How many aircraft carriers do we have? Russian project "Storm". Is a supercarrier a profitable investment? — The parameters of the Russian aircraft carrier have been announced
During the memorable years of perestroika, while communicating with one of the admirals of the US Navy, our leaders of the USSR Navy were shocked by his following statement. " Would any country risk arresting or capturing even one US citizen, because our aircraft carrier would arrive and everything would be decided as it should be? And even if we give you one of the Forrestal-class aircraft carriers with an air wing, this will not help, since in order to develop it we will have to pay with the blood of the pilots and “run” the path that we have covered for 60 years, but during this time we let's go even further».
So it turns out that the American taxpayer clearly knows: no matter what happens, “ his majesty aircraft carrier (AV)“The US Navy will not abandon him and will definitely try to save him. What do Russian citizens pay for? Behind great amount tanks that will not go to save our businessmen and tourists in Thailand or Singapore if necessary, and for the very illusory hope that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will save them?
Projecting force will bring clarity
If necessary, only the projection of force can save. AB and universal landing ship (UDC) are precisely those ships that are capable of projecting power into dubious regions. If a Russian AB and UDC with several escort ships were maneuvering in the South China Sea, relying on friendly Vietnam with a naval base in Da Nang, it is unlikely that the Thai leadership would extradite Russian businessman Viktor Bout to the United States. Most likely, he would have been “quietly” sent through the projecting force to Russia.
This is how this “respectable” Thailand has quietly acted and will continue to act with American, French and other violators of its laws, and even with representatives of these countries who were caught in drug trafficking, although in Thailand itself this is punishable by the death penalty. But for this you need to have projecting power.
Thailand is not a NATO member, and its entire air force in 2011-2012 consisted of only 45 combat-ready multi-role fighters type F-16A/B, clearly unable to withstand 50 Su-33 or MiG-29K based on the Ulyanovsk type aircraft. In Asia smart people and why do they need a little “peace enforcement”. But the Thai leadership, before and now, clearly does not pay attention to the periscopes of submarines. The Thai Navy has a small submarine and no submarines at all.
We can continue to recall the results of power projection in Yugoslavia, Libya and, finally, Syria. Somehow our only aircraft, which went on its last cruise with only 10 Su-33s (the rest of the aircraft were probably sent for modernization), got tired at the wrong time, and we had to assemble a “Tsushima squadron” from the ships of the Northern Army without it to help Syria. , Baltic and Black Sea fleets. What submarines will they fight with? anti-submarine ships included in these forces of ours? Will terrorists be afraid of this force?
Three companies of marines on our landing ships, defenseless from the air, will not scare anyone either. But the roar of the jet engines of the combat Su-33 or MiG-29K, constantly flying in the Mediterranean, could make many people pull their heads into their shoulders.
By the way, the question now becomes very relevant: who after Syria? And many experts believe that among them will be those countries that buy Russian weapons and into which Russian capital is actively penetrating or has already penetrated. So our entrepreneurs will have to finance, first of all, the Navy with its AB and UDC, as well as strategic aviation Russia. They are the ones who are capable of Peaceful time project real power almost anywhere on the globe, as well as protect domestic capital and our vacationing taxpayers.
Where should ABs be based?
Returning to future domestic aircraft carriers, we emphasize: We need a ship the size of Project 11437 Ulyanovsk AB with a displacement of 70–80 thousand tons. England is building two such ABs and France is going to build them. Is Russia really poorer than these countries? It must be admitted that the use of a springboard on our aircraft is not a scientifically based decision, but a tribute to those leaders of the USSR who wanted to fundamentally new technology and technology to receive the title of Hero of Socialist Labor of the USSR. It was the springboard that “ate” approximately 12–16 aircraft of the air group due to the impossibility of placing them in the bow.
This year, “Admiral Kuznetsov” is going to be sent for major repairs and modernization. Perhaps the new Navy command will be smart enough to remove all existing “nonsense” from the ship, enlarge the hangar and, consequently, the air group. Yes and with power plant and something needs to be done as a “circus springboard”. Now, for the sake of funding from government orders, any foreign aviation company will use its aircraft to do everything that the military requires.
The USA and China have already produced electromagnetic catapults, the Americans are installing them on aircraft carriers, and these catapults don’t care how cold it is to work in. And the Russian Navy is engaged in a “circus” and can lift aircraft with a maximum combat load from the deck of its aircraft. The Chinese will soon surpass us in this matter; their electromagnetic catapult is already working, although for now on the ground, but they are going to build nuclear aircraft carriers with a displacement of 65–70 thousand tons.
We think that there is no need to once again emphasize the importance of AB, both in wartime (from the position of fans of global nuclear war) and in peacetime. Many people today understand: The main threats to Russia come from the south. There must be one aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea or further south at all times, which means that, taking into account repairs, rest and combat training, the fleet must have at least three or four aircraft carriers. It is also quite obvious how many of these aircraft are needed and where they should be based. After all, not on Far East, from where the restless south is several times further than from the north, the Baltic and, of course, the Black Sea.
It is probably quite obvious to large Russian taxpayers where and how many of their defenders should be, otherwise our military will again scare everyone with NATO, China and Japan. The military department continues to talk about the Sino-Japanese threat in the east. However, even schoolchildren understand that competition in this region is only possible for us economically. And the growing military confrontation here clearly does not affect Russia, since it is not she, but China that is moving into the “internal sea” of the United States - the Pacific Ocean and has already begun to put pressure on Japan.
Personnel issues
But if it becomes more or less clear why and what kind of aircraft the modern Russian Navy needs, it is worth considering the real problems of their construction and training. Before starting to build an aircraft, we must decide on a radical reform of personnel training for the Navy and, accordingly, we will have to fully or partially accept the system that exists in the United States and other aircraft carrier powers.
Of course, this primarily concerns the training of naval pilots. Candidates must be recruited from graduates of not only Air Force flight schools, but also regular naval schools. educational institutions and young naval officers who served on ships for several years. Here, only the flight training time will be different, but the total time is probably the same, since the Air Force pilots will have to be “harassed” for a long time in order to erase psychological problems in their relationship with the sailors.
Let us note one more aspect that is usually not advertised. The fact is that pilots have always had great respect for sailors, and sailors for pilots. It was probably these two relatively dangerous military specialties that brought them together.
The ranks of naval pilots are the same insoluble problem as the construction of aircraft. But it’s stupid to have, for example, the commander of a group of carrier-based multi-role fighters that solve almost all the main tasks of the fleet, an officer with the rank of “Major”, and the commander of an air defense system complex on the air defense system, who is not active almost all the time, with the rank of “Captain of the 3rd Rank” " It's time to return Russian naval pilots to their naval ranks, restoring justice violated during Soviet times after 1917. Until this time, naval aviation had naval ranks.
Construction price
Now let's look at the economic problems of building an AB. What could be the cost of our new aircraft with nuclear power plants? Let's try to count them. There is no point in guessing about the contract price (illegal excess profits and kickbacks will begin to be included in it), and we will determine the real costs in our “market” economy by comparison.
