The first Soviet dive bomber. The first Soviet dive bomber Modifications and weapons

Ar-2 dive bomber.

Developer: Arkhangelsky Design Bureau
Country: USSR
First flight: 1940

The main advantage of using missile shells from a dive was the increased shooting accuracy and power of the warheads of the shells developed at NII-3. Firing was supposed to be carried out either singly or in a salvo of two, four and eight shells. At the same time, it was believed that it was volley fire that would give the greatest effect.

It was proposed to use I-15bis or I-16 (8 RBS-82) aircraft, as well as dive versions of two motor bombers SB (22 RBS-132) and DB-3 (9 RBS-203) as the main carriers of such weapons.

It was proposed to place missile shells on the SB in a combined manner: 10 RBS-132s should be placed on launchers under the wing planes and 12 RBSs in a special cassette box located in the bomb bay of the aircraft and extended when firing from the bomb bay into the air flow.

On the DB-3, it was proposed to place RBS-203 missile shells as follows: 3 shells under the fuselage and 10 under the wing of the aircraft.

It was assumed that “installation and dismantling of aircraft missile weapons(with the exception of electrical wiring in the wings of the aircraft)" in the field will be carried out by the technical staff of the air units “within 1 hour to 3.5 hours depending on the type of aircraft and the caliber of the RBS”.

To practice the technique of firing missile shells from a dive, improving launchers missile guns, testing the tactics of using missile aircraft Slonimer and Kostikov asked to allocate one SB, one DB-3 and a flight of I-15bis or I-16 aircraft for testing at the NIP AV Air Force. The training ground near Noginsk needed to be equipped “concrete and armored platforms measuring 50x50 m”.

In the period from June 26 to September 4, 1940, field tests of SB No. 221, armed with rocket fragmentation and armor-piercing projectiles of the RS-132 and RBS-132 types, were carried out at the Research and Production Institute of the Air Force KA. The RO-132 rocket guns were mounted under the wing of the aircraft. Firing was carried out from a dive at angles of 45°-50° from a distance of 1500-1700 m. It was found that the probable circular deflection of the RBS-132 when firing in the air was approximately 1.4 times less than when firing the RS-132, and not exceeded 30 m in the lateral direction (instead of 40 m for the PC-132) and 39 m in range (instead of 55 m for the PC-132).

Despite the overall positive results of the firing, it was decided to ban the use of the RBS-132 for firing from an SB aircraft. The fact is that when firing the RBS-132, both on the ground and in the air, the ailerons of the aircraft were deformed from the powerful gas jet. For this reason, during the firing range, the aircraft's aileron was destroyed. It was considered inappropriate to make any changes to the design of the installation of missile guns under the wing of the aircraft.

Note that field tests of RBS on Su-2, Il-2 and Pe-2 aircraft in the summer of 1941 were more successful. Phenomena similar to those observed on the SB did not occur on these aircraft. As a result, RBSs were recommended “...towards the introduction into service of the Red Army Air Force and Navy for use on the Pe-2, Il-2 and Su-2 against enemy land and sea targets..."

Against the backdrop of these events, work was underway to modernize the SB aircraft. The basis for further improvement of the aerodynamics of the SB-RK was the results of state tests of the experimental aircraft MMN 2M-105 and SB-RK 2M-105, carried out, as mentioned above, respectively, in the periods from July 1 to August 16, 1939 and from May 11 to 16 1940, as well as the results of the design of the high-speed short-range bomber SSB, carried out as part of a major modification of the SB aircraft.

In accordance with the Decree of the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 240 dated June 1, 1940, the 22nd aircraft plant was instructed to manufacture and present for testing 3 reference copies of the SB-RK aircraft with improved aerodynamics by August 15. It was necessary to obtain maximum speed “at the engine altitude limit of 490 km/h and the safety margin is 8.5”.

On the reference SB-RKs, the “standard” nose of the serial SBs was replaced with a more aerodynamically advanced F-1 nose, tested on the MMN aircraft, and a new convex canopy for the gunner-radio operator’s cockpit, the so-called “turtle,” was installed, reduced in height. In addition, a number of other improvements were made to the design of the aircraft.

The covering of the upper part of the center section between the 4th and 8th frames was made of balinite plywood, glued with VIAM glue to the wooden detachable parts of the 5th, 6th and 7th frames.

Significant changes were made to the propeller group. New sub-motor frames were installed, “new streamlined engine hoods”, were installed “new fin-tube water radiators...in the wing in special tunnels”, “a new oil system, including one water-oil and one air-oil radiator for each engine”, as well as new oil tanks and console gas tanks with a capacity of 330 liters. VISH-22E variable-pitch propellers with a diameter of 3 m were used.

The new bow provided improved working conditions for the navigator and pilot, ensuring direct communication between them. The glass area of the navigational cabin was increased in comparison with the cockpit of the MMN aircraft, and a second control with a folding steering wheel was installed. At the same time, in order to improve the pilot’s visibility through the glazing of the navigator’s cabin during landing and during a dive, the pilot’s seat was shifted to the left and the instrument panel to the right.

Aiming during bombing from horizontal flight was provided by NKPB-3 sights (for bombing at night and from low altitudes) and an OPB-1M sight installed in the navigator's cockpit.

To aim at the target during dive bombing, the pilot had a PBP-1 sight. A diving attitude indicator and an overload indicator were installed on the pilot's instrument panel.

The aircraft was equipped with brake grids under the planes, hydraulically controlled by the pilot, similar to the Ju-88 aircraft, as well as an automatic dive recovery system, which operated automatically when bombs were dropped. When entering a dive, after opening the command valve, the brake grids opened perpendicular to the flow. The release of the gratings was signaled by mechanical indicators, the so-called “soldiers”, which rose from the skin between the 10th and 11th ribs. At the same time, the elevator trim tabs rose, deflecting them down. When the bomb release button or an additional command button was pressed, the trimmers returned to their original position.

The aircraft's defensive small arms included three ShKAS machine guns: one with a mechanical sight in the nose ball mount (type NU-DB-3f) with 500 rounds of ammunition for the navigator, one with a K-8T collimator sight in the upper rear gun mount TSS-1 (1000 cartridges) and one with an OP-2L sight on the lower MV-2 turret retractable inside the fuselage with 600 rounds of ammunition.

The navigator's bow installation allowed firing in a 50° cone, the TSS-1 installation - 90° left and right, 60° up and 30° down, the lower installation of the MV-2 - 30° left and right and from 4-5 up to 55° down.

The TSS-1 turret was a semi-ring along which a carriage with a machine gun head moved. In the stowed position, the machine gun was located on the left side; for this purpose, a small cutout was made in the TSS-1 screen. When it was necessary to fire, the transparent screen of the turret moved backward along the rails and rose slightly upward, protecting the shooter from the oncoming air flow.

The aircraft's bomber armament had a number of improvements compared to the serial SB, in particular, the ability to mount large-caliber bombs was increased: for dive bombing - up to 4 FAB-250 (two on the outer mounts and two on the inside) or 3 FAB-500 bombs ( two outside and one inside), and when bombing from horizontal flight - up to 3 FAB-500 or 6 FAB-250 bombs (four outside and two inside) or 12 100 kg bombs (4 outside and 8 inside).

The normal bomb load was increased to 1000 kg, and the maximum overload - to 1500 kg. We especially note that the bomb weapon system ensured the release of 1500 kg of bombs both from horizontal flight and from a dive. During a dive, bombs were dropped both from bomb racks inside the fuselage and from 4 external NP-1 type holders completely recessed into the wing, designed by plant No. 22. On NP-1 holders, bombs were attached near the center of gravity by one central yoke and were secured using additional stops

The aircraft's chemical armament included two VAP-500 type air-draining devices (1000 kg in total) and two UKAP-500 type universal chemical aircraft devices (100 kg in total) only on external slings. VAP and UHAP ensured the use of all types of toxic substances, incendiary and smoke-forming mixtures that were in service with the Air Force.

In October 1940, factory tests began on the first prototype of the SB-RK aircraft, the standard for the series. By November 4, 11 flights had been completed. The main defects of the aircraft were: high water temperature (95-100°C) and oil (110-115°C) and insufficient longitudinal stability. On October 29, the 2nd copy of the reference SB-RK was transported to the factory airfield, on which it was planned to debug the weapon system. By this time, the construction of the 3rd reference SB-RK was nearing completion, which was supposed to be transferred to the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft for state testing. On this aircraft, compared to the first and second copies, some improvements were made: the cross-section of the outlet from the water radiator tunnel was increased by reducing the number of shutters (5 instead of 6), the depth control was changed, and an additional battery was installed in the forward fuselage of the F-1.

State tests of the experimental SB-RK, the standard for the series, were completed in January 1941. The leading test engineer was 1st rank military engineer M.I. Efimov, the test pilots were Major V.I. Zhdanov and Captain A.M. Khripkov. The test report was signed by the Head of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the spacecraft, Major General A.I. Filin on January 20, 1941 and on January 31 approved by the Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the spacecraft, Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov. In December, by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, the experienced SB-RK was renamed Ar-2.

During tests at a normal flight weight of 6600 kg, it was achieved maximum speed 475 km/h at an altitude of 4700 m. The time to climb to 5000 m was 7.1 minutes. The service ceiling with a normal flight weight was 10,000 m, and with a flight weight of 7,100 with two FAB-250 bombs on an external sling - 9,000 m. The technical flight range with an internal sling of two FAB-250 at an altitude of 5,000 m at a speed of 390 km/h was 990 km. The takeoff length with a flight weight of 7100 kg was 340 m.

It turned out that the aircraft at operational alignments from 30.5 to 32.7% of the MAR is unstable in the longitudinal sense. The plane became stable only when the alignment was 27.25% MAR. At the same time, lateral and directional stability at all operational alignments was satisfactory. The plane allowed flight with one throttled engine.

During the entire period of state testing, 25 dives were carried out at angles from 40° to 75° with the brake grids retracted and extended to measure the aircraft's dive characteristics. In addition, a dive was carried out on the target with actual bombing of live bombs by the casings. The dive entry speed was 275-295 km/h, the initial entry altitude was 4000 m, the dive exit speed was 550 km/h, and the overload at the exit averaged 4.5 units.

The brake grids and automatic dive recovery function worked flawlessly during testing. When diving at an angle of 75°, the duration of the straight section was 9 seconds, which ensured “...the possibility of targeted bombing”.

The main shortcomings of the new machine related mainly to the propeller-engine group. During the entire testing period on M-105 engines, the following occurred: “destruction of the right oil pump, as a result of which the motor had to be replaced; ... the formation of a crack in the lower crankcase cover on one engine, ... the overflow of gasoline from the carburetors, due to which there was a case of burning of the carburetor suction pipe.”

It was noted that “the cooling system in winter conditions operates at the upper limit of permissible temperatures for engines and will not at all ensure normal operation of the aircraft in summer conditions.” It turned out to be completely impossible to drain the water from the water radiators.

The temperature of the oil leaving the engine reached 110°C during the climb when the outside air temperature near the ground was minus 10°C. This was the upper limit for M-105 engines. The oil system proposed by the plant turned out to be completely unsuitable due to the frequent failure of oil-water radiators - during the entire testing period, 12 oil-water radiators were replaced. The 1.5 atm shunt valves provided by the design did not protect the water-oil radiators from destruction.

All this made the Ar-2 water and oil system “...unsuitable for use in units of the Red Army Air Force”.

As you can see, despite the fact that the M-105 engines were tested on the Ar-2 much later than on the SPB aircraft, and it was possible to analyze the results of the work of the Polikarpov team in fine-tuning this engine, the specialists of the A.A. Arkhangelsky Design Bureau also had to face significant difficulties . Subsequently, the engine installation on the Ar-2 was nevertheless brought to a condition acceptable for operation in parts.

Along with the advantages of the Ar-2 defensive small arms system, which had clear advantages over the existing system on the SB, specialists from the Air Force Research Institute also noted disadvantages. On the nasal installation: “...the power supply unit and the removal of links and sleeves have not been finalized - they often jam”. According to the upper installation of TSS-1: "…It has major defects, without eliminating which its combat use cannot be ensured: ... poor stability of the machine gun when firing; ...sight vibration; ...the link withdrawal is not debugged, which leads to frequent delays during shooting.”

As a general drawback, the use of defensive machine guns of normal caliber was pointed out, the effectiveness of which in air combat no longer met modern requirements. However, all Soviet serial bombers of that time had this drawback, and could not be considered fundamental.

The conclusions of the report on state tests of the aircraft noted that: “The Ar-2 aircraft, manufactured on the basis of the SB aircraft, is significantly better in flight and tactical characteristics than the serial SB aircraft, but in speed it lags behind modern foreign and domestic twin-engine medium bombers. ...The flight properties of the Ar-2 aircraft are similar to those of the SB aircraft, and control of the aircraft is even easier. In terms of controllability and visibility for the pilot, the aircraft is convenient for piloting in formation. ...The Ar-2 aircraft can be cleared for operation in units of the Red Army Air Force, subject to limited use of the power of the M-105 engines...”

The Arkhangelsk Design Bureau and Plant No. 22 were required to bring the propeller-engine group to perfection, ensure the longitudinal stability of the aircraft in all operational modes, upgrade the armament and eliminate the existing defects of the machine, noted in the act and in the report on state tests.

In February 1941, the Ar-2 No. 1/511 with improvements made to its design based on the results of state tests of the lead Ar-2 entered state tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Spacecraft. The M-105R engines on this aircraft were moved forward by 150 mm to improve longitudinal stability. VIT1T-22E propellers with a diameter of 3.1 m were installed. The motor reduction was changed to 0.59 (instead of 0.66). In addition, the aircraft was equipped with thinner brake grilles and jet exhaust pipes. The aircraft's workmanship and surface finish have been greatly improved. These modifications made it possible to obtain a maximum ground speed of 443 km/h and 512 km/h at an altitude of 5000 m.

It would seem worthwhile to continue work on improving the aerodynamics of the Ar-2 and strengthening its armament, thus ensuring the required flight and combat qualities of the aircraft in the series, as well as at an accelerated pace to bring the B-1 to flight and combat condition. However, fate decreed otherwise.

By this time, the lead Pe-2 (in accordance with NKAP order No. 704 of December 9, 1940, PB-100 was renamed Pe-2) had already successfully passed tests, showing good results - with a flight weight of 7536 kg, the maximum speed at an altitude of 5100 m reached the coveted 540 km/h, ceiling - 8700 m, flight range 1200 km. Normal bomb load is 600 kg, overload is 1000 kg.

