB were detained. All of them were convicted of illegal penetration into private life.

At the request of businessmen, officers spied on one of the residents of Moscow and also tapped her phones. The operatives have every reason to believe that such fishing was carried out in the OPB on a grand scale - not without the knowledge and approval of the authorities.

And how could it be otherwise?

It would be foolish to believe that a single healthy area can be found on a decaying body; the same law of communicating vessels.

Today the Ministry of Internal Affairs sells everything. Or almost everything. Including the services of people in police uniforms.

It’s just that everyone has exactly what they protect: investigators have one price list, detectives have another, and outdoor surveillance has a third.

More than once, long before the events described, I heard about commercial orders carried out by OPB employees. In conditions of total spy mania, this business is in special demand: information rules the world.

Repeatedly, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ own security pointed out to the leadership of the OPB the commercial “part-time work” of their subordinates. Useless.

Both the head of the bureau, Colonel General Ivan Balbashov, and his first deputy, Lieutenant General Nikolai Fedyushkin, perceived all such signals as if they were a personal insult. Once Fedyushkin even sent a special officer who was too annoying to him to his mother: “Stop doing x...!” - he said with the general’s directness as if he were cutting.

This stubbornness can, of course, be attributed to the usual concern for the honor of the uniform and a reluctance to let strangers into one’s secrets. But, it seems to me, the reason lies in something completely different. It’s just easier to do dark things in the dark...

* * *

The operatives reached out to retired OPB officer Pavel Alenovsky through their sources. Reliable people whispered that this man accepted orders to perform sensitive police services.

Alenovsky was placed under surveillance. Soon it was possible to establish his contact with a certain capital businessman from the oil sector.

The businessman wanted to follow the lady of his heart. After short negotiations, retired Major Alenovsky undertook to organize external surveillance of her and put her phone on wiretapping. In addition, the lady had to be identified according to all police records.

In total, the “order” cost more than a million rubles. However, the businessman transferred this money to Alenovsky under the control of the special services: during the development process, the operatives managed to persuade the “customer” to cooperate.

A week of “work” behind the “stompers” was enough to more than accumulate irrefutable evidence. Every day, several outdoor surveillance crews sent by Alenovsky secretly escorted the target’s car (rate: $200 per hour). In the mornings and evenings, spies were on duty at her entrance, not knowing that they themselves were also being followed.

Alenovsky worked on a large scale. He involved a dozen and a half of his former colleagues in fulfilling the order. Despite his dismissal, the major still felt at ease in the corridors of the OPB, and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole. For example, the “punching” of an “object” through police records, including data on crossing the state border, was allegedly issued on the instructions of the criminal investigation department.

After a week, it was decided to cancel the operation. Early in the morning of February 2, four outdoor surveillance crews gathered near the “target”’s house, on Architect Vlasov Street. Alenovsky gave a short mini-briefing and handed out the next tasks. But at that moment, when the “scouts” were already seated in their cars, the silence of the yard was broken by the patter of running feet.

FSB special forces detained 16 people. They had walkie-talkies, special service equipment, and notepads with notes on the “object’s” routes. In each of the four cars there was a laptop, where the officers wrote down everything they saw during the day; fortunately for the investigation, copies of previous reports were also preserved.

We must pay tribute vocational training“scouts”. They held firm. To all questions, they answered by rote that they had become a victim of a misunderstanding: “We’re not doing anything, we’re meeting with friends to drink beer.”

Of course, they also denied their involvement in the police service. However, this no longer made sense; The acquaintance with them in absentia took place long before their arrest.

Of the 16 people, exactly half were active employees of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in ranks from lieutenants to majors. The second part consisted of their own former colleagues. On the same day, the Moscow department of the Investigative Committee opened a criminal case against Alenovsky and other persons...

During searches in the apartments of Alenovsky and his accomplices, the investigation found part of the money previously transferred by the oilman. All of them were marked with a special chemical composition“Mascara.”

At the same time, the investigative team visited the headquarters of the OPB on Bolshaya Lubyanka to seize documents. This is where the most interesting thing became clear.