Thus, in the USA, the latest serial Ohio-class SSBNs cost $1.5 billion, and serial Nimitz-class SSBNs, delivered at the same time, cost $3.5 billion. That is, one AB is equivalent in price to 2.34 SSBNs. The cost of the domestic SSBN Project 955 “Yuri Dolgoruky” is 23 billion rubles. If we design and build our aircraft similar in size to Project 11437 (Ulyanovsk) by analogy with the USA, that is, do not load it with useless things, then the price will be approximately 54 billion rubles or at the 2011 exchange rate - about 1.8 billion. dollars. Let's assume that due to inflation it will increase to 2–2.1 billion dollars.
Some may disagree with this approach, since the cost of converting the Admiral Gorshkov into a Project 11430 AB for the Indian Navy already exceeds $1.93 billion. But, firstly, this is the contract price and what else it includes, besides work on the ship, is unknown. Secondly, any major overhaul with re-equipment is always close to the cost of a new ship.
Just look at the work performed on the ship by Sevmashpredpriyatie (SMP):
— all old cable routes and many pipelines were removed and replaced with new ones;
— all hull structures were cleaned of rust, partially replaced and repainted, new hull structures were added;
— all boilers and almost all auxiliary mechanisms were dismantled, they were repaired or replaced with new ones, and then installed on the ship;
— Almost all weapons systems were dismantled and new ones were installed.
In short, simply installing a new mechanism, laying pipelines and cables is one job, but the work of dismantling them and then reinstalling them through new technological hatches costs twice as much. Cutting metal and making a body from it is the simplest and cheapest thing at a factory compared to installing and commissioning equipment.
For information:the costs planned at the end of the 70s for the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft of project 11435, 550–650 million rubles, turned out to be less in 1990 at the time of its delivery to the fleet and amounted to 521 million rubles.
Now about the cost of the air group (AG). If there is no AG in the absence of an air force, then it (the aircraft) will come under the control of the Air Force. And since it will still be necessary to attract aviation to operate over the sea, the state will also pay for these costs, but through a different structure. So whether there is an AV or not, you will have to pay for aviation.
We will not take inflated contract prices (also illegal excess profits and kickbacks) for modern foreign and domestic aircraft. Let’s determine the real cost of ship-based aircraft and helicopters through their cost in the USSR, since almost all of our “modern and latest” aircraft and helicopters were created in the 70s and 80s, and now they are only being improved. This will be useful for determining the real costs of government orders.
At the beginning of 1990, the estimated prices in millions of rubles were as follows:
- Su-27K (Su-33) fighter - 5.6
- multi-role fighter MiG-29K - about 5
— reconnaissance and target designation aircraft Su-27KRTS – 8–10
— AWACS aircraft Yak-44 – 20–23
— Ka-27 helicopter – 1–2.
The cost of the project 11437 aircraft under construction at Ulyanovsk in 1990 was 800 million rubles, and its air group, made up of the above-mentioned aircraft and helicopters, was estimated at 382 million. In reality, in fractions of the cost of the AV project 11437 will cost:
- multi-role fighter - 0.007–0.0125
- AWACS aircraft - 0.029
- helicopter - 0.0025.
Thus, truly, without deception, taking into account the price of a new aircraft for the Russian Navy is 2.1 billion dollars the price of planes and helicopters for him in millions of dollars will be:
- multi-role fighter up to - 26
- AWACS aircraft - 60
- helicopter - 5.
Therefore, if we take the maximum - 50 multi-role fighters (MCF), four AWACS aircraft and eight helicopters - the air group for the new aircraft will cost $1.58 billion. By the way, one of the authors of the article in the mid-90s participated in the inspection of one of the manufacturers of components for a new ship. When he quite easily found out that the cost of the components was inflated by 15–20 times, he was quickly recalled so that he would not interfere with the “cut” of money. In the parking lot of this enterprise there were brand new Mercedes of various denominations with verified salaries of the administration and workers, allowing them to be bought after 50–75 years of work.
In the USA, the number of air groups is one less than the number of aircraft carriers, but they have a lot of aircraft and reserve aircraft. Back in the 80s, domestic experts proposed having 1.5 air groups ready per aircraft. This would make it possible to ensure the continuous combat readiness of each operational aircraft with a different duration of operation of aircraft on domestic aircraft compared to the US Navy. Thus, the real cost of an air group for a combat-ready domestic aircraft will be $2.37 billion with 75 MCI, six AWACS aircraft and 12 helicopters.
Operating costs
Now let's define What is more expensive to operate - AB or other ships? Data have already been given that the cost of a domestic aircraft carrier is equivalent to two submarines, or 1.5 cruisers, or six patrol ships (frigates), or 35 RKA. Since the press has expressed criticism about the prohibitive operating costs of the Project 11435 Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft with a displacement of 60 thousand tons with 52 aircraft on board, we will begin with an assessment of the comparative cost of operation.
Around the world, most of the operating costs of AVs fall on wages crew. The crew of the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft consists of the ship's crew, which arrives during the voyage of the air group's personnel, and the marching staff. The ship's (permanent) crew itself consists of 170 officers, 1,130 midshipmen and sailors, the AG crew consists of 350 flight officers, 310 midshipmen and sailors, and up to 40 officers and midshipmen of the headquarters. The marching headquarters will be on any ship and should be excluded from comparison, as well as the personnel of the air group, since they receive salaries through naval aviation.
The crew of Project 12418 RKA, the construction of which is actively being exported, is five officers and 36 midshipmen and sailors, that is, 165 officers and 1260 midshipmen and sailors will serve on 35 such RKA. If we add to this that the salary of boat crews is also multiplied by a multiplying factor, the cost of the salary of the AB crew will be less by about 20%.
What about the new frigates for Black Sea Fleet project 11356.7? There is no exact data on the number of crews, but there is data on the frigates of Project 11356, which were taken as the prototype of Project 11356.7: 35 officers, 188 midshipmen and sailors. Thus, 210 officers and 1,128 midshipmen and sailors will serve on six frigates. Again it turns out that six frigates are 10–15% more expensive in salary.
Some may ask about fuel costs. Well, you can calculate this too. So, for 8,000 miles at a speed of 18 knots, our AB spends 10,000 tons of fuel oil. But 35 RKA project 12418 at 1600 miles at a speed of 14 knots consume approximately 2500 tons of diesel fuel, and at 8000 miles - 12,500 tons, and at a speed of 18 knots (like AB) - 15,000 tons.
Well, how does it compare with six Black Sea frigates? For them, it turns out 3000 tons of diesel fuel for 2800 miles at a speed of 18 knots. Consequently, almost 9,000 tons of diesel fuel will be consumed for 8,000 miles. Fuel oil and diesel fuel cost the same only under Soviet rule, but now? So it turns out that in terms of basic consumables during operation, AVs are approximately 10–30% cheaper, if not more. At the same time, we must not forget that our aircraft was supposed to be equipped with a nuclear power plant, and a conventional boiler-turbine turned out to be on it by the strong-willed decision of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov. Therefore, comparison of fuel costs is purely theoretical.
It should also be noted that for one member of the ship's crew on a domestic aircraft there is approximately 46 tons of displacement, and on a US aircraft - 32 tons, for one aircraft on our aircraft there are 12-13 flight technical personnel, and on a US aircraft - up to 40 flight technical personnel. This is explained by a different organizational and staffing structure, which in the US Army provides for the presence large quantity repair units and special workshops, reminiscent of small repair factories, which we do not have.