Starting from the new year, aircraft factories No. 39 and No. 22, intended for the Pe-2 series, began to roll out products onto the airfield. The leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force became confident that all the technological and organizational problems associated with the launch of the “pawn” into a large series would be quickly resolved.

On January 29, 1941, the experimental dive bomber “103” with AM-37 engines designed by the OTB NKVD made its first flight under the factory testing program. At the same time, at the 156th aircraft plant, the construction of an improved copy of this aircraft “103U” 2AM-37 was in full swing - the completion of the work was planned in March.

According to GKO Decree No. 401 of October 11, 1940, the maximum speed of these variants of the “103” aircraft was to be 580-600 km/h at an altitude of 7000 m, normal bomb load -1000 kg (overload up to 3000 kg), flight range with normal bomb load - 2500 km, small arms and cannon weapons - 2 ShVAK cannons and 5 ShKAS machine guns.

The first results of factory tests of the "103" aircraft inspired hope that the Air Force would soon be able to obtain an attack aircraft, which, in its flight and combat performance, surpassed all combat vehicles of this class known at the beginning of 1941 and would completely resolve “the task of arming the Red Army Air Force with front-line dive bombers.”

As a result, by the Decree of the Defense Committee of February 11, 1941, serial production of the Yak-4 (by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, BB-22 2M-105 was renamed Yak-4) at aircraft plant No. 81 was discontinued. Serial production of the Arkhangelsky bomber, the Ar-2 2M-105, also ceased. V.M. Petlyakov’s dive bomber, the Pe-2, was firmly established at the 22nd aircraft plant.

On April 1, 1941, A.I. Shakhurin signed order No. 291 “On the design and construction of the MoV-2 aircraft with the AM-38 engine designed by G.M. Mozharovsky. and Venevidova I.V.” Design was entrusted to plant No. 32, and construction to plant No. 89. Since A.A. Arkhangelsky had previously participated in the development preliminary design this attack aircraft, then on April 10, an order was issued by NKAP No. 309, according to which the entire design team of A.A. Arkhangelsky was transferred to the 32nd plant to support the design and construction of MoV-2.

As you can see, the creation of a modern front-line bomber of the Air Force KA on the eve of the big war took place under the slogan “give speed”, and certain successes were achieved in this direction. However, it must be admitted that the “high-speed” development Soviet aircraft bomber type was to the detriment of their basic combat qualities. The passion for speed at the then level of development of the Soviet aircraft industry, mainly engine building, naturally led to a serious reduction in the combat load of bombers, and therefore to a decrease in the “power of bombing attacks on the enemy.” Thus, the main Soviet front-line bomber Pe-2 had a very modest normal bomb load for such an aircraft - only 600 kg (overload 1000 kg), and the high-speed short-range dive bomber BB-22PB had even less - 400 kg (overload 500 kg).

At the same time, in the pre-war period, no serious research was carried out to find optimal forms and methods of combat use of aviation in modern warfare. As a result, work on determining the optimal directions for aviation development (composition and organizational structure of aviation combat forces) and analyzing the combat effectiveness of aircraft has not received due attention various types in a future war. Accordingly, the appearance (flight performance data and design layout of the aircraft, number of engines, crew composition, composition of weapons and layout of their placement on the aircraft, required size of ammunition, etc.) of promising combat aircraft (fighter, front-line bomber, attack aircraft) was not determined etc.) and recommendations for improving the aircraft already in service with the Air Force were not developed.

In turn, the lack of a well-founded concept for the construction of the Red Army Air Force led to the fact that neither the military, nor the country's leadership and the NKAP on the eve of the war had a clear and precise understanding of what combat aircraft, in what quantity and in what proportion it was necessary to equip the air force with spacecraft. And most importantly, there was no unity of views on these issues.

As a result, when making decisions on the creation of a new generation of combat aircraft, as well as on the commissioning or decommissioning of a particular aircraft by the Air Force, only some indicators characterizing the individual flight and combat qualities of the aircraft were taken into account and compared. In fact, all decisions were made by the Defense Committee, the Air Forces of the Spacecraft and the NKAP blindly and for the most part without taking into account the specific combat situation in which the combat vehicles would have to fight.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of a combined arms commander, what is important is not what speed, for example, a bomber flies, or what its ceiling is, but what damage a bomber can inflict on the enemy when performing a specific combat mission in the interests of ground troops. That is, for a combined arms commander important characteristics bomber are: the weight and composition of the bomb load, the effectiveness of the used aviation weapons (air bombs, incendiary mixture, etc.) against specific targets, the accuracy of bombing and shooting. On the other hand, the bomber solves a specific combat mission in the face of counteraction from enemy fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And from these positions, the following are important: speed, maneuverability, ceiling, effectiveness of defensive weapons, combat survivability of the aircraft, etc.

In this regard, to complete the description of the development of the Soviet concept of a high-speed attack aircraft, it is interesting to compare the pre-war serial and experimental dive bombers of the KA Air Force and the Luftwaffe - Ar-2, Pe-2, BB-22PB, "103U", SPB and Ju-88A- 4, from the point of view of their potential combat effectiveness in the conditions of battles on the eastern front.

We will assess the combat effectiveness of bomber aircraft based on the likelihood of the latter completing a specific combat mission to destroy targets in the interests of ground forces, or the likelihood of a bomber’s combat success. In this case, the probability of a bomber's combat success is determined by the probabilities for the bomber not to be shot down by enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery on approach to and over the target, the probability of reaching the target area with a given error, the probability of detecting the target visually and the probability of hitting the target during bombing.

All calculations for the compared aircraft were carried out for the same conditions of their combat use. Typical ground targets and conditions for ground and air battles on the eastern front were taken as initial data. Two methods of combat use of bombers were considered: dive bombing against small-sized, hard-to-vulnerable targets (long-term defensive structures with a floor thickness of no more than 70 cm, bridges, warehouses, etc.), the destruction of which required the use of large-caliber bombs (250 kg and above) , and bombing from a horizontal flight at an area weakly protected or unprotected target (a column of infantry, vehicles and lightly armored vehicles, artillery and mortar guns in position, etc.). In all cases, the maximum characteristics of the aircraft were taken into account in the calculations.

The probabilities of a bomber entering the target area and detecting it were taken equal to one in the calculations. When calculating the probability of hitting a target during bombing, the characteristics of the target's vulnerability in relation to specific types of weapons used were taken into account. The flight and shooting training of pilots and navigators is good.

When assessing the probability of a bomber being shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, it was assumed that the distribution of anti-aircraft artillery (ZA guns) in the enemy tactical defense zone was uniform. Since the operating altitudes of front-line bombers on the eastern front were 2000-3000 m, only medium-caliber ZA barrels were taken into account in the calculations. The bomber's anti-aircraft maneuver was taken into account by introducing an additional error into the aiming of anti-aircraft crews.

When calculating the probability of a bomber being shot down by a fighter, the following assumptions were made, simplifying the calculations, but not affecting the general conclusion when comparative assessment combat effectiveness of bombers of various types: the German Bf.109f-1 was taken as an enemy fighter, the detection and attack of a bomber by an enemy fighter is carried out from a loitering position in the air, the probability of detecting a bomber by the pilot of an attacking fighter in the patrol zone is carried out visually and is taken equal to 1, when calculating the probability of a fighter launching an attack on an enemy bomber from the rear hemisphere (i.e., approaching and combat turning with reaching the attack curve at the opening fire distance) the dive characteristics, rate of climb and time of steady turn (radius) were taken into account, while in all calculations it was it is accepted that the maximum overload on the attack curve at which the pilot could conduct aimed fire does not exceed 4 units, - the probability of a bomber being shot down by a fighter was assessed taking into account the return fire of the bomber's air gunner, - shooting and flight training of fighter pilots - good shooting training of air the arrow is good, - the bomber's anti-fighter maneuver was taken into account by introducing an additional error in aiming, - the conditions of air battles (distribution of firing angles, firing distances and burst lengths, maximum overloads during an attack, etc.) were taken as typical for the period of air battles during the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War, - sights: for fighters - optical, for an air gunner of a bomber - mechanical, - the fighter's shooting in all cases is accompanying. Calculations show that in typical combat conditions on the eastern front, when solving a combat mission of destroying small, hard-to-vulnerable targets, the Ar-2 dive bomber was almost 5.5 times more efficient than the BB-22PB bomber, the Pe-2 was 1.4 times more efficient, and German Ju-88A-4 - 1.3 times.

When solving the combat mission of destroying an area weakly protected target, of all serial Soviet bombers, the Ar-2 again showed the best result. At the same time, the Pe-2 “laged behind” the Ar-2 by 1.3 times, and the BB-22PB by almost 2.5 times. At the same time, the Ar-2 was inferior to the Junkers in terms of efficiency in this type of dual event by about 1.3 times.

The experienced YuZU 2AM-37 dive bomber was superior in combat effectiveness to both the Ar-2 and Ju-88A-4 in solving any tasks of air support for troops. Unlike its opponents, the YuZU was capable of carrying three FAB-1000s (maximum bomb rack capacity) and “throwing” them from a dive.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of war did not allow the aircraft to be quickly brought to flight-combat condition - the AM-37 engine was removed from mass production, and the M-82A engine installed on the aircraft instead suffered from many “childhood” diseases. As a result, the first three production Tu-2 2M-82 (by order of the NKAP No. 234 dated March 28, 1942, the “103” aircraft were given the designation Tu-2) reached the front only in September 1942, and rhythmic and high-quality serial production (already with M-82FN engines) was established only by mid-1944. However, the bomber lost the “ability” to dive bomb—the brake grilles with the control system were removed from the aircraft. The vehicle began to be classified as a medium bomber intended “to carry out daytime bombing missions from horizontal flight near the enemy’s rear.”

A clear outsider when solving any combat mission is the BB-22PB. It should be recognized that the adoption of the BB-22 aircraft in the bomber version by the Air Force is a grave mistake of the Air Force, NKAP and the Defense Committee. It had no real combat value, but a lot of effort and money was spent on its introduction into mass production and development in units.

A serious mistake is the cessation of serial production of the Ar-2 bomber in favor of launching a mass production of the Pe-2 bomber.

The apparent main drawback of the Ar-2 - a lower maximum flight speed compared to the Pe-2 - was completely “covered up” by optimizing the tactics of combat use of the dive bomber, better organizing interaction with cover fighters and control in battle, as well as training the flight personnel of bomber regiments in air combat with enemy fighters alone and as part of a group. This is confirmed by the example of the Luftwaffe pilots, who, having attack aircraft with mediocre flight characteristics, achieved high efficiency in combat operations mainly due to the rational tactics of their combat use, excellent organization of interaction with their fighter aircraft and with ground troops, and good flight and combat training of the crews. .

Most importantly, the Ar-2 had excellent takeoff and landing qualities and was more accessible than the Pe-2 for mastery by young wartime sergeants. As you know, the Pe-2 absolutely did not tolerate high leveling - in this case the landing gear was guaranteed to break. “Pawns” broken during landings accounted for up to 30% of faulty vehicles in units.

In any case, throughout the war, the Ar-2 could show better combat effectiveness in solving any combat mission of front-line bomber aviation than the main dive bomber of the Air Force, the Pe-2 aircraft.

As follows from the analysis of the potential combat effectiveness of the compared bombers, the bomb armament system of the German Ju-88A-4 was more consistent with the distribution of typical ground targets against which aviation had to operate on the eastern front in the initial period of the war than the bomb armament of Soviet bomb carriers.

The main caliber of the Junkers was a 50-kg aerial bomb - 28 pieces on board, while the bomb armament system of Soviet bombers was mainly designed to carry 100-kg aerial bombs (6-12 pieces). It was in this version of the suspension that the carrying capacity of Soviet aircraft was maximally used. When using smaller caliber bombs, Soviet bomb carriers found themselves underloaded. For example, when suspending bombs of 50 kg caliber, the Pe-2 “did not reach” 100 kg to the normal bomb load and 500 kg to the maximum.

At the same time, based on the vulnerability characteristics of typical ground targets in the initial period of the war (motorized mech columns, artillery batteries in positions, etc.), the main type of aerial bombs should have been fragmentation bombs of 25 kg caliber and high-explosive bombs of 50 kg caliber, as well as smaller caliber fragmentation bombs. For example, the reduced area of destruction of armored personnel carriers and light tanks when dropped from a height of 500-1000 m by ten FAB-50m was about 400 m2, and by six FAB-100 - only 180 m2.

In the directive of the Air Force Commander Colonel General P.F. Zhigarev No. 14501/12153 dated January 25, 1942 on the results of the inspection of the combat operations of air units of the Western and Southwestern Fronts in January 1942, it was stated in this regard that: “...In the majority of aviation units of the air forces of the Western and Southwestern Fronts, illiterate use of small arms, cannon and bomber weapons was noted... The caliber and type of bombs used often do not correspond to the nature of the target. Standard charges are used: FAB-100 or FAB-50, even against targets that require destruction with fragmentation bombs...”

Conducted by the head of the department of small arms and cannon armament of VVA aircraft named after. N.E. Zhukovsky, 1st rank military engineer E.B. Lunts, in February-March 1942, analyzed the combat experience of units of the Western and Southwestern Fronts (19th, 46th, 47th and 63rd Garden), The 6th and 7th IAK Air Defense for the period June-December 1941 showed that in many cases bombs were used mainly based on the convenience and speed of preparing aircraft for combat missions, while the protection of targets and the effectiveness of bombs (lethal fragmentation force, high explosive effect, etc.).

According to Lunts, during the first 6 months of the war, all types of aviation spent 41.6% of combat sorties on carrying out the combat mission of destroying tanks, mechanized troops, artillery in positions and manpower, 2.5% on actions against enemy airfields and by railway objects - 1.6%. The remaining sorties were associated with the performance of combat missions without the use of aerial bombs.

That is, instead of using fragmentation bombs like AO-25s, AO-25m and high-explosive bombs like FAB-50, FAB-50m, bomber air units used bombs like FAB-100 - 56% of the weight of all bombs dropped on the enemy.

At the conclusion of his report, Professor Luntz suggested “...remove the FAB-100 from service” and “...prohibit units in the pursuit of tonnage from using bombs that do not correspond to the nature of the target (for example, FAB-100 instead of FAB-50m or AO-25).”

On the other hand, at the beginning of the war there were few enemy ground targets, the destruction of which required the use of large-caliber aerial bombs (pillboxes, bunkers, bridges, warehouses, etc.), and changes should be made to the design of combat aircraft in order to ensure maximum loading with bombs caliber 50-25 kg was “troublesome” and also risky. So, to correct the situation, we had to urgently create 100-kg bombs that were more effective in terms of fragmentation. The most successful, as we know, were the high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-100 and the incendiary ZAB-100. OFAB-100 had a powerful high-explosive effect when exploded and produced a lot of heavy fragments, which at a distance of up to 10 m from the point of detonation could penetrate German tank armor up to 30 mm thick and disable 155 mm field guns. In turn, the incendiary “weaving” easily pierced the ceilings of buildings, knocking out windows and doors with a high-explosive blow, thereby providing an air flow for the spread of fire.