It turned out that according to the papers, all the detained officers did not go to work that day: some had a day off, others had sick leave. At the same time, for some reason, the sick and vacationers were officially given special equipment, cover documents, and even government money for operational expenses (the so-called “nine”).

The leadership of the OPB simply tried to hide the last fact, but could not. The investigation managed to seize the log books before retroactive corrections were made to them...

If a police intelligence officer is listed as on vacation, but nevertheless is given documents under a different name, a camera, a walkie-talkie, and other spy paraphernalia, this means only one thing: his management understands perfectly well that he is going on a criminal mission.

Only complete idiots can fail to see this; But I personally cannot believe that the most secret service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is headed by fools. Just as I can’t believe in the selfless roteness of the police chiefs.

They saw everything. They knew everything perfectly well. But for some reason they didn’t lift a finger to bring order to their household.

Even after the arrest of Alenovsky’s group, no internal proceedings followed in the OPB. None of the employees, including those who illegally issued special equipment to vacationers, were punished.

Of the eight detainees, only a few people resigned, and even then at will. The rest continue to perform police service.

The sins of his subordinates were taken upon himself by the head of the OPB, General Balbashov, who was awaiting retirement anyway: the day before he had just turned 60.

With his departure, the scandal subsided, and everything gradually returned to normal. Perhaps also because Balbashov’s place was taken by his faithful comrade-in-arms Nikolai Fedyushkin...

* * *

The exposure of Alenovsky's group is not a special case, as someone would like to imagine, not an isolated unfortunate incident; it's a system. It’s just that the total secrecy that reigns in the OPB did not previously allow washing dirty linen in public.

A very significant incident took place several years ago. Then, in December 2006, in the west of Moscow an attempt was made on the life of a certain businessman named Kurt. During the investigation, it was revealed that the day before, surveillance crews had been on duty at the victim’s house for several days.

Here it is - a saving thread, you just have to pull it. But after a couple of days, an internal security officer from the OPB drove up to the head of the search of the district police department, seized a tape recording the duty of the “intelligence officers,” and promised to look into everything. Since then, no one has seen him again...

Or another example, when the prosecutor's office exposed a criminal group from among OPB employees who legalized criminal foreign cars. Cars stolen in the Baltics and Western Europe, were registered under the guise of operational transport, allegedly used for the needs of the OPB. At least eight cars passed through their hands.

I can’t help but remember the scandal that happened in Voronezh, where the deputy head of the operational search department of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate was detained red-handed, selling information from a closed database to bandits. They took it only because the development was carried out by the FSB; otherwise the traitor might well have served until now. (Internal CSS cannot boast of any particular successes in the field of fighting “werewolves.”)

The above examples alone are enough to understand how deeply corruption and betrayal have corroded the OPB; But for some reason no one draws any proper conclusions from this.

“Intelligence” employees, speaking on the condition of anonymity, talk about terrible things happening in the OPB.

About how safe houses turn into apartments for the general's pleasures. How “intelligence officers” are forced to work on orders from commercial structures and spy on colleagues from other services. About daily drinking bouts, when OPB generals themselves get behind the wheel and drive around Moscow in search of Chechen terrorists. About the total situation of spy mania and general suspicion reigning in the service; What else is there to talk about if even one of the deputy heads of the OPB discovered a “bug” in his official car. (This was reported to both Balbashov and Fedyushkin - but, as usual, no investigation followed.)

Is it any wonder that from 10 to 30% of employees leave the OPB every year, and the crews do not go on missions in full force; Only people with nerves of steel can serve in such conditions...

* * *

The Alenovsky case is a completely logical result of the 10-year reign of General Balbashov and his entourage, who turned the OPB into a structure not controlled by anyone, not accountable to anyone: a kind of closed order of the sword-bearers, where the main law is the order of the boss.

This lack of control led to natural results: the OPB turned into a law-free territory, like the Zaporozhye Sich. And from the Sich, it is known, there is no extradition.

The demonstrative, ostentatious impudence with which Alenovsky’s group acted (they could have at least not recorded the issued equipment in the journal) proves how openly and with impunity these people felt.