This leads to the fact that Russian aircraft cannot be away from the base for a long time (no more than four months), but US aircraft can. The American aircraft carrier also carries out a large amount of routine maintenance and repair work on aircraft and helicopters, many of which are simply unacceptable on a Russian ship under existing rules. Therefore, even with the same number of AGs of ours and the American AB, the displacement of our AB and the cost of its construction will always be less than that of the American one.
This will happen, of course, only if it is not again “armed” with powerful missile weapons that are not typical for it (anti-ship missiles, various air defense systems and other “nonsense”), a luxurious two-tiered flagship command post (such a “meeting room” on the “Admiral Kuznetsov” "is practically not used, but "ate" together with the anti-ship missile cellar more than 30 meters of the hangar and, therefore, 6-10 aircraft in it). In the US Air Force, this flagship command post has only one tier, is smaller in area and is located on the gallery deck.
/Vladislav Nikolsky, doctor technical sciences, Professor;
Nikolay Novichkov, Candidate of Technical Sciences, vpk-news.ru/
The project of a promising aircraft carrier provides for the presence of a springboard and ejection launch of aircraft. The aircraft carrier has lifts for aircraft of both vertical and swing types, which significantly saves the space they occupy on the ship.
The promising aircraft carrier currently exists only in the form of models. Some of them undergo a cycle of “sea” tests in numerous pools of the Krylov Center, simulating the “swimming” of the future ship in various climatic, weather conditions, seas and oceans of the planet.
Another model gives a visual idea of what the ship of the future will actually be like.
The first thing that catches your eye is the practically “naked” deck of the future aircraft carrier compared to previous projects of aircraft-carrying cruisers.
Instead of a massive “island” superstructure, there is a control tower. This not only saves space on the deck, but should also reduce the radio signature of the ship at sea.
The deck itself also has differences: there are two springboards on it - a large one and a smaller one, and, accordingly, two take-off directions. At the stern and bow of the aircraft carrier there are fixed planes and helicopters - at least five different types. There are clearly more of them than there are on the deck of the only aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov in service with the Russian Navy or the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya converted for the Indian Navy.
According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, the main requirement for the developers is that this ship must have broad capabilities “both in terms of the use of carrier-based aircraft and in terms of combat effectiveness in operations as part of heterogeneous forces.”
According to preliminary data, the length of the Storm will be 330 meters, width - 40, draft - 11, speed - up to 30 knots. The laying of the aircraft carrier is planned in 2025 in Severodvinsk, since Sevmash is the only enterprise in Russia that has experience in creating ships of this class.
The Storm nuclear reactor will be tested on a promising Leader-class destroyer, and in Zhukovsky near Moscow they are already testing an electromagnetic catapult for accelerating aircraft.
The model shows models of aircraft that are planned to be placed on the aircraft carrier: T-50, Mig-29K/KUB carrier-based fighters, Yak-44E AWACS aircraft and Ka-32 anti-submarine helicopters.
The concept of a new multifunctional aircraft carrier, developed at the Krylov Scientific Center, according to the head of the author’s group Valentin Belonenko, provides for placement on board up to 100 aircraft.
It is noted that the dimensions Russian ship correspond to the American Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, the largest ships in the world at the moment.
On such an aircraft carrier, Valentin Belonenko made it clear, the latest generation of planes and helicopters can take off even in a storm using springboards and catapults.
The fact that the ship is planned to carry missile and electronic weapons is one of its main features.
The fact is that Soviet and Russian shipbuilding still have not decided what class to classify domestic aircraft carriers into.
It is reported that the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov is armed with 48 Su-27K (Su-33) fighters and Su-25K attack aircraft, 12 Ka-27 helicopters.
At the same time, under the take-off deck of the cruiser, unlike similar Western ships, there are 12 launchers supersonic long-range strike cruise missiles "Granit" capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
The cruiser also has four Kinzhal close-zone air defense systems - a total of 192 missiles, 8 installations of the Kortik air defense missile and artillery complex and 6 rapid-fire (up to 1000 rounds per minute) six-barreled AK-630 artillery machine guns.
There is no such set of weapons on any ship in the world.
It is precisely because of this diversity in armament that Kuznetsov is not considered a classic aircraft carrier. However, according to military experts, it is precisely this arrangement of cruising weapons that makes the Admiral Kuznetsov the most versatile naval weapon. Such a ship is equally suitable for participation in a general nuclear or non-nuclear war, as well as in local conflicts.
Nevertheless, according to former deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy Igor Kasatonov, “An aircraft carrier will never be alone at sea, it will always be guarded by escort ships. It is they who will be tasked with repelling an air attack or countering enemy submarines, so the aircraft carrier must be an airfield , not a cruiser."
Two versions are currently being worked on promising aircraft carrier: with a nuclear power plant and non-nuclear. If it has a nuclear power plant, then the ship's displacement will be 80-85 thousand tons and it will be able to carry up to 70 aircraft. If it is non-nuclear, then 55-65 thousand tons and up to 55 aircraft.
In a non-nuclear version, the ship may be intended for export. In nuclear - for the Russian fleet.
Currently, a program of deep modernization of heavy nuclear cruisers project 1144 type "Orlan". The Russian Navy has four such ships: “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Admiral Lazarev”, “Admiral Ushakov” and “Peter the Great”.
These ships were specially created to protect and escort aircraft-carrying cruisers in order to conduct combat operations against surface, underwater, and air targets.
To interact as part of a group of such ships, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Ulyanovsk was specially built in the USSR, but they did not have time to complete its construction, and the ship was scrapped.
However, the decision to repair and modernize the Orlans shows that the idea of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier fleet has not been forgotten in Russia.
The lead cruiser 1144 of the Admiral Nakhimov project is already at the shipyard in Severodvinsk, awaiting the start of work. According to plans, the cruiser “Peter the Great” will also go there in 2018. It is possible that by this time a final decision will be made to begin construction of a new aircraft carrier. A floating dock worth about $500 million is being built in Severodvinsk, capable of supporting the construction of ships with a displacement of more than 100 thousand tons: tankers, bulk carriers and aircraft carriers themselves.
In 2016, it is planned to supplement naval aviation with MiG-29K aircraft, which will become the basis for the formation of a new aviation military unit as part of the Northern Fleet. All this suggests that the fleet is preparing for the arrival of new aircraft carriers.
Currently the only Russian aircraft carrier is aircraft carrier“Admiral Kuznetsov” - in 2016 he will receive a regiment of MiG-29K fighters. In addition to the air group, the cruiser is armed with Granit cruise missiles and several types of air defense missile and gun systems.
In January it was reported that construction of a new universal landing ship would begin in 2018, and a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrying cruiser is expected to appear in 2030.
The state armament program until 2020 does not include the construction of an aircraft carrier. Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Armaments Viktor Bursuk stated that the new Russian aircraft carrier will join the Navy after 2030.