The situation changed in 1944-1945, when the Red Army and the Space Forces faced particularly strong Wehrmacht defenses. As is known, German fortified areas were a rather difficult target for aviation due to the high saturation of air defense systems, the small size and high strength of long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures. The usual density was up to 6 bunkers and bunkers per 1 km of front, although in some cases their number reached 20 per 1 km of front. The missile defense strip along the front ranged from 30 to 140 km, and the total number of bunkers and bunkers - from 60 to 900. At the same time, the capabilities of the main front-line bomber of the Air Force KA Pe-2 were still insufficient - two FAB-250 standard bomb loads (4 The FAB-250 was rarely “dragged”) did not provide the required probability of hitting Wehrmacht fortifications, and the Tu-2 2M-82 bomber, as noted above, by this time had already lost its diving properties.

That’s when the finest hour of the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 dive bomber could have come - its ability to carry 6 FAB-250 or three 500-kg aerial bombs and “throw” them from a dive could be more useful to the Red Army than ever. By this time, the Ar-2 would have already gone a certain way to improve its flight and combat qualities by strengthening defensive weapons, improving aerodynamics, and increasing power power plant and combat survivability. Naturally, the Ar-2 could not completely replace the Tu-2, but it would complement it successfully.

One can only regret that as of June 1, 1941, the KA Air Force units had only 164 Ar-2 2M-105 aircraft, of which: 147 (3 faulty) aircraft were in units of the Military Districts, the rest were in units of the Center and 22 -m plant. In the conditions of the strategic retreat of the Red Army and the frankly poor organization of combat operations of aviation and ground troops, the Ar-2 bombers were unable to show all that they were capable of. In addition, due to the lack of the required cover by its fighters and insufficient training of the flight personnel, most of the Ar-2 was lost in the first months of the war - according to official data from the headquarters of the Air Force, the combat losses of the Ar-2 in 1941 amounted to 95 aircraft.

Let us note that the leadership and specialists of the Russian Navy Air Force, when developing a plan to equip naval aviation with modern combat aircraft in 1941, considered the Ar-2 as the main type of dive bomber, and the “pawn” mainly as a long-range escort fighter. But no one “heard” their opinion...

Modification: Ar-2
Wingspan, m: 18.00
Length, m: 12.50
Height, m: 3.56
Wing area, m2: 48.20
Weight, kg
-an empty plane: 4516
-normal takeoff: 6660
-maximum take-off: 8150
Engine type: 2 x PD M-105R
-power, hp: 2 x 1100
Maximum speed, km/h
-near the ground: 443
-at altitude: 512
Cruising speed, km/h: 475
Practical range, km: 1500
Rate of climb, m/min: 765
Practical ceiling, m: 10500
Crew: 3
Armament: 4 x 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns

Continuation. Beginning in AiK No. 2,3,4/2003

External load of four 230 kg bombs on Ar-2

In parallel with the development of the SB-RK 2M-105, the Arkhangelsk Design Bureau began developing a new high-speed short-range bomber SBB. At first, the new aircraft had the index C (under this designation the aircraft model was purged at TsAGI), but soon the aircraft index was replaced by B. The aircraft was conceived as a radical modification of the serial SB with increased flight and combat performance and continuity in production technology. When designing it, the experience of creating MMN, SB-RK was used. and later Ar-2. The SSB crew included a pilot, a navigator and a gunner-radio operator.

The main advantage of the new aircraft was its significantly improved aerodynamics. The general layout and combat scheme of the B bomber were similar to the SB aircraft, but with a two-tail tail. In order to “maximize the speed of the aircraft,” the load per unit area of the wing in the normal version of the combat load was increased to 149 kg/m 2 and up to 162 kg/m 2 in the reloading room. In this regard, the wing area was reduced to 40 m G. The wing became shorter and slightly narrower in comparison with the SB wing. At the same time, to ensure the required landing speed, it was planned to use TsAGI flaps, which were a cross between conventional flaps and Fowler flaps. The wing profile was chosen as a high-speed NACA-22 type with a relative thickness at the root of 14.7% and at the tip of 8%.

The SBB design assumed the widespread use of open profiles instead of pipes, stamping, and load-bearing cladding. The skin of the SBB aircraft, and especially the wing, was made smooth with flush riveting. The wing tip and its upper part between the wing spars had a skin of bakelite plywood glued to a metal frame. It was assumed that such a wing design should provide the necessary strength and good aerodynamics.

The fuselage was made in the form of a well-streamlined "airship shape", which, according to experts. was the most advantageous from an aerodynamic point of view.

Water radiators were located inside the center section of the wing with an inlet at the center section toe and an outlet at the rear. Moreover, it was supposed to use ribbed aluminum radiators designed by the Leningrad SKB NKAP.

The tail support was retractable in flight.

The design of the aircraft provided for a significant simplification of technology compared to the SB aircraft. Open profiles were used on the SBB. including spars (instead of pipes on the SB). Exposed riveting was used throughout the car. A number of elements were made by stamping. The number of welded assemblies was reduced and replaced with stamped ones made of duralumin and steel.

The center section spars were steel channels with flanges connected to each other by braces made of pipes, and in some places by sheet metal.

The flanges of the side members of the detachable part of the wing were made of two pressed corners riveted together with a flange bent in cross-section. The upper and lower belts were connected to each other by a smooth sheet supported by vertical corner posts.

The ribs were stamped from sheet duralumin. The upper wing skin between the spars, working in compression, was reinforced from the inside with corrugation. This section of the upper center section skin was “not cut”, but passed entirely through the fuselage. For the same purpose, in order not to make any cuts in the lower part of the wing, they refused to retract the landing gear into the wing.

For the “correct operation” of the load-bearing part of the skin, the connection of the detachment with the center section was carried out not at four points, but along the entire contour of the bow in the area between the side members.

The use of load-bearing skin ensured greater survivability of the aircraft and made it possible to better “make the surface and maintain the wing profile.”

According to calculations, the safety margin was provided for case A equal to 8 instead of 7 for the SB aircraft.

The M-105 with a TK-2 turbocharger was considered as the main engine of the SBB power plant. In addition to it, it was supposed to use the M-106 engine.

By this time, the M-105 had already passed 50-hour state tests, and the TK-2 turbocharger was installed on an SB aircraft with M-103 engines for flight testing.

In the future, in order to further improve the aerodynamics of the aircraft, it was planned to install the M-105TK upside down. In this case, the layout of the engine unit and radiator was improved and space was freed up in the wing to accommodate gas tanks instead of radiators. There was an agreement on this issue with the engine builders of the 26th plant. However, later this version of the engine installation was abandoned as it did not have significant advantages for the bomber aircraft over the traditional installation of the engine.

In both options, it was planned to use three-bladed propellers of the 3-SMV-2 type variable in flight with a diameter of 3.25 m.

The normal bomb load was 600 kg, during overload - 1000 kg (of which 800 kg inside the fuselage). The range of aerial bombs included aerial bombs of calibers from 2.5 to 250 kg. At the same time, small fragmentation and incendiary bombs of 2.5-15 kg caliber, as well as chemical bullets, were loaded into cassettes of small bombs. High-explosive aerial bombs of 250 kg caliber and air-draining devices of the VAP-200 type were suspended only on external bomb racks. The reloading version of the bomb load was obtained by using 10 FAB-100s, of which 8 were placed in the fuselage, and a couple of “hundreds” were placed on external bomb racks.

Small arms included one normal-caliber UltraShKAS machine gun in the navigator's nose mount and one UltraShKAS or heavy-caliber ShBAK-12.7 machine gun on the pivot for the radio operator. The navigator's machine gun had 600 rounds of ammunition, and the radio operator's gunner had 800 rounds of ammunition for the UltraShKAS and 300 rounds of ammunition for the ShVAK.

SBB-1

The normal flight weight of the SBB with M-I05TK engines was 5961 kg, and with the M-106 engine - 5851 kg. The estimated maximum flight speed with M-105TK engines was supposed to be 455 km/h at the ground and 612 km/h at an altitude of 9000 m. With M-106 engines - 587 km/h at an altitude of 7000 m.

The rate of climb of a bomber with M-I05TK was expected to be higher than in the version with M-106 engines - the SBB 2M-I05TK climbed to a height of 5000 m in 5.5 minutes, and the SBB 2M-I06 in 6 minutes.

In both variants, the takeoff run with normal flight weight without the use of flaps was 350 m. The landing speed did not exceed 118 km/h.

The flight range of the SBB at a speed of 0.8 from the maximum did not exceed 880 km in the version with M-I05TK engines and 970 km in the version with M-106 engines. In the fuel overload version, the maximum flight range with a take-off weight of 6466 kg could be no more than 1500 km.

To increase the flight range, the project provided for the suspension under the wing of outboard jettisonable fuel tanks for 520 kg of fuel. In this case, the take-off weight of the aircraft reached 7025 kg.

In general, as follows from the analysis of the flight-tactical data of the SBB aircraft presented in the project, all the declared data were quite real, although overestimated in some respects. In response to the military’s comments on this matter, the Arkhangelsk Design Bureau promptly made the necessary changes to the project. According to additional materials the maximum speed of the SBB 2M-I05TK-2 at an altitude of 8500 m was supposed to be 600 km/h, the flight range with 600 kg bombs at 0.8 maximum speed was 800 km and the ceiling was 10500 m. But these figures also raised doubts. The head of the aircraft department of the 7th Main Directorate of the NKAP, I. I. Mashkevich, in his letter addressed to the Deputy Head of the 11th Main Directorate, Leontyev, indicated that: “...According to the flight data, a remark should be made regarding speed. The drag coefficients are taken to be underestimated, and therefore they need to be increased... then The maximum speed with an efficiency of 0.7 instead of 0.76 is obtained at 9000 m as follows: ... 570 km/h. The remaining data does not cause any comments."

The conclusion on the preliminary design of the SBB was approved by the Head of the Space Forces Air Force, commander of the 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov and the Member of the Military Council of the Space Forces Air Force, divisional commissar F.A. Agaltsov on October 11, 1939 with the amendment: “Increase the fuel supply - normal range 1000 km , with an overload of 1500 km without external suspension at a speed of 0.9 V poppy ".

In November 1939, after discussing the SBB layout, a decision was made to build the aircraft. According to the Decree of the Defense Committee of March 4, 1940, two copies of the B-1 and B-2 were built. The first option corresponded to the variant of a high-speed bomber, and the second - to a dive bomber. The B-2 aircraft differed from the B-1 in having a wider fuselage and a slightly different layout of the forward fuselage.

A prototype of the B-1, which was equipped with serial M-105 engines. Construction was completed by October 1940, after which factory testing began. On October 20, the B-1 was taken to the airfield of the 22nd plant, ground work and taxiing were carried out. Bearing in mind the sad experience of testing SPB 2M-105. accompanied by disasters and numerous forced landings due to the fault of the M-105 engines. The first flights of the B-1 under the factory test program were decided to be carried out from a large airfield. The plane was transported to the Central Airfield, where test flights were carried out on October 30. The approaches showed that the B-1 was ready for its first flight, however, due to the lack of a TsAGI conclusion on flutter, they did not dare to release the aircraft on its first flight. After receiving a conclusion from TsAGI, pilot Yu. K. Stankevich performed the first flight on the B-1 on November 6. Having completed 6 flights, which were generally successful, they decided to transport the car back to the airfield of the 22nd plant in Fili in the summer. On November 26, 1940, after landing at the airfield in Fili, the left landing gear strut broke during taxiing.

Meanwhile, at the end of October 1940, M.A. Lipkim took off the BB-22PB dive bomber. which, with a flight weight of 5962 kg, showed a speed of 533 km/h at an altitude of 5100 m. The bomb load of the “twenty-second” included 4 FAB-100 or 2 FAB-250.

Preparations for factory testing of the head serial dive bomber PB-100 produced by plant No. 39 were in full swing. The first flights under the factory testing program were scheduled for the first ten days of December.

It was at this time, on November 18, 1940, that a meeting of the joint commission of the NKAP, the Air Force and TsAGI was held, during which, based on a comparison of the main characteristics of the PB-100, SB-RK bombers. BB-22G1B and B, it was concluded that it was advisable to launch the PB-100 aircraft into serial production as the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA and to retain the BB-22 in the series (to protect the “hundredth”, since it was built from non-scarce materials). With regard to the B-1 aircraft, it was indicated that the latter, compared to the PB-100 with the same engines and original defensive weapons, has significantly better takeoff and landing characteristics and rate of climb. However, the commission did not make any decisions on the B-1 (on stopping or intensifying work on the aircraft). According to the commission’s conclusion, “...aircraft B, compared to the PB-100, is one year late and has not yet passed testing.”

Such cautious behavior of the commission is quite understandable. On the one hand, the commission members may have already understood that in the event of war, the well-developed technology of the B bomber and its good takeoff, landing and aerobatic qualities would play almost a decisive role in the rapid deployment of mass production of combat vehicles and the training of wartime flight personnel , having in all respects poor initial flight training. In addition, the launch into mass production of the Pe-2 bomber, which was quite difficult for the Soviet aviation industry, still concealed many pitfalls, and to expect good results from BB-22PB 2M-105 it was still not necessary. But, on the other hand, how the B-1 would behave in the future, and especially its engine installation, was still not completely clear. The commission members wisely decided not to take risks - “Better a bird in the hand than a pie in the sky.” The decision on the B-1 was postponed “for later,” and Arkhangelsky was given the chance to bring his bomber to flight-combat condition.

SPB Polikarpov

Bomber Yakovlev Yak-4

Airplane "100" Petlyakov

Pe-2 dive bomber

Taking advantage of the accident, the Arkhangelsky Design Bureau decided, simultaneously with the repair of the landing gear, to make a number of changes to the aircraft design based on the results of the first test flights. In an updated form, the B-1 bomber again went on a test flight only on February 20, 1441. From March 24 to July 9, 1941, factory tests were carried out, during which test pilot Yu. K. Stankevich reached an altitude of 4900 m maximum speed 540 km/h. It was expected that after eliminating some design flaws, the bomber's speed would increase to 560-565 km/h.