The reaction that followed the revelations of businessmen in police uniform is typical. The top officials of the OPB, even for the sake of decency, did not want to keep a good face in the face of a bad game.

“Nobody detained my employees,” Vladimir Pronin, the head of the OPB department under whose subordination they worked, told me, for example. “They came to the prosecutor’s office on their own, of their own free will. By the way, they might not have walked.”

I heard an even more interesting interpretation from the lips of the acting. Head of the OPB Nikolai Fedyushkin. In general, our conversation with Lieutenant General Fedyushkin turned out to be extremely entertaining.

When I called him in the evening, he was... how to put it mildly... a little tired.

For some reason, Fedyushkin mistook me for an employee of the prosecutor’s office (even though I introduced myself honorably), so for the first half of the conversation he explained his respect for the supervisory authority.

The second half of the conversation also cannot be described: it was rather a set of interjections and abrupt phrases. The thread of the story kept slipping from the general's lips.

First, Fedyushkin said that all the scoundrels had been expelled from service; then he said that there was no reason to fire them. At first he said that there were no arrests, but a minute later he announced that there were arrests after all. Of course, the employees did not go to work that day... Or did they? Well, of course, they went out. And they were given equipment... Or they weren’t given...

They say that in such a tired state, acting. The head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs visits almost every evening. And it’s true: his work is endless. How not to get tired...

It is not surprising that he does not have enough time or energy to keep track of his subordinates. In OPB they know how to look after others, but not themselves...

We have long been accustomed to printouts of telephone wiretaps, operational certificates, and to the fact that any closed databases - from the traffic police to the tax office - are sold almost openly.

In both business and politics, spying on competitors is commonplace. Putting your phone on wiretapping is much easier than finding an honest policeman.

Even in the highest offices - in the Kremlin, the White House, the Duma - people try in vain not to be frank: if you want to say something, take them out into the corridor.

Any more or less noticeable person constantly lives “under the hood.” (For example, I read my first “wiretaps” 10-12 years ago.) This has already become so natural and familiar that no one, in fact, even thinks about such chimeras as privacy and the secrecy of personal data.

Dry judicial statistics: over the past three years, under Article 137 of the Criminal Code - violation of privacy (it was under this article that a case was brought against Alenovsky’s group) - only... 52 people were convicted. And in this ridiculous figure is the answer to all questions.

This means that the operational search bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - at least as long as it is dominated by people like Fedyushkin - has every chance of finally changing one letter in its abbreviation. Not OPB, but OPG.

This way, at least it will be more honest...

In the war of the special services, which has not subsided for a minute over the centuries, a variety of means and methods are used. "Lenta.ru" will tell you about the features of the most ancient and one of the most effective ways obtaining information and preventing state crimes - external surveillance.

They have

The activities of US intelligence services on their territory are mainly based on the principle of “perimeter security.” If the counterintelligence of Russia and many other countries operates according to the scheme of identifying a crime with the subsequent capture of a spy and bringing him to trial, then overseas the work is structured in a completely different way. The FBI simply does not leave intelligence officers unattended for a minute. At the same time, a gigantic budget and extensive technical and human resources sometimes allow this organization not to bother carefully camouflaging its exterior. When a person suspected of belonging to a foreign intelligence agency arrives in the United States, he comes under close escort of secret surveillance from the doorstep of the airport.

As a rule, it looks like this: day and night, on weekends and holidays, the FBI's target will feel under surveillance. At the same time, depending on the importance of the “client”, as well as his experience and professionalism, the number of people and cars can be in the dozens. And unlike the common stereotype that surveillance is carried out in inconspicuous machines, Americans use a wide range of the lineup- from the most ordinary small cars to expensive sports cars and powerful SUVs.

The security tactics of the American intelligence services dictate a number of additional rules of the game to the object of surveillance. So, if a person takes his car away from observation - whether at a traffic light, in a traffic jam or on a deserted highway, then the next day he will discover that the car has a punctured tire. If history repeats itself, punctures will appear on all four wheels. If this does not work, then one fine day on a deserted street a person will meet a black gang, and there will be no police around. At all.