This myth still haunts numerous monographs dedicated to the Soviet aircraft carrier fleet. The designers of the “five” themselves claim that the creation of Project 1143.5 was not the result of the evolutionary development of ships of the “Kyiv” type, but the third attempt to implement the design of a real aircraft carrier, which began back in 1971. The requirements for the new ship were revised with kaleidoscopic speed - the composition of the air group, aviation equipment, the number of anti-aircraft weapons and displacement changed. In 1980, the USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov (1908-1984) demanded that the displacement of the designed aircraft carrier be reduced by 10,000 tons, the catapults removed and it be reoriented to short take-off and landing aircraft, for the launch of which a springboard should be used.
In February 1982, the first Soviet aircraft carrier with a continuous flight deck was laid down in Nikolaev, at the Black Sea Shipyard (ChSZ) under the name “Riga” (serial number S-105). However, a year later it was remortgaged under the new name “Leonid Brezhnev”. Then sea trials were carried out under the name "Tbilisi", but when Georgia declared sovereignty, the ship was given the current name "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov". On August 1, 1990, state tests began. During testing, 16,200 miles were covered and 454 aircraft flights were completed. In May 1990, the ship was temporarily included in the 30th division of surface ships of the Red Black Sea Fleet, and on December 25, 1990, eight years, three months and 24 days after laying, the acceptance certificate was signed. On January 20, 1991, it was officially enlisted in the Northern Fleet, and the naval flag was raised on it. On December 1-24, 1991, the cruiser sailed around Europe to its permanent base in Vidyaevo, Murmansk region.
The main technical and technical characteristics are as follows: displacement 55,000 tons, speed 29 knots, length 304.5 m, width at the waterline 38 m, greatest beam 72 m, draft 10.5 m, crew 1,960 people, aviation personnel 626 people. The main power plant is a boiler-turbine unit with a total capacity of about 200,000 liters. With. Armament: 52 aircraft (MiG-29K, Su-27K fighters, Su-25K attack aircraft, Ka-27 helicopters), 12 launchers for anti-ship missiles, eight launchers for anti-aircraft missiles, eight six-barreled 30-mm machine guns, two rocket launchers.
The ship has a through flight deck, which ends with a ski-jump at the bow. Cable aerofinishers are installed in the aft part of the flight deck - when landing, the aircraft grabs the aerofinisher cable with a hook installed under the fuselage and, experiencing an overload of up to 3.5 g, is slowed down, which reduces the distance after landing to 80-100 m. In the bow of the ship under the deck there are 12 vertical launchers of anti-ship missiles (ASM) "Granit", covered with armored covers flush with the flight deck.
The architecture of Project 1143.5 TAKR has become “more aircraft carrier-like” compared to its predecessors - with a through flight deck with an area of 14,800 m², a ski-jump with a landing angle of 14.3° in the bow, two onboard 40-ton aircraft lifts on the starboard side in the bow and stern from the island 13-tier superstructure (height above deck 32 m). The presence of developed sponsons and the displacement of the superstructure to the right made it possible to increase the width of the flight deck to 67 m. The landing section of the flight deck (205 x 26 m), including the left side sponson, is located at an angle of 7° to the ship’s axis. The entire surface of the flight deck and springboard has an anti-slip, heat-resistant (up to 450 ° C) Omega coating, and three areas (10 x 10 m) are intended for vertical landing Yak-41, were laid out with heat-resistant (up to 750 ° C) AK-9FM slabs.
The fully welded hull has seven decks and two platforms in height. A continuous double bottom runs along the entire length of the ship. The main structural material of the hull, main watertight bulkheads, decks and platforms, sponsons and island superstructure is steel; for the manufacture of secondary barriers and bulkheads, aluminum-magnesium alloys were used (with fastening to steel structures). The surface structural protection (SSP) is made according to the shielding principle; composite structures (such as steel-fiberglass-plastic-steel) serve as internal protective barriers. The main material of NKZ is high-strength steel. To protect fuel tanks and aviation ammunition magazines, local box-shaped armor was used. For the first time in the practice of domestic aircraft carrier shipbuilding, underwater structural protection (SSP) was used to increase the survivability of the ship, which significantly increases the unsinkability characteristics. Based on the results of numerous research projects and full-scale experiments, the depth of the onboard PKZ was taken to be within 4.5-5.0 m. Of the three longitudinal bulkheads, the second one was armored (on the lead ship it was a package, i.e. multi-layered, on the second - monolithic).
The hangar is a closed type, with a total area of 3,980 m² (153 x 26 x 7.2 m) - about 50% of the length and 70% of the width of the ship, used for storage and Maintenance up to 70% of the regular number of shipborne aircraft (LAV). It also stores travel tractors, ship gas-jet and fire engines, as well as a set of means for deck maintenance of the LAC. Transportation and placement of aircraft are provided with folded wing consoles, and helicopters with folded blades rotors. At all regular LAC parking places in the hangar and at technical positions, they are moored and grounded. The hangar is equipped with a semi-automatic system for chain transportation of LAC, which makes it possible to abandon the use of tractors and eliminate the contamination of the interior with exhaust gases. Tractors are required only for operations with LAC on the flight deck, when transporting them from the hangar to the lift platforms and back. The typical composition of the air group based on the Project 1143.5 ship includes 52 aircraft: 18 Su-27K and MiG-29K aircraft each and 16 Ka-27 helicopters.
To ensure the landing of high-speed aircraft on the deck, Svetlana-2 aerofinishers are used - four cables stretched across the deck, located at a distance of 12 m from each other and connected through blocks with four hydraulic brake machines designed to dampen kinetic energy. In the operating position, the cables rise above the deck to a predetermined height to catch the landing aircraft with the brake hook, ensuring its complete stop after 90 m of travel with a longitudinal overload of no more than 4.5 g. The fourth cable, counting from the stern, is combined with the Nadezhda emergency barrier. The cable of the first arresting arrester is located 40 m from the stern. In the middle of the second aero arresting device on the deck there is a white circle with a diameter of 17 m - the place where the aircraft brake hook is recommended for pilots to touch when landing.
The main power plant of the TAKR almost completely replicates that used in project 1143.4: four-shaft, steam turbine, with a total power of 200,000 hp. With. The increased fuel supply made it possible to increase the cruising range to 18 knots. travel up to 8,000 miles. The power was increased due to the installation of new boilers. Thanks to this, with an increase in standard displacement by 10,000 tons, it was possible to achieve a full speed of 29 knots. Steam is produced by eight KVG-4 boilers with increased steam capacity. Steam for needs not related to the movement of the ship is obtained through extraction from the main boilers, so an auxiliary boiler installation was not needed. The ship's propulsors are four bronze low-noise fixed-pitch five-blade propellers with a diameter of 4,260 mm and a mass of 12,524 kg each.
The Russian TAKR has powerful missile armament: the Granit-NK missile strike system includes 12 ZM-45 anti-ship cruise missiles placed in below-deck silo-type launchers (the silo covers are made flush with the deck). Anti-aircraft missile weapons - four modules of the Kinzhal air defense system (192 missiles) and eight modules of the Kortik air defense system (256 missiles and 48,000 30-mm shells), located on the side of the sponsons and providing the possibility of all-round firing of air targets. Artillery weapons are represented by three batteries consisting of six 30-mm rapid-fire artillery mounts AK-630M (48,000 rounds). Initially, it was planned to place another battery of these machine guns under the nose edge of the take-off springboard for firing at the nose heading angles. Two embrasure cutouts were intended for their installation (they are clearly visible in photographs of the early stage of construction of the lead ship), but they were abandoned.