At the same time, in February 1941, the Ar-2 N° 1/511 with improvements made to its design based on the results of state tests of the parent Ar-2 entered state tests at the Air Force Scientific Research Institute. The M-I05P engines on this aircraft were moved forward by 150 mm to improve longitudinal stability. VISH-22E propellers with a diameter of 3.1 m were installed. The motor reduction was changed to 0.59 (instead of 0.66). In addition, the aircraft was equipped with thinner brake grilles and jet exhaust pipes. The aircraft's workmanship and surface finish have been greatly improved. These modifications made it possible to obtain a maximum ground speed of 443 km/h and 512 km/h at an altitude of 5000 m.

It would seem that. It is worth continuing work to improve the aerodynamics of the Ar-2 and strengthening its armament, thus ensuring the required flight and combat qualities of the aircraft in the series, as well as at an accelerated pace to bring the B-1 to flight and combat condition. However, fate decreed otherwise.

By this time, the lead Pe-2 (in accordance with the order of the PKAP No. 704 of 00.12.40, PB-100 was renamed rt Pe-2 - author) had already successfully passed tests, showing good results - with a flight weight of 7536 kg, the maximum speed was at an altitude of 5100 m was the cherished 540 km/h. ceiling - 8700 m. flight range 1200 km. Normal bomb load is 600 kg, overload is 1000 kg.

Starting from the new year, aircraft factories No. 39 and No. 22, designed for the Pe-2 series. They began to roll out products onto the airfield. The leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force became confident that all the technological and organizational problems associated with the launch of the “pawn” into a large series would be quickly resolved.

On January 29, 1941, the experimental dive bomber "103" 2AM-37, designed by the OTB NKVD, made its first flight under the factory testing program. At the same time, at the 156th aircraft plant, the construction of an improved copy of this aircraft, the YuZU 2AM-37, was in full swing - the completion of the work was planned for March.

According to the State Defense Committee Resolution N? 401 of October 11, 1940, the maximum speed of these variants of the "103" aircraft was supposed to be 580-600 km/h at an altitude of 7000 m. The normal bomb load is 1000 kg (overload up to 3000 kg), flight range with a normal bomb load is - 2500 km. small arms and cannon weapons - 2 ShVAK cannons and 5 ShKAS machine guns.

The first results of the factory tests of the "103" aircraft inspired hope that the Air Force would soon be able to obtain an attack aircraft, which in its flight and combat performance surpasses all combat vehicles of this class known at the beginning of 1941 and will completely solve the "task of arming the Red Army's LIS with front-line dive bombers ".

As a result, by the Decree of the Defense Committee of February 2, 1941, serial production of the Yak-4 (by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, BB-22 2M-105 was renamed Yak-4) at aircraft plant No. 81 was discontinued. Serial production of the Arkhangelsky bomber, the Ar-2 2M-105, also ceased. V. M. Petlyakov’s dive bomber, the Pe-2, was firmly established at the 22nd aircraft plant.

BASIC YEARS AND TACTICAL DATA OF THE SBB AIRCRAFT (according to the preliminary design, 1939)

Bomb rack for dive bombing PB-3 for Ar-2

On April 1, 1941, A. I. Shakyrin signed order No. 291 “On the design and construction of the MoV-2 aircraft with an AM-38 engine designed by G. M. Mozharovsky and I. V. Venevidov.” The design was entrusted to plant No. 32, and construction to plant No. 89. Since A. A. Arkhangelsky had previously participated in the development of the preliminary design of this attack aircraft, on April 10 an order was issued by NKAP N? 309, according to which the entire design team of A. A. Arkhangelsky was transferred to the 32nd plant to support the design and construction of MoV-2.

Despite the difficulties associated with moving and settling into a new location, in the summer of 1941, the second version of the SBB, the B-2 dive bomber, was built. It was assumed that, compared to the B-1, its maximum speed at the design altitude would be 40-60 km/h higher.

At the same time, due to the success of the “103” and “YUZU” bombers during testing at the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft, the military and NKAP’s interest in the B aircraft steadily declined, and the outbreak of the war completely interrupted all work on this machine. A. A. Arkhangelsky himself, by order of the NKAP No. 823 of August 9, 1941, was transferred to aircraft plant No. 156 to organize the repair and restoration of serial SB bombers. Subsequently, the design bureau of A. A. Arkhangelsky was evacuated to Omsk in October 1941, and the B-1 aircraft was sent to the rear in December 1941. What happened to him next is unknown.

As you can see, the creation of a modern front-line bomber of the Air Force KA on the eve of the big war took place under the slogan “give speed,” and certain successes were achieved in this direction. However, it must be admitted that the “high-speed” development of Soviet bomber-type aircraft came at the expense of their basic combat qualities. The passion for speed at the then level of development of the Soviet aircraft industry, mainly engine building, naturally led to a serious reduction in the combat load of bombers, and therefore to a decrease in the “power of bombing strikes on the enemy.” Thus, the main Soviet front-line bomber Pe-2 had a very modest normal bomb load for such an aircraft - only 600 kg (overload 1000 kg), and the high-speed short-range dive bomber BB-22PB and even less - 400 kg (overload 500 kg).

At the same time, in the pre-war period, no serious research was carried out to find optimal forms and methods of combat use of aviation in modern warfare. As a result, work on determining the optimal directions for the development of aviation (composition and organizational structure of combat aviation forces) and analyzing the combat effectiveness of various types of aircraft in a future war has not received due attention. Accordingly, the appearance (flight performance data and design layout of the aircraft, number of engines, crew composition, composition of weapons and layout of their placement on the aircraft, required size of ammunition, etc.) of promising combat aircraft (fighter, front-line bomber, attack aircraft) was not determined etc.) and recommendations for improving the aircraft already in service with the Air Force were not developed.

In turn, the lack of a well-founded concept for the construction of the Red Army Air Force led to the fact that neither the military. On the eve of the war, neither the country's leadership nor the NKAP had a clear and precise understanding of what combat aircraft, in what quantity and in what proportion the Air Force should be equipped with spacecraft. And most importantly, there was no unity of views on these issues.

As a result, when making decisions on the creation of a new generation of combat aircraft, as well as on the introduction or removal from service of the Air Force of a particular aircraft, only a few indicators were taken into account and compared. characterizing separately the flight and separately combat qualities of aircraft. In fact, all decisions were made by the Defense Committee, the Air Forces of the Spacecraft and the NKAP blindly and for the most part without taking into account the specific combat situation in which the combat vehicles would have to fight.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of a combined arms commander, what is important is not what speed, for example, a bomber flies, or what its ceiling is, but what damage a bomber can inflict on the enemy when performing a specific combat mission in the interests of ground troops. That is, for a combined arms commander, the important characteristics of a bomber are: the weight and composition of the bomb load, the effectiveness of the used aviation weapons (air bombs, incendiary mixture, etc.) against specific targets, the accuracy of bombing and shooting. On the other hand, the bomber solves a specific combat mission in the face of counteraction from enemy fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And from these positions, the following are important: speed, maneuverability, ceiling, effectiveness of defensive weapons, combat survivability of the aircraft, etc.

In this regard, to complete the description of the development of the Soviet concept of a high-speed attack aircraft, it is interesting to compare the pre-war serial and experimental dive bombers of the KA Air Force and the Luftwaffe - Ar-2, Pe-2. BB-22PB, "YUZU", SPB and Jn88A-4, from the point of view of their potential combat effectiveness in battles on the eastern front.

We will assess the combat effectiveness of bomber aircraft based on the likelihood of the latter completing a specific combat mission to destroy targets in the interests of ground forces, or the likelihood of a bomber’s combat success. In this case, the probability of a bomber's combat success is determined by the probabilities for the bomber not to be shot down by enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery on approach to and over the target, and the probability of reaching the target area with a given error. the probability of detecting a target visually and the probability of hitting a target during bombing.

Tupolev aircraft "103U"

German twin-engine dive bomber J1188A-4

The German Bf 109F-1 was accepted as an enemy fighter; the bomber was detected and attacked by an enemy fighter from a loitering position in the air.

the probability of detection of a bomber by the pilot of an attacking fighter in the patrol zone is carried out visually and is taken equal to 1,

when calculating the probability of a fighter launching an attack on an enemy bomber from the rear hemisphere (i.e., approaching and combat turning with reaching the attack curve at the opening fire distance), the dive characteristics, rate of climb and time of steady turn (radius) were taken into account, and in all in the calculations it was assumed that the maximum overload on the attack curve at which the pilot could conduct aimed fire did not exceed 4 units,

– the probability of a bomber being shot down by a fighter was assessed taking into account the return fire from the bomber’s air gunner,

– shooting and flight training of fighter pilots – good, shooting training of an air gunner – good,

– taking into account the bomber’s anti-fighter maneuver was carried out by introducing an additional error in aiming,

– the conditions of air battles (distribution of firing angles, shooting distances and burst lengths, maximum overloads during an attack, etc.) were taken as typical for the period of air battles during the Great Patriotic War,

– sights: for fighters – optical, for a bomber gunner – mechanical,

– the fighter’s shooting in all cases is accompanying.

FLIGHT DATA OF FRONT BOMBERS

Calculations show that in typical combat conditions on the eastern front, when solving the combat mission of destroying small, hard-to-vulnerable targets, the Ar-2 dive bomber was more effective than the BB-22PB bomber by almost 5.5 times, the Pe-2 by 1.4 times, and the German Ju88A -4 – 1.3 times.

The experienced dive bomber "103U" 2AM-37 was superior in combat effectiveness to both the Ar-2 and Ju88A-4 in solving any tasks of air support for troops. Unlike its opponents, the 103U was capable of carrying three FAB-1000s (maximum bomb rack capacity) and “throwing” them from a dive.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of war did not allow the aircraft to be quickly brought to flight-combat condition - the AM-37 engine was removed from mass production, and the M-82A engine installed on the aircraft instead suffered from many “childhood” diseases. As a result, the first three serial Tv-2 2M-82 (by order of the NKAP No. 234 of March 28, 1942, the “103” aircraft were given the designation Tu-2) reached the front only in September 1942, and rhythmic and high-quality serial production ( already with M-82FM engines) was established only by the middle of 1944. However, the bomber lost the “ability” to dive bomb – the brake grids with the control system were removed from the aircraft. The vehicle began to be classified as a medium bomber, designed “to perform daytime bombing missions from horizontal flight near enemy rear lines.”

A clear outsider when solving any combat mission is the BB-22PB. It should be admitted that the adoption of the BB-22 aircraft in the bomber version by the Air Force spacecraft is a grave mistake by the Air Force, the NKAP and the Defense Committee. It had no real combat value, but a lot of effort and money was spent on its introduction into mass production and development in units.

A serious mistake is the cessation of serial production of the Ar-2 bomber in favor of launching a mass production of the Pe-2 bomber.

The apparent main drawback of the Ar-2 - a lower maximum flight speed compared to the Pe-2 - was completely "covered" by optimizing the tactics of combat use of the dive bomber, better organizing interaction with cover fighters and control in battle. as well as training the flight personnel of bomber regiments in air combat with enemy fighters individually and as part of a group. The example of Luftwaffe pilots convinces us of this. which, having attack aircraft with mediocre flight characteristics, achieved high combat effectiveness mainly due to the rational tactics of their combat use, excellent organization of interaction with their fighter aircraft and with ground troops, and good flight and combat training of the crews.

Main. The Ar-2 had excellent takeoff and landing qualities and was more accessible than the Pe-2 to master by young wartime sergeants. As you know, the Pe-2 absolutely did not tolerate high leveling - in this case the landing gear was guaranteed to break. “Pawns” broken during landings accounted for up to 30% of faulty vehicles in units.

As follows from the analysis of the potential combat effectiveness of the compared bombers, the bomb armament system of the German Ju88A-4 was more consistent with the distribution of typical ground targets. against which aviation had to act on the eastern front in the initial period of the war, than the bomb armament of Soviet bomb carriers.

The main caliber of the Junkers was a 5()-kg aerial bomb - 28 pieces on board, while the bomb armament system of Soviet bombers was mainly designed to carry 100-kg aerial bombs (6-12 pieces). It was in this version of the suspension that the carrying capacity of Soviet aircraft was maximally used. When using smaller caliber bombs, Soviet bomb carriers found themselves underloaded. For example, when suspending bombs of 50 kg caliber, the Pe-2 “did not reach” 100 kg to the normal bomb load and 500 kg to the maximum.

At the same time, based on the vulnerability characteristics of typical ground targets in the initial period of the war (motorized mechanized columns, artillery batteries in positions, etc.). The main type of bombs was supposed to be fragmentation bombs of 25 kg caliber and high-explosive bombs of 50 kg caliber. as well as smaller caliber fragmentation bombs. For example, the reduced area of destruction of armored personnel carriers and light tanks when ten FAB-50m were dropped from a height of 500-1000 m was about 400 m 2 , and six FA B-100 - only 180 m 2 .

In the directive of the Air Force Commander Colonel General P.F. Zhigarev No. 14501 / 12153 dated January 25, 1942 on the results of the inspection of the combat operations of air units of the Western and Southwestern Fronts in January 42, it was stated in this regard that: " ...In the majority of aviation units of the air forces of the Western and Southwestern Fronts, an illiterate use of small arms, cannon and bomber weapons was noted... The caliber and type of bombs used often do not correspond to the nature of the target. Standard loading is used: FAB-100 or FAB-50 even against targets requiring destruction by fragmentation bombs..."

Conducted by the head of the department of small arms and cannon armament of VVA aircraft named after. N. E. Zhukovsky, 1st rank military engineer E. B. Lunts in February-March 1942, analysis of the combat experience of units of the Western and South-Western Fronts (19th, 46th, 47th and 63rd Garden) . 6th and 7th and for air defense for the period June-December 1941 showed that in many cases bombs were used mainly based on the convenience and speed of preparing aircraft for combat missions, while target protection and effectiveness were not taken into account at all bombs (destructive force of fragments, high-explosive effect, etc.).

According to Luntz. During the first 6 months of the war, all types of aviation spent 41.6% of combat sorties on carrying out the combat mission of destroying tanks, mechanized troops, artillery in positions and manpower, and 2.5% on actions against enemy airfields and on railways. . objects – 1.6%. The remaining sorties were associated with the performance of combat missions without the use of aerial bombs.

That is, instead of using fragmentation bombs like AO-25s, AO-25m and high-explosive bombs like FAB-50. FAB-50m bomber air units used bombs of the FAB-100 type - 56% of the weight of all aerial bombs dropped on the enemy.

At the conclusion of his report, Professor Luntz proposed “...to remove the FAB-100 from service” and “...to prohibit units from using bombs that do not correspond to the nature of the target in pursuit of tonnage (for example, FAB-100 instead of FAB-50m or AO-25).”