Of course, not all foreigners receive such attention, but as for Russians, and in last years and Chinese citizens (mostly diplomats, journalists and businessmen), then the Americans do not skimp on any means.

We have

The specifics of external surveillance in Russia are based on different principles. The main task that is assigned to the operational search units of the police and intelligence services is the secret collection of information about the routes of movement of the surveillance object, its contacts and places of visit. If we touch on the counterintelligence activities of the FSB of Russia, then, unlike their American colleagues, our operatives pursue the goal of catching a criminal red-handed. For this they will use the whole complex events. And external surveillance occupies one of the leading places in it.

Surveillance secrecy is achieved through a number of techniques. First of all, an outdoor surveillance officer is required to have a thorough knowledge of the streets of the city in which surveillance is carried out. Also, the employees of operational search units are no strangers to artistry - if the object of surveillance decided to cheat and identify the observer on the opposite side, for example, on the platform of a sparsely populated metro station, then it is important for the latter not to reveal himself either with a gesture or a glance.

There are many more ways to conduct surveillance, both on foot and in vehicles. The arsenal of Russian outdoor surveillance today includes various technical means of surveillance, tracking and communication, as well as a wide variety of vehicles, but detailed information about all this is a state secret.

We have them

Today, experts note an increase in the intelligence activity of foreign intelligence services in Russia. First of all, this concerns the intelligence activities of the NATO bloc. Spies from key countries in Southeast Asia, primarily from China, are not slowing down their pressure either. But representatives of the American intelligence community are showing particular zeal.

As a former employee of the operational search department (OPU) of the FSB of Russia, who wished to remain anonymous, told Lenta.ru, the Americans are acting extremely actively, if not brazenly, on our territory. When going on a mission, be it a meeting with an agent, planting or excavating a cache, as well as covering for their colleagues at such events, American intelligence officers use the techniques of getting away on the road, disappearing in the crowd, and changing clothes. By the way, the Americans added an element of novelty to this trick as old as time - there were cases of them changing their appearance both with the help and with the use of the most modern makeup products, made in maximum accordance with the type of facial skin.

Scouts from other countries behave differently. If we take representatives of European countries, then aggressive attempts to identify and separate from them are to a lesser extent characteristic of them. The exception is representatives of the Baltic countries, who act according to the patterns of the Americans and feel their support. Chinese special services also do not strive to demonstrate their prowess.

To some extent, this can be explained by the range of interests of a particular intelligence service. “Westerners” traditionally direct their main efforts to obtaining information about the political and economic situation in Russia, as well as about changes in Moscow’s foreign policy vector. Gathering political information does not always involve contact with people knowledgeable about state secrets, so Americans rarely fear being caught as spies.

Representatives of China, in particular employees of the Third Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China (scientific and technological intelligence), continue to gravitate towards secret Russian technologies. The main priorities of the Chinese include developments in the promising T-50 fighter, missile weapons and space systems. Hence the great caution. If a conversation between an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover and an engaged political scientist is practically unprovable, then obtaining technical information of a closed nature from an employee of a secret research institute can result in a prison sentence for a foreigner (unless he is a diplomat, who can get off with simple deportation from the country).

The need for outdoor advertising

Now external surveillance units are acquiring new importance in the operational work of counterintelligence, noted Lenta.ru’s interlocutor. New models of digital equipment are being supplied to the OPU, and the fleet of vehicles has expanded. The expert called one of the main achievements the elimination of the personnel failure of the 1990s, when, during a period of lack of money, the middle level of employees was knocked out and the overall professionalism of the “toptuns” fell sharply.

The need for external surveillance work in various cases has also increased. The staff of the operational control department is not able to cover all the needs of the operational services of the FSB, so the issue of involving operational search teams in events is decided at a fairly high management level. But in the case of successful prevention of crimes within the competence of the Russian special services, the surveillance officers rarely receive their well-deserved rewards, being stuck somewhere at the same level.

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