Due to perestroika and the beginning of the collapse of the USSR economy, the commissioning of the ship was greatly delayed. The first landing on the deck of an aircraft carrier was made by test pilot Viktor Georgievich Pugachev (b. 1948) on September 1, 1989, while combat pilots began to master the deck of the Kuznetsov only in 1994 and already in the Northern Fleet. In 1996, the aircraft carrier made its first long-distance voyage from Barents Sea to the Mediterranean. During the voyage, combat training tasks were practiced; In the Mediterranean Sea, Russian pilots exchanged friendship visits with American colleagues from the air group of the aircraft carrier America, however, the Americans did not dare to land their planes on the deck of the Russian ship and sent a helicopter. From 1996 to 1998 was undergoing renovations, which were greatly delayed as a result of underfunding. In 1998, he took part in major exercises of the Northern Fleet.
In 1999 he went to sea twice combat training. In 2000, he participated in major exercises, during which he died Submarine K-141 "Kursk" took part in the rescue operation, which is why the cruiser's second trip to combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, which was supposed to take place at the end of 2000, was cancelled. From 2001 to 2004. was undergoing scheduled maintenance.
In 2004, as part of a group of nine ships of the Northern Fleet, including the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Peter the Great", the missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov", squadron destroyer"Admiral Ushakov" and support vessels took part in a month-long voyage to the North Atlantic. On December 5, 2007, as part of a naval strike group, it went on its second trip to combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, which lasted until February 3, 2008. According to representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the aircraft carrier requires major repairs, but due to lack of finances, repairs have been postponed until indefinite term. The ship's seventh long-distance voyage was completed in May 2014. From May 14 to August 20, 2015, the TAKR was under repair at the dock of the 82nd ship repair plant (Roslyakovo). On November 6, 2016, the TAKR set off on a cruise to the Mediterranean Sea as part of a group of the Northern Fleet.
Currently, "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" is part of the Northern Fleet and is the only aircraft-carrying ship Russian Navy. During cruises, the cruiser is based on Su-25UTG and Su-33 aircraft of the 279th naval fighter aviation regiment (based airfield - Severomorsk-3) and Ka-27 and Ka-29 helicopters of the 830th separate naval anti-submarine helicopter regiment (based airfield - Severomorsk-1). Thus, this aircraft-carrying cruiser can rightfully be considered a full-fledged aircraft carrier. Not the same, of course, as the American nuclear giants such as the Nimitz, but quite equal in combat potential to, for example, the newest French nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. And in terms of the number of naval air group, Kuzya even has superiority: 52 aircraft versus 40 for the Frenchman.
In 1983, a decision was made to build a second ship, Project 1143.5, which received the name “Riga” (serial number S-106). The TTZ included the possibility of improving the project in the event of the emergence of new types of weapons and electronic equipment. Its construction began immediately after the launch of the lead TAKR: two 900-ton cranes installed the laying block (bow MKO) of a new order with two GTZA and four main boilers already mounted and covered. The ship was launched on November 25, 1988, and during completion it was renamed “Varyag” (June 19, 1990).
Initially, the 6th completely repeated the “five”, but already in June 1986, a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued to change some of the main elements of the cruiser, in particular electronic weapons (the ship was assigned the index project 1143.6). Thus, the Mars-Passat radar was to be replaced with a more effective new Forum, consisting of the Podberezovik radar with the ability to select air targets, two Fregat-MA radars and an information processing, target distribution and target designation system of the Poyma type. All this required the alteration of about 150 rooms, mainly in the superstructure. It was also necessary to correct a significant amount of design documentation, which led to a delay in the completion of the cruiser by approximately nine months. In addition, on the Varyag, unlike the lead ship, it was already planned to provide a base for the Yak-44RLD radar patrol and guidance aircraft (with the ability to take off from a distant launch position), which also caused a number of alterations. True, until the end of 1991, this work was not actually started due to the lack of data on the aircraft from the Design Bureau named after. Yakovleva.
“Varyag” was built for the Pacific Fleet with a delivery date of 1993. Even after the collapse of the USSR, until the end of 1991, completion proceeded in accordance with the schedule agreed upon and approved even before the abolition of the former Ministry of Shipbuilding and Industry of the USSR. To ensure the basing of aircraft carriers at ChSZ, they managed to manufacture and send to the Far East a special pontoon-berth, similar to the one that was previously delivered to Vidyaevo for the Admiral Kuznetsov. Taking into account the planned modernization, blocks of premises previously intended for Mars-Passat radar stations were cut off on the superstructure and foundations were installed for the Fregat-MA AP of the Forum radar.
But soon the economic crisis in the former republics of the Union made itself felt at ChSZ - cable supplies by the Amurkabel and Azovkabel enterprises were disrupted, which, in turn, did not receive raw materials from Uzbekistan. Then problems arose with pricing and its impact on the cost of building a ship. Moreover, as always happens during periods of collapse of large states, this was accompanied by collapses in the economy, rising prices and galloping inflation.
Despite the cessation of funding (IV quarter of 1991), the Black Sea Shipbuilding ( CEO Yu. I. Makarov) completed the construction of the TAKR at his own expense, hoping that Moscow would later reimburse the costs (more than 700 million US dollars in 1980s prices). However, the former Soviet republics that became independent did not show any interest in completing the Varyag. Russia, which declared in 1993 that it was ready to complete the ship, also did nothing for this, limiting itself to fruitless negotiations. In particular, regarding the Varyag, it was proposed to create a special intergovernmental body with emergency powers that would coordinate the completion of the cruiser. Government delegations from Ukraine and Russia even came to Nikolaev to inspect it. But none of them, under the new conditions, had the means to complete the construction of such a complex ship.
Therefore, in March 1995, Russia officially refused to finance the construction of the Varyag, transferring it to ChSZ to pay off the company’s debts 1 . Ukraine after consideration different options dismantling the ship, which was 67% complete, including the possibility of using it as a floating spaceport, was eventually forced to sell the unfinished aircraft carrier abroad. Based on the results of the study carried out in 1997-1998. In an international tender, the winner of which was a Chinese company registered in Macau, Varyag was sold by the State Property Fund of Ukraine for only 20 million US dollars.
While its fate was being decided, the Varyag continued to remain at the plant, turning at the beginning of 2000 into the “goose that lays the golden eggs” for ChSZ - the Chinese paid the plant $5,000 a day for parking the TAKR. In the first half of 2000, it was expected that a contract would be signed with a Chinese company for the completion and conversion of the Varyag into a floating self-propelled entertainment and tourist complex (the contract amount was expected to be 200-300 million US dollars). But plans changed, and on June 14 at 5.30 am, tugs removed the Varyag from the factory waters and began towing it to China. His further fate will definitely be discussed in the corresponding issue of NiT.