On the other hand, at the beginning of the war there were few enemy ground targets, the destruction of which required the use of large-caliber aerial bombs (bunkers, bunkers, bridges, warehouses, etc.), and changes should be made to the design of combat aircraft in order to ensure maximum loading with bombs caliber 50-25 kg was “troublesome” and also risky. So, to correct the situation, we had to urgently create 100-kg bombs that were more effective in terms of fragmentation. The most successful, as is known, were the high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-YUO and the incendiary ZAB-YUTSK. OFAB-YO had a powerful high-explosive effect when exploded and produced a lot of heavy fragments, which at a distance of up to 10 m from the point of detonation could penetrate German tank armor up to 30 mm thick and disable 155 mm field guns. In turn, the incendiary “weaving” easily pierced the ceilings of buildings, knocking out windows and doors with a high-explosive blow, thereby providing an air flow for the spread of fire.

The situation changed in 1944-45, when the Red Army and the Space Forces faced particularly strong Wehrmacht defenses. As is known, German fortified areas were a rather difficult target for aviation due to the high saturation of air defense systems. small size and high strength long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures. The usual density was up to 6 bunkers and bunkers per 1 km of front, although in some cases their number reached 20 per 1 km of front. The SD zone along the front ranged from 30 to 140 km. and the total number of bunkers and bunkers ranged from 60 to 900. At the same time, the capabilities of the main front-line bomber of the Air Force KA Pe-2 were still insufficient - two FAB-250 standard bomb loads (4 FAB-250 were “carried” rarely) did not provide the required the probability of hitting Wehrmacht fortifications, and the Tu-2 2M-82 bomber. as noted above, by this time it had already lost its diving properties.

That’s when the finest hour of the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 dive bomber could have come - its ability to carry 6 FAB-250 or three 500-kg aerial bombs and “throw” them from a dive could be more useful to the Red Army than ever. By this time, the Ar-2 would have already gone a certain way to improve its flight characteristics by strengthening defensive weapons, improving aerodynamics, increasing the power of the power plant and combat survivability. Naturally, the Ar-2 could not completely replace the Tu-2, but it would complement it successfully.

One can only regret that as of June 1, 1941, the K Air Force units had only 164 Ar-2 2M-Yu5 aircraft, of which: 147 (3 faulty) aircraft were in units of the Military Districts, the rest were in units of the Center and at the 22nd plant. In the conditions of the strategic retreat of the Red Army and the frankly poor organization of combat operations of aviation and ground troops, the Ar-2 bombers were unable to show all that they were capable of. In addition, due to the lack of the required cover with its fighters and insufficient training of the flight personnel, most of the Ar-2 was lost in the first months of the war - according to official data from the headquarters of the Air Force of the Red Army, combat losses of the Ar-2 in 1941 amounted to 95 aircraft.

It should be noted that the leadership and specialists of the Navy Air Forces of the KA, when developing a plan to equip fleet aviation in 1941 with modern combat aircraft, considered the Ar-2 as the main type of dive bomber, and the “pawn” mainly as a long-range escort fighter. But no one “heard” their opinion...

Considering that the Su-2 short-range bomber, in the conditions of a major war, “according to the rules” turned out to be untenable as a type combat aircraft, and the armored attack aircraft Il-2 AM-38 did not fully meet the requirements of modern warfare, then we have to state: the combat strength and armament of the attack aircraft of the Kaliningrad Air Force on the eve of the war turned out to be generally inconsistent with the nature and conditions of combat operations. With the outbreak of the war, this circumstance, coupled with the insufficient level of combat training of the flight personnel of the units and the operational-tactical training of the command staff of aviation formations and headquarters, as well as the leadership of the Air Force and the Red Army, led to low efficiency of air support for friendly troops and large losses from enemy fire. .

Drawings for Oleg Rastrenin’s article about the Ar-2 aircraft were made by Sergei Ershov

SB with M-100 engines

Outstanding Soviet aircraft designer A.A. Arkhangelsky created dozens of various projects during his life aircraft. The designer spent a lot of effort on improving the design of his brainchild - the SB high-speed bomber, on the basis of which the AR 2 aircraft was created. Alexander Alexandrovich's further work is largely related to the work of the design bureau of A.N. Tupolev.

History of the aircraft

Existed under the 22nd aircraft factory Throughout the second half of the 30s of the last century, the A. Arkhangelsky Design Bureau was refining the design of the SB serial bomber. Within the framework of the navigator's cabin, these works were planned to reach a maximum speed of at least 500 km/h with a noticeable increase in defensive capabilities. One solution to this problem was the creation of several modifications with liquid-cooled engines M-103 and M-104. At the same time, the elements of the wings and fuselage of the aircraft remained virtually unchanged.

One of the requirements of the military in the 30s was to ensure the ability to bomb a modernized version of the SB using a dive.

During early work on the development of this version of the dive bomber, the design bureau created a special bomb rack PB3, which made it possible to safely remove bombs from the compartment during a dive.

The device was serially installed on some series of SB bombers.

Bomb rack for dive bombing PB-3 for Ar-2

The experience of the war in Spain showed that Soviet serial SB bombers were unable to successfully resist the new German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighters.

The designers understood that the reserves for modernizing the existing fuselage of the SB bomber were practically exhausted.

Since the beginning of 1939, the main focus of modernization has been to improve the aerodynamic performance of the aircraft using fuselage and wing elements with a modified configuration.

Such modifications theoretically made it possible to increase the speed bar to at least 600 km/h.

By May 1939, an experimental MMN was developed and assembled - Small Modification of the "N" aircraft (as the Soviet serial bomber SB was designated in the plant documentation). The aircraft was equipped with two liquid-cooled M-105 engines with three-bladed VISH 22E propellers with variable pitch during flight.

Some of the main differences of the aircraft were a reduced wing area, improved aerodynamics, enhanced bomber and defensive weapons, an increased fuel supply of 230 liters and the introduction of redundant controls in the navigator's cabin.

Improvements made it possible to increase speed indicators to the following values:

at ground level up to 405 km/h,
at an altitude of 4200 m up to 458 km/h.

Such parameters were achieved with a combat load of 500 kg placed on the internal sling. With a load of 1000 kg, the speed data was slightly lower - 383 and 445 km/h, respectively. But such parameters did not suit the Air Force command, which considered that in 1940 a bomber with a speed of at least 500 km/h was needed. In parallel, there was another copy of the MMN, equipped with more powerful M-104 engines, but no data on its testing has been preserved.

Despite the failure, it was the MMN project that became an important step towards the creation of the future AR 2 bomber.

When creating the next modification of the aircraft, the designers used a wing from the MMN with engine radiators placed inside it. This design determined the designation new version bomber - SB RK (with Radiators in the Wing). The aircraft with serial number No. 2/281 made its first flight in April 1940.

Thanks to improved aerodynamics, the bomber reached a speed of 492 km/h at an altitude of 4700 m. At the same time, the aerobatic and take-off properties did not differ from the standard SB bomber.

Still a serial SB-RK

The active stage of testing occurred in May-August 1940. At the later stage of test flights, the bomber was equipped with movable grilles on the wings and an automatic dive recovery system. Such devices were created with an eye on the German units installed on the German Yu.88 dive bomber. The gratings were used to slow down the aircraft during a dive.

The test results obtained were promising, therefore, even before their completion, the 22nd aircraft plant received an order to produce three reference copies of the SB RK bomber. The aircraft were required to reach a speed in horizontal flight of at least 490 km/h at an altitude corresponding to the engine altitude limit, and to have a structural safety margin suitable for diving.

The first reference prototype began to be tested later than agreed upon - in October 1940. This aircraft featured a number of aerodynamic modifications. The front part of the fuselage was designed in the form of a fairing of the F-1 model, borrowed from the MMN project. The shooting point on the upper rear part of the fuselage received a new canopy of reduced size. The flights revealed insufficiently efficient operation of the cooling system and low longitudinal stability of the aircraft.

These shortcomings were eliminated on the third reference bomber by changing the shape of the radiator channel and moving an additional battery to the nose of the fuselage.

Rare wartime footage: AR-2 and its crew

The tests were completed in January 1941, but on December 9, the SB RK received the official designation “AR Two dive bomber” and was put into service. The aircraft will only remain in production for a few months, during which between 185 and 200 units will be assembled.

Performance characteristics

Already during early test runs, the AR 2 dive bomber with a weight of 6600 kg was able to be accelerated to a speed of 475 km/h at 4700 m. At the same time, climbing to such a height took about 5 minutes. The maximum flight ceiling depended on the load and ranged from 9 to 10 km. The maximum flight range with a bomb load of 500 kg on an internal sling was 990 kilometers.

The power of the power plant was quite enough to continue the flight on one engine, while the propeller of the second engine was feathered.

The serial bomber AR 2 was equipped with M 105R engines equipped with exhaust pipes that made it possible to use the reactive energy of gases. At takeoff, the engines developed power up to 1100 hp, and at the altitude limit - 1050 hp. The motors were equipped with a modernized VIT1T-22E propeller with a diameter increased to 3100 mm.

Due to the increased diameter, the gear ratio of the AR 2 engines was changed. In addition, much attention was paid to the quality of the external finishing of the fuselage and wings.

Due to all the measures, it was possible to achieve a speed of 443 km/h at the ground and about 512 km/h at the operating altitude of the engines, which increased to 5000 m.

The time to climb to such an altitude for production aircraft has increased to 6.5 minutes.

Flight tests showed good dive characteristics. The aircraft entered its peak at an altitude of about 4000 m at a speed of just under 300 km/h. By the time it came out of its dive, the speed of the AR 2 bomber reached 550 km/h with an overload of 4.5 G. The main overall dimensions of the aircraft are given in the table.

Combat use

Deliveries of serial AR 2 aircraft to combat units began in December 1940, and they were designated in documents as the SB of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Bombers mainly fell into the following units:

20 aircraft in the 2nd SBAP (Speed Bomber Aviation Regiment) of the Leningrad District. The regiment was based at the Kresttsy airfield in the Leningrad region.
An unspecified number of aircraft entered the 46th SBAP and 54th SBAP of the Baltic District, based at the Shavli airfield and in the Vilna region.
An unknown number of AR 2 bombers arrived at the 13th SBAP Western District, located in Russia, and later in the Borisov region.
There were a certain number of AR 2 in the 33rd SBAP of the Kyiv district in Belaya Tserkov and Gorodishche.
An unknown number of bombers were in the 27th IAP (fighter aviation regiment) of the Moscow District, based at the Central Airfield of Moscow.
19 bombers were part of the Baltic Fleet aviation (as part of the 73rd BAP) and another 6 were in training units. The regiment's equipment was stationed in Pärnu.
One AR 2 was under the jurisdiction of the Department air force fleet.

Most active development new technology and dive bombing techniques were carried out by the flight crew of the 13th SBAP. According to the recollections of veterans, by the spring of 1941, the pilots had quite successfully mastered the new method of attack. Almost all of the regiment's equipment was destroyed on the ground by massive bombing on the first day of the war.

The AR 2 and SB bombers that remained in service were lost by the beginning of July. The regiment was withdrawn from the front to be re-equipped with new PE 2 aircraft.

PE-2 dive bomber

Bombers of the 33rd Regiment participated more intensively in the fighting. Retreating along with the bulk of the Red Army troops, the regiment's personnel took part in battles in the area of Voronezh, Kharkov and Stalingrad. As of May 1942, the regiment's regular strength included two serviceable AR 2 bombers. The date of their loss or write-off has not been established.

Immediately after the start of the war, equipment from the 27th IAP was transferred to an airfield near the city of Borisov, from where it flew out for some time to participate in battles. AR 2 and SB bombers of the 73rd Air Force Regiment of the Baltic Fleet entered the battle at the end of June, attacking advancing German troops in the Daugavpils area.

The Soviet side suffered heavy losses, although all AR 2 bombers survived. In July-August, equipment was involved in attacks on German and Finnish naval formations.

According to reports before October 1941, the 27th IAP lost 15 AR 2 bombers, after which it was withdrawn to the rear for rearmament. The fate of the remaining aircraft in good condition is unknown.

Modifications and weapons

Since the release of the AR 2 bomber did not last long, the aircraft did not have time to acquire modifications. But the design solutions incorporated in the aircraft served as the basis for the creation of the SBB (High-Speed Short-Range Bomber) project. The only copy of such an aircraft was built and tested at the end of 1940 - beginning of 1941.

Further development of the AR 2 and SBB projects was hampered by the hasty deployment at the 22nd plant of the production of the more promising PE 2 dive bomber, which by March 1941 had completely ousted the AR 2 from production. The outbreak of war and the subsequent evacuation of the Arkhangelsky Design Bureau to Omsk put an end to the projects.

The armament design of the AR 2 serial bomber was a development of solutions tested on SB and MMN aircraft.

As a defensive weapon, the aircraft had three firing points equipped with 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns:

Bow ball launcher, from which the navigator fired. The machine gun had a conventional mechanical sight and 500 rounds of ammunition.
TSS 1 rotating turret with a collimator sight and 1000 rounds of ammunition, located on the upper rear side of the fuselage. From above, the installation was closed with a sliding plexiglass cap, in which there was a cutout for the barrel of a machine gun.
Retractable turret with 600 rounds to protect the lower hemisphere. Fire from both installations in the rear was conducted by one onboard gunner.

All three AR 2 points had good firing angles and left virtually no “dead” zones. The big disadvantage was the use of one shooter to service two installations. When two fighters attacked from different directions, the gunner was simply physically unable to repulse them simultaneously.

To improve combat qualities, a number of improvements were introduced in bomb weapons.

The AR 2 dive bomber had external and internal suspensions that allowed the use of up to four high-explosive bombs weighing 250 kilograms each. All outer holders have been recessed to improve aerodynamics.

German soldiers inspect the Soviet Ar-2 bomber shot down near Demyansk.

Subsequently, the number of bombs weighing 250 kg was increased to six (overload). Optionally, instead of them, three more powerful FAB 500 bombs could be suspended, weighing half a ton each. In this case, one bomb was placed inside the fuselage, and two - on external suspensions. Both types of bombs could be used for dive bombing.

When using the AR 2 aircraft for bombing in horizontal flight, there were three combinations of bomb suspension:

3 bombs weighing 500 kg,
6 bombs weighing 250 kg (two of them on the internal suspension),
12 FAB 100 bombs weighing 100 kg each (4 of them outside the fuselage).

In addition to high-explosive bombs, the AR 2 bomber could carry chemical weapons, consisting of two VAP pouring devices or two UKAP chemical aircraft devices. Both devices could be filled with any poisonous or incendiary substance and were mounted only on an external sling.

Surviving copies

According to archives, as of June 1, 1941, various regiments included 164 AR 2 bombers with M 105R engines. The bulk (147 vehicles, 3 of them in non-flying condition) were in various regiments of the border Military Districts, the rest were in the Central District and under scheduled repairs at the 22nd plant.

Almost all of these aircraft were lost in the initial months of the war - according to headquarters data, by the end of 1941, irrecoverable losses amounted to 95 bombers. The aircraft was officially withdrawn from service in 1944, but it is extremely doubtful that by this time at least one AR 2 remained in service.

For a long time it was believed that not a single copy of the AR 2 dive bomber has survived to this day, even in the form of wreckage.

But in the winter of 2009, members of the Rearguard search club discovered aircraft wreckage at the bottom of Lake Bezzubovskoye in the Pskov region. All found parts were brought to the surface.

Based on the serial numbers, it was established that this AR 2 bomber was shot down by German anti-aircraft fire on July 25, 1941 during the battle for the city of Velikiye Luki. The navigator died while parachuting, but the pilot and gunner escaped and later reached the location of the Soviet troops.

Video about AR-2

This aircraft could become the best domestic front-line bomber of the Second World War. But that did not happen. Why? Let's try to figure this out. But, first of all, let's turn to history and start our conversation with the activities of the chief designer of the aircraft, Alexander Arkhangelsky.

Brief biographical information about Arkhangelsk

Arkhangelsky Alexander Alexandrovich. born on December 30, 1892. Died on December 18, 1978. In less than 86 years, he managed to make a huge contribution to the development of our aviation, becoming one of the outstanding aircraft designers.

In 1918 he graduated from Moscow Higher Technical School. He combined his studies with work in the aerodynamic laboratory and aeronautical club, led by Professor N. E. Zhukovsky. Based on the resolution of the NTO Board of October 30, 1918, the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute was created in our country, the chairman of which was Nikolai Egorovich Zhukovsky, and the deputy chairman was mechanical engineer Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev. Tupolev was simultaneously appointed head of the aviation department, and mechanical engineer Alexander Alexandrovich Arkhangelsky became his assistant. Arkhangelsky also took an active part in the creation of the first snowmobiles in our country; together with A. A. Mikulin, he tested their prototypes.

In the heat of the organization of the aircraft design bureau of A.N. Tupolev at TsAGI, Arkhangelsky participated in the design of all aircraft of this design bureau as the head of one of the design departments. Under the leadership of Arkhangelsky, the fuselages of almost all Tupolev multi-engine vehicles were designed.

When creating the world's first heavy all-metal twin-engine bomber TB-1 (ANT-4), as well as when developing variants of aircraft based on it, Arkhangelsky specialized in developing the nose of the aircraft fuselage.

At the initiative of the Air Force, at the beginning of 1928, AGOS TsAGI began developing a three-engine dual-purpose aircraft - civil (mainline passenger aircraft and cargo aircraft) and military (landing transport and cargo aircraft of military transport aviation and reserve bomber), which received the name ANT-9 .

The general management of the work on the creation of the aircraft was carried out by A. N. Tupolev, but since the basis of the aircraft was the fuselage, with a nine-seat passenger cabin housed in it, the main Tupolev fuselage specialist A. A. Arkhangelsky became the leading engineer of the project. Over three years, 66 copies of the ANT-9 were built, of which 61 were built at plant No. 22 and 5 at plant No. 31. According to unspecified data, several dozen ANT-9s were converted into twin-engine ones during the repair process passenger aircraft PS-9 with M-17 and M-17F engines at Aeroflot plant No. 84.

A. A. Arkhangelsky

On July 10, 1929, the plane, on board of which appeared the inscription “Wings of the Soviets,” went on a tour of the capitals of Europe. The crew consisting of M. M. Gromov and flight mechanic V. P. Rusakov with passengers on board took off from Moscow and by August 8, in 53 flight hours, flew a distance of 9037 km, landing at the airfields of Berlin, Paris, London, Rome and Warsaw. The flight was mostly successful. The general management of the flight was carried out by Arkhangelsky.

The next major work of the A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau was the creation in 1930 of the TB-3 heavy bomber. Arkhangelsky, who designed the fuselage of the aircraft, also took an active part in the creation of the TB-3.

In 1931, under the leadership of Arkhangelsky, a five-engine passenger aircraft ANT-14 for 36 passengers was created. The plane was built and received the name "Pravda".

At the end of 1933, the 15th anniversary of TsAGI was celebrated at the Bolshoi Theater. In this regard, eight employees of the Institute were awarded orders. Arkhangelsky was also awarded. “... For special services in the creation of multi-seat aircraft and initiative in the field of organizing aerosanpo business in the USSR,” he was awarded the Order of Lenin. Subsequently, he was awarded this order five more times.

In 1934, Arkhangelsky was entrusted with the creation of a fundamentally new high-speed bomber. To solve this problem, a new, fifth design team is being organized at TsAGI. Alexander Alexandrovich was entrusted to head it. The brigade turned out to be a youth team - in total, the brigade included over 100 young designers, average age who did not exceed 25-27 years. Arkhangelsky, at 41, turned out to be the oldest not only in age, but also in current affairs.

The task assigned to Arkhangelsky turned out to be quite difficult, but by the summer of 1935 it was successfully solved. In 1936, the new aircraft was already put into mass production. In subsequent years, until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the fifth brigade continuously worked to improve the SB aircraft and its modifications. In 1936, the Arkhangelsky Design Bureau was transferred to serial plant No. 22 and became an independent organization. Intensive work is underway to improve the security system. to create its dive variants, faster front-line bombers MMN, Ar-2, “S” and “B”, single-engine dive bomber “T”, attack aircraft. cruisers and high-altitude aircraft.

After the launch of serial production at plant No. 22 of the Pe-2 aircraft, Arkhangelsk is left without an independent production base. For some time he was transferred to plant No. 32 to assist designers I.V. Vsnevidov and G.M. Mozharovsky in developing the armored attack aircraft MoV-2 they proposed. The issue of providing a production base to Arkhangelsk at the Tushino plant of the People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding was also considered.

The war began, and by order of the NKAP dated August 9, 1941, the Arkhangelsky Design Bureau, consisting of 82 people, was transferred to plant No. 156 to assist the Air Force in the repair of combat aircraft (mainly SB) and the manufacture of spare parts. A little later, after the evacuation of the Tupolev Design Bureau, Arkhangelsky’s team joins this team. Soon he became Tupolev's deputy, and from 1947 - his first deputy. He takes an active part in the creation of long-range and reconnaissance modifications of the Tu-2. Subsequently, Arkhangelsky took part in the creation of Tu-4, Tu-70, Tu-104 and Tu-1 14 aircraft.

Design team

Arkhangelsky’s merits in the creation of our aviation have been noted more than once. In addition to five Orders of Lenin, Alexander Alexandrovich was awarded two Orders of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, and two Orders of the Red Star. In 1940 he was awarded a doctorate technical sciences, and in 1941 he was awarded the title of Stalin Prize Laureate. For the second time he became a Laureate of the Stalin Prize in 1949, for the third time in 1952. In 1947 he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, and in 1957 he was awarded the title of Lenin Prize Laureate.

The Air Force sets the task of creating a high-speed short-range bomber

In the early 1930s, a number of countries made such advances in the development of twin-engine all-metal aircraft that the idea of creating a bomber became quite realistic. superior in flight speed to the biplane fighters in service at that time. The main weapon of a high-speed bomber in confrontation with enemy fighters was supposed to be precisely high speed flight.

The first bombers of the new type were created in the USA by the Martin company. The twin-engine bomber of this company, the Martin 139, was adopted by the American Army Air Corps (in the B-10 and B-12 variants). had a maximum flight speed of about 340 km/h. While most fighters at that time flew at speeds less than 310-320 km/h. The American bomber was produced in relatively small numbers and practically did not take any serious part in hostilities.

The first attempts to create high-speed multi-purpose aircraft were made in our country. An example is the development of the Mi-3 multi-seat fighter; it was planned to create a high-speed bomber based on the basic version. During tests, the Mi-3 achieved a maximum speed no lower than that of the American aircraft, but it was not possible to solve the problem of flight stability.

Under these conditions, the command of the Space Forces Air Force set a task for the aviation industry to create in the near future an aircraft similar to the American one. Initially, the appearance of such an aircraft was defined as a twin-engine short-range bomber.

In terms of experimental aircraft construction for 1934-35. development was envisaged. in accordance with the tactical and technical requirements of the Air Force, the short-range bomber BB-2 (it is possible that, under the name BB-1, it was intended to create a short-range bomber as a development of the cruiser KR-6. It is known that such attempts were made).

At the same time, we proceeded from the requirement to ensure the invulnerability of the aircraft by increasing survivability (using an all-metal structure). increasing the flight speed, ceiling and maneuverability of the aircraft. In addition, it was necessary to ensure normal flight without descent if one engine was damaged. Since in this case a reduction in flight speed was inevitable, the bomber was supposed to have effective defensive weapons.

The high-speed bomber was a new operational-tactical type of combat aircraft, designed to hit targets directly on the battlefield and in the immediate operational rear of the enemy.

From the very beginning, the aircraft was conceived as a mass-produced aircraft, so requirements were placed on it to ensure simplicity of piloting techniques. The aircraft being developed was to be based primarily on unpaved airfields of limited size. Consequently, the bomber had to have good takeoff and landing properties (relatively short takeoff and run, ease of calculation during approach, low landing speed, no tendency to stall on the wing, stable trajectory during the run, no tendency to turn on the takeoff run).

Airplane SB 2RTs in the plant workshop

SB 2RC during testing

By the beginning of February 1934, Air Force specialists had developed tactical and technical requirements for the BB-2 aircraft. They provided for a maximum flight speed of 350 km/h at an altitude of 4000 m. landing speed 90 km/h, aircraft ceiling 7000-8000 m, flight range 800 km. The armament was supposed to include a bomb load of up to 500 kg. Defensive armament was to consist of three movable ShKAS machine guns: a bow one with 1000 rounds of ammunition (500 rounds in reserve), an upper one with 1000 rounds of ammunition (1000 in reserve), and a lower one with 500 rounds (500 in reserve). It was recommended to use a choice of motors: either the air-cooled Wright “Cyclone” R820-F-3 motor (or RCF-3, subsequently produced at our factories under license under the name M-25). or the liquid-cooled motor "Hispano-Suiza" l2Ybrs (the motor was put into mass production at our factories under the name M-100), or the domestic liquid-cooled motor M-34RN. or the domestic air-cooled M-58 engine being developed and developed to develop the latest modifications of the Cyclone.

Preliminary development of variants of the BB-2 aircraft was started by the TsAGI team under the leadership of A.N. Tupolev. On February 17, the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) issued a resolution No. 22 “On the construction of a high-speed bomber.” The decree obligated TsAGI, no later than September 1, 1934, to release for factory testing a high-speed twin-engine bomber in two versions powered by Wright Cyclone and Hispano-Suiza engines with the following flight and tactical data: maximum flight speed at an altitude of 4000 m - 320-330 km/h (the speed was reduced at the insistence of Tupolev). flight range with normal load – 700 km. overload - 1100 km, the bomb load included one 500 kg caliber bomb or two 250 kg caliber bombs or 5 caliber 100 kg bombs. Defensive armament included the use of a bow pair of ShKAS machine guns, developed by Plant No. 32 together with TsAGI, one upper ShKAS machine gun and one lower ShKAS.

The decree obliged to simultaneously build one aircraft with Raig Cyclone engines and one with Hispano-Suiza engines. The third plane is “for reserve” - with engines that gave the best results during the tests. GUAP pledged to begin preparations in 1934 for the production of the first series of aircraft in the amount of 15 units for military testing. The resolution was signed by V. M. Molotov.

The first experimental BB-2 - SB 2RTs aircraft

At TsAGI, work on the construction of experimental aircraft began in May 1934 in the newly created Arkhangelsky design team, which worked under his direct supervision. At TsAGI, the aircraft was named ANT-40 (A.N. Tupolev’s fortieth aircraft).

The preliminary design of the ANT-40-1 with Wright "Cyclone" engines (SB 2RN - a high-speed bomber with Wright "Cyclone" engines - this name corresponded to the Air Force documentation) was submitted for approval by the Air Force Directorate on March 8, 1934. By March, the layout was ready SB 2PI.1. It was examined and approved by the layout commission.

On April 25, 1934, construction of the first prototype of the SB aircraft began, but it was somewhat delayed, partly due to the overload of the workshops of the TsAGI experimental structures plant (ZOK), and mainly due to the fundamental novelty of the design being created. On October 1, the plane was rolled out to the factory airfield. and on October 7 he took off.

The aircraft was equipped with air-cooled Wright "Cyclone" RCF-3 engines with a nominal power of 730 hp at a design altitude of 4000 m. The propellers are three-blade, metal. fixed pitch, diameter 3.51 m.

The aircraft is of an all-metal structure, mid-plane design, with a smooth skin. A special high-speed wing profile ANT-40 was developed for it. The length of the aircraft was 12.035 m, the wingspan was 19.0 m. The wing area was 46.3 m. The wing had a longitudinal and transverse V of about 6. The estimated maximum flight speed at an altitude of 3000 m is 360 km/h, landing speed is 1 10 km/h. time to climb 5000 m – 13.0 min. practical ceiling – 8000 m.

The wing is two-spar. consisting of a center section, made integral with the fuselage, and two detachable parts. The side member pipes and some components are made of chrome steel, the rest are made of explosive alloy. Like the entire aircraft, the wing was covered with a smooth covering made of explosive alloy. The riveting is flush. The wing was equipped with compensated flaps. The monocoque fuselage consisted of nose and tail sections, which were attached to the central part of the fuselage through spars and skin. Horizontal tail of brace type. The elevator was equipped with servo rudders. Axial and horn compensation were absent. The rudder was also equipped with a servo rudder. The landing gear is single-post with air-oil shock absorption, retractable in flight using a hydraulic system. The main wheels measuring 900x200 mm were equipped with brakes.

No weapons were installed on the prototype aircraft. The normal flight weight of the aircraft was 4709 kg. empty weight 2890 kg. fuel weight 530 kg. butter 60 kg. The crew of the aircraft included a pilot, a navigator and a gunner-radio operator.

Factory tests were carried out by the Experimental Flight Testing and Development Department (OELID) of TsAGI.

The flights were carried out by TsAGI pilot K.K. Popov. The maximum flight speed achieved during testing was 325 km/h. When installing weapons, it could be slightly lower than required. But the main drawback of the aircraft was poor controllability and stability in flight - a common childhood disease of all high-speed aircraft created at that time. Insufficient longitudinal stability led to the fact that the plane spontaneously lifted its nose, then lowered it. The situation was aggravated by the high sensitivity of the elevators at very low loads on the steering wheel. To combat this drawback, the area of the stabilizer was increased, the angle of its installation was changed, the area of the elevators was reduced, and rubber cords were introduced into the control system, returning the steering wheel to the neutral position. But the effect of all this turned out to be insignificant.