Initially, the cruisers of projects 1143.5 and 1143.6 were supposed to be equipped with steam catapults (one of them was even built and tested on land). But the developers failed to provide the necessary rigidity to the catapult track design, and it turned out to be inoperative. Therefore, as a necessary measure, instead of catapults, the ships received springboards. In the summer of 1982, in Crimea, at the Nitka complex, experimental work began on taking off Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft from a springboard, which ultimately ended in success.
In the used ski-jump scheme, take-off from the deck is carried out by accelerating the aircraft with its own engines in afterburner mode. At the end of the takeoff run, the plane reaches the springboard, which sets the required angle of climb and makes takeoff somewhat easier. Until the engines reach full thrust, the aircraft is held on the deck by special grips on the landing gear, which are then lowered below the deck in a strictly synchronized manner, making it possible to begin the takeoff run. To reflect the jet stream of an aircraft standing at the start, a protective deflector shield rises above the deck.
"Kuznetsov" has three launch positions, two of which are located on the deck, one after the other, at a distance of about 85 m. But since take-off is only from a springboard, several aircraft cannot take off at the same time. It is quite natural that to increase the speed of aircraft takeoff, rapid alternation of starts from the left and right positions is used. The speed of alternation is related to the speed of cleaning the deflector shield of the nearest starting position. The lack of catapults did not allow the cruisers to compare with modern US aircraft carriers in the ability to quickly lift an air group into the air on alert. The advantage of American aircraft carriers in this regard is that they are equipped with four catapults for launching aircraft, which are located in pairs at an angle to each other on the bow on a corner section of the deck. This scheme allows aircraft to be lifted into the air with an interval of only 15 seconds between them.
In 1984, the main opponent of aircraft carriers, Ustinov, died. Almost immediately after this, the Nevsky Design Bureau was again entrusted with the design of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with increased displacement, more aircraft and steam catapults. Despite the fundamental difference from the Kyiv-class ships, the aircraft carrier still continues to be called the seventh TAKR - project 1143.7. When this ship was laid down at the ChSZ slipway in Nikolaev on November 25, 1988, it received the name “Ulyanovsk”. TTZ for its development in accordance with the weapons program for 1986-1995. The NPKB received it in December 1984. In 1986, the draft design was completed and approved, and in 1987 - technical project (chief designer L.V. Belov, then Yu.M. Varfolomeev). In October of the same year, the main elements of ATAKR were approved: an air group consisting of 70 aircraft (Su-27K and MiG-29K fighters, Yak-44RLD radar and guidance aircraft, Ka-27 and Ka-31 helicopters), a ski jump, two catapults, arresting devices , new anti-ship missile system "Bolid" (later replaced by "Granit"), air defense missile system "Dagger", air defense missile system "Kortik", four-shaft nuclear power plant (280,000 kW), total displacement 73,400 tons, full speed 30 knots.
ATAKR was intended to impart combat stability to fleet formations in operationally important sea and ocean areas, as well as to destroy enemy naval groups in cooperation with other naval forces. Externally, it would differ from the ships of Project 1143.5 in the increased main dimensions, the presence of a third aircraft lift (from the stern on the left side), a reduced superstructure in length, and most importantly, the presence of two steam catapults. In general, continuity was maintained - the ship was equipped with a bow take-off ramp.
The creation of ATAKR represented a qualitatively new stage in the development of Soviet military shipbuilding and aircraft carrier fleet. Project 1143.7 ATAKR had no foreign analogues. In terms of aviation equipment, it could be comparable to the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier J.S., which was then under construction. Washington,” and was superior to it in terms of the availability of strike missiles and anti-aircraft firepower. On the ship, to the maximum possible extent, samples of weapons, mechanisms, equipment and materials previously provided for ships of Project 1143.5 were used. 33 development work was carried out, 11 of which were carried out according to the plans of the Ministry of Defense (Navy and Air Force). The number and range of the naval air group increased. In particular, it was planned to create the Su-27KM multi-purpose aircraft, the Su-27KPP jammer aircraft, the Su-27KRTS target designation and reconnaissance aircraft, the Yak-44PLO anti-submarine aircraft and the Yak-44RLD radar patrol and guidance aircraft. A prototype of the Mayak steam catapult and a prototype of the superheated steam energy complex that ensures its operation, consisting of a boiler unit, steam accumulators and condensers, passed preliminary tests at the Nitka complex and were recommended for operation. In general, according to experts, the new types of weapons of the ship Project 1143.7 should have met the world level of 1995-2000.
The ship's power plant was created on the basis of serially produced and successfully operated missile cruisers type "Kirov" (project 1144) PPU KN-3 and GTZA-653. Implementation nuclear energy promised to provide significant reductions in fossil fuel consumption, thereby providing the ship with an almost unlimited cruising range, the possibility of long-term maintenance high speeds progress and more than doubling the reserves of aviation fuel and aviation ammunition. Airplane landing conditions were improved due to the absence of the heat plume typical for ships of previous projects with CTU. At the same time, the corrosion of aircraft located on the flight deck was reduced.
The ship was to have the following main dimensions: maximum length - 321 m, waterline length - 280 m, maximum width (with corner deck and transition bridges) - 79.5 m, waterline width - 38 m; side height from the main line to the upper deck amidships - 27.5 m, in the bow - 33 m, overall height - 65.5 m; standard displacement - 62,580 tons.
The lead ATAKR, named “Ulyanovsk” (serial number S-107, senior builder P. S. Gerasimov), was laid down in Nikolaev on the slipway “O” on November 25, 1988. The slipway period was designed for 36 months, the total duration of construction was 105 months , delivery date to the fleet - 1995. The cost of the order was estimated at 800 million rubles. At Nitka it was planned to begin testing the ejection takeoff of the Su-27K and MiG-29K. In addition, they also planned to complete the construction of the previously mothballed BS-3 block for testing serial models of catapults and arresting devices intended for installation on ships being built by ChSZ.
The slipway work at Ulyanovsk was carried out using progressive technology, with the formation of a hull on the slipway from 27 large blocks weighing up to 1,380 tons, full of mechanisms, devices and equipment. To ensure nuclear shipbuilding at ChSZ, work began on the reconstruction and modernization of the entire production. It was necessary to build a number of special production units, for their placement in the water area of the Southern Bug adjacent to the ChSZ, a fairly large area was washed with sand.
Work on forming the hull on the slipway progressed quite quickly. In total, they managed to install structures with a total weight of about 27,000 tons. At ChSZ, almost everything was ready for the installation of an automatic control unit, a technical department special energy specialist, responsible for the installation and physical start-up of a nuclear installation. It was planned to mount four reactors on the ship, combined into two 1,400-ton zonal blocks - for the bow and stern engine groups. For their assembly, a floating autonomous workshop with a sliding roof was specially built and installed on the ground at the stern of the slipway “O”. Upon completion of assembly, the blocks were supposed to be lifted by 900-ton cranes and installed on the ship. The bodies of four metal radiation protection tanks were welded, the shell of which was filled with lead. In 1990-1991 ChSZ received reactor vessels, steam generators, pumps, filters and pipelines. One of these blocks was welded, the second was assembled and prepared for welding. There were no problems or delays during the construction of the Ulyanovsk, and the ship could well have been delivered on time. It was also planned to build a second ATAKR (S-108), the laying of which was scheduled for 1992.