At the same time, the aircraft reacted sluggishly to the operation of the ailerons. The ailerons were expanded by riveting an additional strip to them. This slightly increased their effectiveness.

On October 31, the SB 2RTs plane crashed on landing. On November 29, 1934, in response to a letter from the head of the airborne forces of the spacecraft dated January 22, 1.34, the acting deputy head of TsAGI A.N. Tupolev and head of the design department A.A. Arkhangelsky sent a letter to the head of the GUAP Korolev and copies to the head of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the spacecraft and the head of the UMTS and V of the spacecraft, in which they reported that: “... the SB itself is with an engine. The Wright Cyclone was released in September of this year and made 9 test flights. Due to an accident during landing on the last flight, the testing of the aircraft was not completed, but the tests that took place give every reason to assert that the Government’s assignment regarding the flight data of the aircraft will not only be fulfilled, but also exceeded.”

Well-known publications say that the aircraft was soon returned for repairs to the TsAGI ZOK, and subsequently, after repairs, in February 1935, the aircraft entered repeated factory tests. However, in the official document of TsAGI “Brief report for 1934 and the prospect of the 1935 plan for TsAGI”, signed on January 7, 1935 by the head of the institute N.M. Kharlamov. the issue of repairing the SB 2RTs is interpreted somewhat differently, namely: “...At the moment, a backup is being built (emphasis added by us - author) using some surviving parts of the first machine. The backup will be ready for factory testing in a month or a month and a half.”

Thus, on February 5, 1935, SB 2RTs, a backup of the first vehicle, entered repeated factory tests. Factory tests of the backup continued until September 1935. By this time, all standard weapons were installed on the aircraft. In addition, some design changes were made to the aircraft. The aircraft's flight weight has increased by more than a ton.

The factory test program also included testing the aircraft's weapons at the Noginsk test site. Gradually, factory tests developed into joint ones, since, in addition to factory pilots, pilots from the Air Force Research Institute K A were also involved in the flights.

On July 13, while firing machine guns at the training ground, the pressure in the gas system suddenly dropped. As a result, V.A. Stepanchonok made an emergency landing near the village of Gorki. Neither the plane nor the crew were injured.

On September 25, the tests were officially transferred to the category of joint ones and continued until October 1935. Both TsAGI specialists and the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft were involved in their implementation. Korzinshchikov was appointed crew commander from TsAGI, and Stepanchonok from the Air Force Research Institute. The tests first continued at the OELID base, and then they were transferred to the airfield of the Air Force Research Institute.

Flight data of SB 2RC turned out to be close to the parameters terms of reference and a preliminary design, but interest in the variant with Wright Cyclone engines had fallen by this time, since the SB aircraft with the Hispano-Suiza SB 2IS (ANT-40-2) engines, which had higher flight characteristics, had already flown. SB 2RC was transferred to OELID TsAGI to conduct experiments on fine-tuning the SB aircraft. So from February 21 to March 1, 1936, this aircraft flew with retractable skis and in-flight variable pitch propellers from Hamilton.

Second experimental BB-2 - SB 2IS

The fate of SB 2IS (ANT-40-2) was more successful than SB 2RTs. By May 15, 1934, they began to build a prototype of this SB variant. It differed from its predecessor not only in engines, but also in some dimensions. The span (up to 20.33 m) and wing area (up to 52.9 m) have increased j), as well as the area of the horizontal tail. The volume of gas tanks has almost doubled. Flight weight increased to 4850 kg (maximum - up to 5530 kg).

The ANT-40-2 was equipped with two Hispano-Suiza engines of 780 hp each. Two-blade metal fixed-pitch propellers. The propeller hubs were covered with small spinners. The shape and dimensions of the engine nacelles were close to those of the ANT-40-1. but in the front part the hoods were not round, but oval in shape. Engine cooling was provided by frontal honeycomb radiators. At the front they were covered with horizontal blinds, and at the outlet the air flow was regulated by rotating scoops.

The plane was assembled for the New Year. and already on December 30, 1934, pilot N.S. Zhurov made the first flight on LNT-40-2. The takeoff was carried out on wheels.

SB 2IS

Plumage SB

Having heard the report of the head of TsAGI N. M. Kharlamov on the results of work for 1934, in his Resolution the GUAP stated that: “... TsAGI has achieved a number of major achievements of global importance in the field of aviation technology, which contributed, along with strengthening the country’s defense capability , also making our aviation the best aviation in the world.

Through the experimental construction of TsAGI: ...Solved the problem of high-speed bomber aircraft...

In particular. TsAGI completed the following government tasks: ...SB with two Spanish engines. The high-speed bomber was designed and built according to the same design as the SB with RC. but with slightly different aerodynamics. In factory tests it showed very high flight qualities. Its speed of 433 km/h is higher than many of the world's best fighters. This aircraft was built from superdural using new technology (smooth skin, blind riveting), creating a huge turning point in Soviet aviation and the aircraft industry...”

Factory tests took place until February 6, 1935. Outstanding results for that time were achieved. The maximum speed at an altitude of 4000 m was 430 km/h. The aircraft's rate of climb was also noted to be quite good.

To conduct joint tests of the Design Bureau and the Air Force, a crew from the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft was appointed by January 23. The group included pilot Minder, navigator Bryandinsky, flight timekeeper Nolde and technician Obydennikov.

On February 8, 1935, joint tests of the SB 2IS began at the Air Force Scientific Research Institute of Kaliningrad. Before the completion of the tests on February 19, 38 flights were completed. In addition to Minder, pilots M M Gromov, A. N. Filin and A B Yumashea took part in the flyby of the aircraft from the Research Institute of the Air Force. The Zhurov crew from OELID TsAGI participated in the tests.

The tests were carried out with skis that were not retractable in flight. The maximum speed on skis was 320 km/h at the ground. at a design altitude of 4000 m – 351 km/h. at an altitude of 8000 m – 310 km/h.

Climb time 5000 m – 7.2 minutes. practical ceiling - 9400 m - an outstanding result for its time. It was expected that in summer conditions with the wheeled chassis retracted, the maximum speed at the design altitude would be 410-420 km/h.

The flight weight of the aircraft was 5000 kg. The wing span is 20.3 m. The bearing surface of the wing has an area of 47.34 m; . Accordingly, the specific load on the bearing surface is 105.7 kg/m g. The power developed by the motors near the ground is 1530 hp, and at the design altitude for the motors of 3100 m – 1720 hp. Accordingly, the specific load related to the power at the ground was 3.26 kg/hp. and at the design height – 2.9 kg/hp. The aircraft's center of gravity was 29.3% of the MAR.

The report on state tests noted that the SB 2IS did not pass the tests. Nevertheless, it was recommended to take the aircraft into service. introduce it into mass production and eliminate shortcomings. By March 15, 1935, it was necessary to bring weapons and equipment.

The main shortcomings were noted: insufficient longitudinal stability of the aircraft, insufficient efficiency of the ailerons, “insufficient” rudder when flying on one engine, and incompleteness of the engine cooling system.

In conclusion, it was concluded that “SB 2IS belongs to a new tactical class of modern bomber aircraft with extremely high horizontal flight speed and rate of climb...”

On March 3, 1935, SB 2IS unexpectedly crashed. Flight speed was measured at low altitudes. Suddenly, when the flight speed reached 370 km/h, a strong vibration of the wings appeared; according to the pilot’s testimony, the control stick of the aircraft was torn out of his hands. Minder pulled it towards himself with all his might and made a “slide” to reduce the speed, then went to land. After landing, a swelling of the wing skin was discovered, which occurred as a result of flexural-torsional aileron flutter due to incomplete weight compensation of the ailerons.

SB 2IS on a ski chassis

Ski chassis stand

The flutter phenomenon, theoretically known at that time, had not yet actually been encountered in domestic practice. A group of TsAGI specialists, which included M.V., who later became academician, began developing ways to combat it. Keldysh. They recommended increasing the aileron weight compensation to 90-43%. The plane was under repair for a month.

Before submitting the aircraft again for state tests, TsAGI decided to first check how effective the converted ailerons were and whether vibration would arise again. The test flight was entrusted to the pilot Zhurov. It was carried out under the direct supervision of Arkhangelsky.

During the flight, a speed of 400 km/h was reached - no vibration was observed. After listening to the pilot's report to Arkhangelsky. A. N. Tupolev, who was present at the airfield, hastened to inform Ordzhonikidze and Alksnis that “the flutter on the Security Council has been defeated...”

During the repair, changes were made to the tail unit - the area of the stabilizer was increased, the flettner plate was replaced with a trimmer controlled in flight, and the installation angle of the stabilizer was reduced by 1°. All these modifications were supposed to improve the flight stability of the aircraft. But it turned out. that stability has not improved significantly. In addition, a new “soreness” was discovered - overheating of engines in summer conditions. At an ambient temperature of +20°C, the engines overheated during taxiing so much that it became simply impossible to take off normally. The measures taken did not produce results.

On June 16, 1935, the SB 2IS was again transferred to the Research Institute of the Air Force K A for the second stage of state tests. They were escorted by Minder's crew. A maximum flight speed of 404 km/h was recorded at an altitude of 5000 m. The aircraft showed a good rate of climb and a fairly large service ceiling. But at the same time, the test report noted such shortcomings as: underdeveloped engine installation, insufficient longitudinal and lateral stability, and a tendency for a roll to occur when accelerating. The upper turret, due to insufficient rigidity, gave a large dispersion of bullets when firing. Vibrations of the sub-engine frame were detected, which were transmitted to the airframe structural elements. The aircraft's operational shortcomings were also significant.

For these reasons, the aircraft did not pass state tests, and on July 18 it was returned to TsAGI for further improvements.

During the modifications, quite a lot of changes were made to the car. The engines were shifted 100 mm forward, and consoles with increased sweep along the leading edge were used. This provided a more forward alignment of the bomber. We increased the area of the stabilizer and changed the angle of its installation. The transverse V of the consoles was increased. Weight and aerodynamic compensation for the rudder, elevator and ailerons were introduced. The vertical tail has acquired a more rounded shape.

SB 2RTs on a ski chassis

Diagram of firing angles on SB

View of the navigator's cabin

Additional state tests of SB 2IS

On September 23, 1935, SB 2IS was again transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for additional state tests. A total of 308 flights were carried out, the flight time on the aircraft was 74 hours 56 minutes.

The priority tasks for eliminating the shortcomings noted in the report were considered to be the following: "... bringing the safety margin to the standards required by the resolution in relation to safety standards; ... increasing the survivability of skis, at least up to 350-300 landings: ... reducing and completely eliminating the tendency to bonneting , especially when landing on softened soil and loosened snow cover: ...improving engine cooling at positive outside temperatures of 20" and above: ...increasing the survivability and reliability of dynamo drives: ...eliminating shortcomings in weapons and special equipment noted in the report: ... improving operation by facilitating access to aircraft components that rub, wear out quickly, and require frequent inspection, and especially the engine.”

In the future, it was necessary to extend the normal range of the vehicle without reducing the payload to at least 1200-1500 km. and the maximum speed is up to 450-480 km/h. In addition, it was supposed to “increase the safety factor to 1/2 times, according to current strength standards,” as well as the bomb load to 750-1000 kg “due to a corresponding reduction in the dead weight of the structure.”

The test conclusions stated: “The SB 2IS aircraft, as already noted by the Research Institute of IBS in reports on state tests in February and June 1935, belongs to a new tactical class of modern bomber aircraft. High flight performance and sufficiently powerful weapons provide it with tactical independence and speed actions

In particular, air combat tests have established that the SB can use its speed to evade attacks from an I-15 type fighter (the maximum flight speed at an estimated altitude of 3000 m was 367 km/h - author). Leaving behind a strong air stream up to 150-200 m long, the aircraft frustrates a fighter flight attacking from behind, disrupting its aimed fire at these distances. Thanks to its coloring, the SB aircraft is well camouflaged on the snowy surface of the earth and against the background of clouds, significantly complicating attacks by fighters and observation of it from the ground.

Compared to the previous aircraft model. SB 2IS. Having passed state tests, this sample has the following advantages.

By plane:

...The longitudinal stability of the aircraft has been significantly improved, the aircraft is stable up to alignment of 32", MAC on the connector. The previous model was stable only up to 29" ( .

...The severe stalling of the aircraft to the left at high speeds has been eliminated. and increasing the rigidity of the center section eliminated deformations of the skin.

Navigator's bomb sight

Four views of the gunner-radio operator's turret

...Performing cross-country flights in adverse meteorological conditions is possible, since the equipment and stability of the aircraft's path allow instrument driving.

...Flight on one engine is possible for a long time and at significant altitudes (up to 5000 m). At the same time, the aircraft retains significant maneuverability.

Increasing the rigidity of the engine frame increased the operational reliability of the aircraft.

By armament:

...The machine guns of all rifle installations and the installations themselves worked on the ground and in the air without fail at outside air temperatures down to -40°C.

...Easy maneuvering of the coaxial machine gun mount and machine gun on the TUR-9, within the permissible firing angles, is carried out at speeds of up to 280 km/h.

...Horizontal holders with EMF up to a height of 8100 m and outside air temperatures down to -51"C worked flawlessly.

...The mechanical part, the emergency release and the hatch control mechanism worked normally at all altitudes and flight modes.

... Heated EMPS and electric squib launchers (presented for the first time), installed on KV-2 bomb racks, worked flawlessly at temperatures down to -53°C and at altitudes up to 8200 m.

... Electric pyrotechnic descents provided more reliable operation, since they are simpler in design and easier to operate and require less power consumption."

Military experts noted the following as the main disadvantages of the aircraft:

View of the radio operator's position

Lower shooting mount

ShKAS machine gun bottom mounted

Scheme of suspension of eight 100-kg bombs and one 500-kg bomb in the SB bomb bay

“For the aircraft: Statistical tests have not been carried out, which so far excludes the possibility of flying this aircraft with an increased load and, therefore, limits the ability to increase its range and limits the maneuver of the aircraft at high speeds.

On armament: Reliable operation of machine guns at sub-zero temperatures is not ensured; the TUR turret, when rotating it at high flight speeds over 280 km/h, requires significant effort from the shooter. The OPI-1 sight fails to operate at altitudes above 6000 m and at an outside air temperature of -30°C at lower altitudes.

Regarding special equipment: SPU-3 does not work reliably - microphones freeze.