By November 1991, the ship's readiness was 17-20%. After the collapse of the USSR and the cessation of funding, the slipway was blocked by the ATAKR corps, which did not allow it to be used for its intended purpose. Based on a real assessment of the situation, on February 4, 1992, an order was issued by the Prime Minister of Ukraine on the disposal of Ulyanovsk, and on February 5, an order was issued by ChSZ to stop work on the order S-107 (and S-108). The dismantling of the hull was completed by November2. Thus, the evolution of domestic aircraft carriers was put to an end... And Russia’s place in the elite club of nuclear aircraft carriers was taken by France, which in 1995 launched its first such ship, the Charles de Gaulle.
Since 1991, the implementation of projects for the construction of aircraft-carrying ships in Russia has been suspended. Around 1990 (1991?) an article “Do we need an aircraft carrier” appeared in Moscow News. This topic was picked up by dozens of “very specialized publications” - “Moskovsky Komsomolets”, “Echo of the Planet”, etc. Only the lazy did not write about it. On their pages, “experts” expressed only one thought - “the new democratic Russia does not need AVs, it’s better with this money...”. The result of this company was a reduction and then a complete collapse of the aircraft carrier program. But this does not mean that in the new conditions there was no reason to have such ships in the Russian Navy. The press noted that after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there followed a transfer of the defense efforts of states into the interethnic space.
As is known, the length of Russia’s maritime borders is 38.8 thousand km (for comparison, the length of the land border is 14.5 thousand km), the area of the continental shelf is 4.2 million km2. Along the entire maritime border there is a 200-mile exclusive economic zone with an area of more than 6.3 million km2, in which sovereign rights and jurisdiction must be ensured Russian Federation and protection of its interests.
In these gigantic sea and ocean expanses, naval forces, ships of various purposes, classes, types, including aircraft carriers, must be constantly or periodically (on call, with aggravation of the situation, etc.). That is why, taking into account the increasingly increasing shortage of organic types of ship fuel in the near future, we will have to admit that there is no alternative to nuclear power plants for the military shipbuilding of industrially and economically developed countries for the next few decades. Of course, ship-based nuclear power plants require a high level of maintenance, strict compliance with nuclear safety requirements (structural, operational, environmental, etc.). Such experience and, most importantly, a system for operating nuclear power plants in the Navy and the country’s icebreaker fleet exist.
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The only Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, will not be able to go to sea for the next three years. Last weekend it was docked for repairs. This event makes even more relevant the discussion of what kind of ship could replace the Kuznetsov. It is surprising that an extremely ridiculous idea on this matter was voiced by an authoritative scientific center.
The aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov will be seriously repaired and modernized. On September 15-16, the ship was placed in a large floating dock in Roslyakovo. Kuznetsov will spend the next three years undergoing repairs, after which, as stated, it will be able to serve for at least another twenty years.
However, the discussion about which ship will replace the Kuznetsov is becoming increasingly heated. And one of the most pressing aspects of this discussion was the discussion of whether Russia needs so-called light aircraft carriers - similar to the Kuznetsov, but with a smaller displacement and a smaller air group.
“The fleet believes that from the point of view of the economic price-quality ratio, it is not practical for Russia to build light aircraft carriers. It is preferable to build aircraft carriers with a displacement of about 70 thousand tons, which allow them to carry on board large quantity aircraft."
Three months later, his colleague, head of the Navy shipbuilding department Vladimir Tryapichnikov, reported on the ongoing development of an aircraft carrier with a nuclear power plant:
“Yes, it is expensive, but the ship must be modern, perform the appropriate tasks, and such a decision will be made in the near future.” At the same time, it was previously reported that the military department approved the preliminary design of a promising destroyer, Project 23560 (code “Leader”) with a nuclear power plant.
In other words, it would seem that the fleet has already decided on what it would like to have in its composition: heavy nuclear aircraft carriers and nuclear destroyers.
However, it turns out that not everything is so simple.
The phenomenon of alternative
It is known that at the previous international military-technical forum (IMTF) "Army-2017", the Krylov State Scientific Center (KGSC) planned to present its next concept project - the light aircraft carrier (AVL) "Storm-KM". But, although the model of the ship was already ready, the matter was limited to the transfer of documents to the then Deputy Minister of Defense Yuri Borisov. There was no clear reaction from the customer.
For a long time, the concept was known only from a screenshot from a monitor screen and from fragments of performance characteristics: displacement (it is not clear what) 30-40 thousand tons, the number of aircraft on board 40-50. In the picture one could see a strange object with a very wide flight deck, an island on the left (!) side and central (not side) aircraft lifts.
At the beginning of August, the new head of the Nevsky Design Bureau, which designed all our aircraft carriers, Sergei Orlov (former Chief Accountant United Shipbuilding Corporation) praised the work of the Krylovites (which in itself is strange, since it is not comme il faut to praise competitors): “They are supporters of the construction of several small aircraft carriers. In principle, I agree with this idea. The new ships should be similar to the Admiral Kuznetsov, but smaller in size. The Krylovites don’t even make preliminary designs, but concept designs, and very good ones.”
As it turned out, this was artillery preparation before the decisive assault - on August 21, the world saw the Storm-KM model at the stand of the Krylov Center at the Army-2018 International Military Forum.
Strange performance characteristics
At Army-2018, the total displacement of the KGNC AVL increased to 44,000 tons (normal - up to 40,500, standard - up to 37,000 tons).
Overall completeness coefficient Kop ( business card of any ship), equal to the ratio of the volume of the immersed part of the hull (normal displacement divided by the estimated density of sea water) to the parallelepiped formed by the length, width and average draft along the structural waterline (KVL), which, according to GOST, correspond to the same normal displacement, for the "Storm" -KM" correspond to a destroyer with elongated and pointed contours (0.47). While for the hydrodynamically perfect, but quite complete “Admiral Kuznetsov” it is equal to 0.64 (with adequate Kop, the total displacement of the KGNTs creation would be close to Kuznetsov’s). The ratio of length to width (coefficient L/B, which characterizes propulsion, is too small (6.84 versus 8.08), width to draft (B/T, stability) is too high (4.47 versus 3.72).
If the aircraft carrier had been designed in a circle of young ship modellers, such nonsense could be understood and forgiven, but in this case we are dealing with learned men.
When thinking about the classification of the new concept of the Krylov Center, I remember the 42,500-ton French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, which no one would even think of classifying as light. Light aircraft carriers can rightfully include the decommissioned British Invincibles or the Spanish Principe de Asturias with a total displacement of about 20,000 tons. "De Gaulle", like "Kuznetsov" and "Storm-KM", are clearly classified as middle-class aircraft carriers (40-60 thousand tons).
Both the classification and the underestimated coefficient of overall completeness of the brainchild of the KGNC are perceived as an attempt to mislead the public and the customer.
Step back
In its progressive development in the construction of aircraft carriers (AV), our country was forced to settle on Project 11437 with a total displacement of 75,000 tons with 70 aircraft on board and a nuclear power plant. Now, when circumstances force us, and opportunities allow us to continue the construction of AB, it would be logical to start with a similar project.
However, the so-called naval science (“the so-called” refers only to the notorious department of advanced design of the KGSC, which produces freaks) for reasons understandable to it is trying to turn back the wheel of history and persuade the customer to build defective combat units.
This damage is, first of all, expressed in the composition of the air group. As the Krylovites promise, it will not be possible to squeeze 46 aircraft into the displacement they indicate. Suffice it to say that Kuznetsov, which is a third larger, can accommodate the estimated number of planes and helicopters. The only way to help here is to place additional aircraft on the huge flight deck of the Storm-KM (probably intended for this purpose), but for our northern latitudes this is not an option - the new Russian aircraft carrier needs a spacious hangar. The aircraft/helicopter capacity of the Krylov AVL can be estimated according to the conditional norm voiced by the former general director of the Nevsky PKB Sergei Vlasov: “one aircraft can be accommodated per thousand tons of displacement” - 37-40 aircraft.
37-40 aircraft are two three-flight (2x12) squadrons of fighter-bombers, 4 radar patrol and guidance aircraft (RLDN) and 9-12 helicopters for various purposes. Due to the fact that one fighter squadron, under any circumstances, must provide long-range air cover for a carrier aircraft group (CAG), a light aircraft carrier only has one attack squadron (12 aircraft), suitable for operations against sea or coastal targets. A 75,000-ton aircraft carrier can accommodate three times as many attack squadrons, and this best demonstrates the failure of the KGNC concept.
Secondly, due to the insufficient power of the main power plant (GPU) and, as a consequence, the electric power plant (EPU), it will not be possible to place electromagnetic catapults on the aircraft (the recharging time of the energy storage devices for launching the aircraft will be too long). And a promising aircraft carrier without such a catapult automatically falls into the category of inferior. In order to somehow compensate for this shortcoming, KGNC specialists propose installing an electromechanical catapult on their concept (apparently, for launching a UAV).
In addition, the aircraft lifts located in the center of the flight deck (in the center plane), and not on the side ones, are puzzling - a relic of the past that reduces the usable area of the hangar and does not allow raising and lowering aircraft whose dimensions exceed the dimensions of the elevator.
Finally, why a gas turbine power plant? It's already approved preliminary design destroyer with a nuclear power plant, and it is planned to begin in 2019-2020 and finish it in 2022 technical design. Nuclear escort destroyer and gas turbine aircraft carrier!
In general, one gets the impression that KGNC is rowing against the tide.
Why Russia can't waste its time on trifles
First, Russia does not have the ability to spend too much money on defense. Therefore, when choosing such an expensive sample military equipment we must be sure that it will give us guaranteed advantages over foreign analogues. A “light” aircraft carrier cannot give such guarantees. Any of our warships must be at least twice as powerful as the American one, since we will not be able to outnumber a potential enemy.
The new Russian aircraft carrier can compete on equal terms with two American ones only thanks to its air group. The Americans arrogantly gave us a head start in the field of carrier-based aircraft, believing that after the devastation of the 1990s they no longer had to fear our navy. The basis of the air wings of their aircraft carriers currently consists of the F/A-18E/F “Super Hornet” fighter-bombers, which grew out of the F/A-18A/B light vehicles, the competitor of which at one time was the F-16 prototype - an analogue of our MiG- 29. In the future, two of the four attack squadrons of all US Navy aircraft carriers are planned to be re-equipped with single-engine F-35Cs.
The current situation gives us the opportunity to surpass the enemy at sea (more precisely, in the air over the sea, which is almost the same thing), by landing “sea-worn” Su-57s on new aircraft carriers, and then systematically bringing them to complete perfection. However, the AVL of the KGNC does not allow placing on it more than one squadron of heavy fighters, which, as mentioned above, will be occupied only by long-range air cover of the KAG, which will negate our advantage. At the same time, 75,000-ton aircraft carriers with four Su-57 squadrons will become real masters of the ocean for a long time, rubbing the noses of the arrogant (exceptional) Americans.
Secondly, today Russia does not have any suitable construction sites for aircraft carriers. Some time later, they can be built in workshop No. 55 of Sevmash (after the completion of the Yasen series and partly Boreev-A) and in the Zvezda shipbuilding complex (SSK) in the Far East. At the end of last year, one of the KGSC employees spoke in the spirit that “the AVL concept will be an addition to our Storm aircraft carrier [a monster with a displacement of 95-100 thousand tons], a light aircraft carrier is cheaper and faster to build.”
Bad idea. We have neither time, nor funds, nor production capacity, to first build light and then heavy aircraft carriers.
In general, it’s high time for us to seriously think about unification in shipbuilding and move to working on the principle of “one class - one project.”
Thirdly, when proposing a small aircraft carrier, KGSC specialists do not take into account at all the prestige of the country that it will represent in the World Ocean. They want us to be looked down upon not only by the Americans, but also by the Britons, and some time later by the Chinese and Indians? A state whose navy is based on light aircraft carriers is not worthy of being called a great maritime power.
The beginning of the twentieth century is one of the most dramatic and most interesting periods in the history of our country. An unexpected defeat in the war with Japan, an even more amazing revolution of 1905, which came “out of nowhere.” Intensity of passions, explosions and murders. And then seven years of peace and prosperity, as if there was no chaos and anarchy. Then - an incredibly fierce war that began in just a couple of weeks summer season vacations. Two revolutions that did what seemed impossible. The state disappeared within a few days. At all. So that later, in agony and blood, appear under a new banner and with a new name. And then... The rest is a different story. This book is dedicated to the beginning of the twentieth century, when all the above-described ups and downs were just emerging from the darkness of history.
Today we often evaluate “that” Russia based on the materials of the revolutionaries who came to power in 1917. It is impossible to find objectivity in their leaflets and assessments. When it comes to the Russian Empire, the topic of “mediocre generals”, “rotten regime”, “weak-willed tsar”, “financial dependence on the West”, etc. almost always comes up. If you carefully study the question of where these clichés come from, then we we will see that the author of this “product” are persons and forces that are involved in the fight against Tsarist Russia. That is, her killer testifies against the victim.
But that's not so bad. The real problem is that not only the leaders of October, but also the leaders of February, before their victory, actively fought against the Russia of that time. This means that a stream of clichés and politicized assessments of the “tsarist and autocratic” came from both the Reds and the Whites.
To complete the picture, we must not forget that our “Western partners” contributed to the denigration of their geopolitical enemy - the Russian Empire. Information warfare was not invented today or even in the twentieth century; only at that time the role of the Internet was played by newspapers and rumors. For this reason, the characteristics pre-revolutionary Russia who came from the West should also not be taken for granted by us. There are more myths about this than in Ancient Greece. Among them is the myth of “poor, backward tsarist Russia”, the myth of blatant class inequality, the myth of the complete fiasco of the Russian army in the Crimean, Russo-Japanese and First World Wars and others. In reality, Russia was one step away from victory in both the Russo-Japanese and the First World War. But internal traitors with foreign support twice led our country to defeat.
Read this book and many myths will crumble to dust. I am sure that each of us will find the story that he, without knowing it, assessed on the basis of the publications of “independent journalists” and “objective evidence” of those years.
Nothing has changed since then. Not in Russia, but in the assessments given to us by strict “Western teachers”, who for some reason consider themselves the only correct branch of the development of human civilization, and all others, including Russian civilization, are incorrect and dead-end.