On operation: It was noted that the operation of the aircraft is difficult. Maintenance, inspections and minor repairs require a lot of time. Replacing individual engine units requires the prior removal of other units and parts."

In conclusion, the report on the tests of the SB-2IS stated: “The SB-2IS aircraft should be considered to have passed state tests. It is considered necessary to oblige the State Aviation Administration to carry out work to further eliminate the identified defects and to further modify this type of aircraft. Conduct a full study of the issues of combat use of the SI aircraft at the Air Force Research Institute.” .

The conclusion was signed by the head of the Air Force Research Institute K A brigade commander Bazhenov, the head of the 1st department of the research institute Petrov, the head of TsAGI Kharlamov and the head of OELID TsAGI Chesalov. The test report was approved by the head of the airborne forces of the spacecraft, Ya. I. Alksnis, on February 14, 1936.

Let us note that the testing and development of the SB 2IS aircraft took a very long time - they lasted more than a year. But it should be taken into account that this aircraft was fundamentally new for that time. It was developed by a young team that had not yet accumulated sufficient experience. At the same time, the main difficulties that Arkhangelsky’s team had to face (stability and controllability of the flight, as well as effective cooling of the engines) were “standard” problems for all Soviet aircraft of that time. At the same time, TsAGI for a long time could not develop effective recommendations on these issues. This circumstance was repeatedly pointed out by the head of the Air Force Research Institute A. I. Filin and the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force Ya. V. Smushkevich. These problems were truly solved for the first time on P.O. Sukhoi BB-1 aircraft. Su-6 and Su-8, as well as Polikarpov I-185 and TIS.

Upon completion of state tests, the SB 2IS was transferred as a standard to plant No. 22, where the assembly of serial SBs was already underway.

Suspension of 100 kg bombs

100 kg bomb in bomb bay

Suspension in the bomb bay of two 250-kg

500 kg bomb suspension

Bomb bay doors

The layout of the SB 2IS was practically no different from the version with RCF-3 engines. The main power unit of the SB 2IS airframe was: the wing center section with engine nacelles and the central part of the fuselage, structurally connected into one whole. Detachable parts of the wing, nose and tail, were attached to them fuselage parts.

The cockpit of the navigator-gunner was located in the front part of the fuselage of the aircraft; at the same time, he solved the tasks of the bombardier. Next was the pilot's cabin, then the bomb bay and, closer to the tail of the plane, the radio operator's cabin.

The bomb bay was located in the central part of the fuselage. The mid-plane arrangement of the wing, the spars of which pierced the bomb bay, determined the bomb suspension scheme. The maximum caliber of bombs was limited to 500 kg. In this case, large-caliber bombs weighing 500 and 250 kg were suspended horizontally in the bomb bay under the wing spars. The suspension of bombs of smaller caliber - from 100 kg and less - was carried out in combination: vertically in the front part of the bomb bay between the wing spars and horizontally in the rear part behind the rear wing spar.

Since the entire bomb load weighing 500-600 kg was placed near the aircraft’s center of gravity, its release did not have a significant effect on the aircraft’s stability and controllability characteristics. The bomb release was controlled by the navigator using electrical and mechanical releases. The cockpit had a duplicate emergency mechanical release.

To suspend the bombs, two KD-2 winches were provided, mounted on a special removable frame.

To repel enemy air attacks, the SB 2IS aircraft was equipped with three rifle mounts developed at Plant No. 32 under the leadership of N.P. Shebanov.

The navigator's cabin housed a shielded rifle mount with a pair of ShKAS machine guns (total ammunition capacity of 1000 rounds), movable only in the vertical plane. At the same time, due to the dispersion of bullets during firing, a small cone of fire was formed in the horizontal plane.

In the radio operator's cabin there were two movable rifle installations with ShKAS machine guns. The top installation is a TUR-9 turret (ammunition capacity 760 rounds), and the bottom installation is a hatch installation (ammunition capacity 500 rounds). TUR-9 provided fire in a cone in the upper rear hemisphere, and the hatch - in the lower rear hemisphere. In the stowed position (in the absence of attacks by enemy fighters), the machine guns were retracted inside the cabin.

Note that TUR-9 at that time was the most original turret for the ShKAS rapid-firing machine gun, allowing, to a certain extent, to decide

aerial shooting dachas in all flight modes of high-speed aircraft. “Currently, the TUR-9 is the only turret that allows firing on turns and other types of overloads. This is achieved by balancing the weapon with the weight of the shooter and easy-to-use control mechanisms.” - stated in the report of plant No. 32 on testing the turret.

Distinctive feature The hatch installation was extremely easy to install and fairly light in weight (5.6 kg).

The design of the navigator's machine gun mount was based on the requirement of "the navigator's quick transition to shooting." Distinguished by its special design, the installation was “a major step in the design of special high-speed aircraft weapons.” Its distinctive feature was the enormous rate of fire for those times, about 3000-3500 rounds per minute, and low weight.

Third experimental BB-2 - TsKB 26 2M-85

It is curious that, apparently, on the initiative of S.V. Ilyushin, the task of developing and building the BB-2 bomber was also given to the design bureau of plant No. 39.

On July 14, 1934, by resolution of the STO at the Council of People's Commissars for Vod No. 34, it was obliged to develop and submit for state testing its own version of the BB-2 aircraft by November 1, 1935.

View of the radio station in the radio operator's cabin

View of the SB pilot's cockpit

Engine "Hispano-Suiza"

According to the stories of veterans of the Ilyushin Design Bureau, to some extent confirmed by archival documents, the initial development of a version of this aircraft by S.V. Ilyushin instructed II.N. Polikarpov, and further development of the aircraft under the code TsKB-26 was carried out in the design team No. 3 of the TsKB by Sergei Vladimirovich’s closest associate (classmate at the Air Force Academy named after Prof. N.E. Zhukovsky) A.A. Senkov.

A little bit later. On August 29, 1934, the head of the Air Force Department of the Air Force, Ya. I. Alksnis, approved the tactical and technical requirements for the BB-2 aircraft, specially formulated for Plant No. 34. The aircraft was included in the experimental construction plan approved in April 1935. Ilyushin stated the following flight tactical data for this aircraft: maximum flight speed at an altitude of 4500-5000 m 410-425 km/h. flight range 1000-2000 km, ceiling 9700 m, bomb load 600-1000 kg.

In January 1935, state tests of the M-85 air-cooled engines (a licensed version of the French Gnome-Ron 14K engine) were completed. Ilyushin chose these engines for his aircraft.

S.V. Ilyushin described the design of the new aircraft as follows. “The BB-2 K-14 aircraft is a monoplane with a low-lying wing of an all-metal structure. The fuselage of the first flight prototype of the aircraft (TsKB-26 - author) is made entirely of wood, the frame of which consists of stringers, spars and transverse laminated plywood panels. The skin made of plywood veneer.

The fusel consists of five longitudinal spars, a system of stringers and a transverse set consisting of laminated plywood and wooden frames. The fuselage is covered with 4..4 mm thick veneer and six layers of veneer. The fin is integral with the fuselage.

...The wing consists of five parts. The middle part of the center section is rigidly attached to the fuselage and is integral with it. The size of the aircraft center is such that it, together with the fuselage, can fit into the dimensions railway. ...Thus, the wing consists of a central part and two adjacent compartments on which the landing gear and engine units and two consoles are mounted. The wing consists of two truss-type hardened chromium-silver steel spars. The wing frame consists of a set of equal-force ribs and longitudinal stringers. And where the consoles and engines connect to the center section, the rigid skin will be connected so that it works across its entire scope. The covering is smooth with hidden riveting. Ribs and sheathing made of superdural. Between the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the inner ends of the ailerons there are flaps to reduce the landing speed. Wing profile C LARK U15. The thickness at the root of the wing is 16%, at the tip of the wing 10%. Relief from hinge moments is achieved using flatners."

The remaining structural elements (engine unit, landing gear, crutch, etc.) were carried out in the same way as on the DB-3 aircraft, the design of which was repeatedly described.

A special feature of the TsKB-26 bomb bay (according to the project) was the installation of cassette holders for hanging ten 100-kg bombs not on the side walls of the fuselage, but along the axis of the aircraft. A 1000 kg bomb could be suspended from a holder mounted on the axial rib. and on two holders mounted on the side ribs, one bomb of 500 kg caliber each.

It must be said that the design of the aircraft itself turned out to be quite rational and lightweight, but not without a number of serious shortcomings.

In particular, the reduction in wing weight was achieved through the use of an all-metal structure with a thin-walled skin that works smoothly when the wing bends, as well as by unloading its end parts with fuel tanks made in the form of sealed wing compartments (a prototype of caisson tanks). But as it turned out later, this wing design also led to a decrease in the flight, combat and operational qualities of the aircraft.

Thus, the use of thin duralumin wing skin (0.5-1.2 mm thick), reinforced with sparse stringers, already at the design stresses in the main load-bearing elements - spar belts and stringers, led to bulging of the skin even in horizontal flight. The deterioration of the quality of the wing surface naturally had a negative impact on the aircraft's flight performance. Buckling of the thin duralumin skin was reduced to some extent due to the use of steel belts of the side members, which, with equal deformation of them and the duralumin skin panels, reduced the stresses acting in the skin. However, this did not exclude bulging of the skin.

TsKB-26

LTX SB 2IS from the report on state tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force KA (report dated February 14, 1934)

In addition, fastening the skin to the stringers and ribs with secret rivets by countersinking a hole in the material from the point of view of combat survivability turned out to be completely unsatisfactory. When an anti-aircraft shell burst, under the influence of a blast wave, the heads of the rivets easily broke through the holes, and the skin was torn off from the stringers, ribs and spars over a large area.

In turn, replacing one battle-damaged or leaking gas tank took three technical specialists 3-4 days...

The TsKB-26 aircraft was built as experimental aircraft(without weapons) and demonstrated high tactical data, superior in many respects to the characteristics of the SB 2IS. The plane had good aerobatic qualities.

In the summer of 1936, V.K. Kokkinaki set five world records at TsKB-26. For the first time on an aircraft of this class, he demonstrated the execution of a dead loop. But its fate as a high-speed bomber did not work out for a number of reasons.

Based on the pilot construction plan. government approved in April 1935, on the basis of the TsKB-26 aircraft, the TsKB-30 long-range bomber was designed with the following main indicators: maximum speed 400-415 km/h at a flight altitude of 4000-4500 m, flight range 4500 km. ceiling 9000 m. bomb load 600-1000 kg. It was planned to build both types of Ilyushin bombers.

Here we should dwell on a number of inaccuracies in the description of the history of the creation of the TsKB-26 aircraft. In particular, some publications claim that the plane “left” for its first flight in the early summer of 1935, others indicate the exact date of the first flight - July 1, 1935. In reality, everything was far from the case.

Let's look at the documents. November 1, 1935 Ilyushin sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR Bazilevich<вх. № 2871 от 02.11.35 г.), в которой писал о безобразном отношении руководителей ГУАП и завода N» 39 Королева. Марголина и Леонтьева к выполнению Правительственного задания по постройке самолетов ЦКБ-26 и ЦКБ-30. Несмотря на то, что чертежи по ЦКБ-26 были сданы 39-му заводу до 1 мая 1935 г.. а по ЦКБ-30 – до I августа, завод к постройке самолетов к I ноября 1935 г. практически понастоящем\ не приступил.

S.V. Ilyushin’s letter is quite long, so below we present only some excerpts from it: “According to the Experimental Construction Plan approved by the Government on July N July 1934, plant No. 39 named after Comrade Menzhinsky was given the task of building a twin-engine short-range bomber BK ( or otherwise SB) with the deadline for passing State tests on November 1, 1935.

...The same short-range bomber, on the basis of the Experimental Construction Plan approved by the Government in April 1935, is being developed into a long-range bomber (thus, both types are combined into one). with a deadline for passing State tests by February 1, 1936.

...Working drawings for both aircraft were submitted for production: 1 copy each from March 1 to May 1, 1935. Thus, the production period was six months (from 1.3 to 1.9). The period is more than enough. The second copy of the aircraft is 70% built according to the drawings of the first aircraft of the copy. New drawings were 30% completed by August 1st. Likewise, the period is quite sufficient.

I repeat: Plant 30 had all the necessary and sufficient conditions to fulfill the Government’s Assignment for these aircraft on time.

All our demands and pressures on the management of the Plant (Comrade Margolin and Comrade Leontyev) regarding accelerating the construction of aircraft on time remained ineffective. We could not break through the walls of indifference and disinterest in releasing these vehicles on time, which we consider necessary to inform you about with all responsibility and ask you to report this issue to the Chairman of the Council of Civil Affairs and Defense of the USSR, Comrade V. M. Molotov. 3 construct, brigade head. No. 39 Ser. Ilyushin. 1.11.35. No. 2/ her"

From consideration of this document, as well as the dates of the flight over Red Square. setting records, it can be assumed that the first flight of the TsKB-26 took place no earlier than April 1936.

This conclusion is confirmed by two more official documents: the first is the “Plan for Experimental Construction of Aircraft for 1936-37.” prepared as an annex to the STO Resolution No. OK-Icc, and the second - “Certificate on the progress of work on the main experimental aircraft.” prepared by the GUAP apparatus by the end of 1936.

The fourteenth line of the "Plan for Experimental Construction of Aircraft for 1936-37." looks like this: “Long-range bomber with 2 M-85 TsKB-26 engines... (the following are the main flight data - author)... No. 39 The first copy with a reduced range is produced by 1.IV.36."

That is, the “Plan…” provided for the release date of the aircraft by April 1, 1936. At the same time, in the “Certificate...” in the section on the progress of experimental work at the GUAP for 1935, the TsKB-26 aircraft is not mentioned at all...

It can be assumed that the requirements of the “Plan…” were practically fulfilled, and in April 1936 the first flight of TsKB-26 took place.

On May 1, 1936, a significant event took place in the life of our aviation - three of the fastest BB-2 bombers in the world flew over Red Square at once: SB 2RTs and SB 2IS by A. A. Arkhangelsky and SB 2M-85 (TsKB-26) S. V. Ilyushina. Glorious military deeds awaited both vehicles...

(To be continued)

Ar-2 is a twin-engine dive bomber, which was a deep modernization of the SB high-speed bomber.

Developed since 1939 under the leadership of A.A. Arkhangelsk and was originally designated SB-RK, i.e. “radiators in the wing”: instead of engine nacelles, radiators were placed in detachable parts of the wing, which made it possible to give the engine nacelles a more streamlined shape. In addition, the aircraft was equipped with underwing brake grilles, the shape of the forward fuselage was changed, making it more streamlined, and the wing span and area were reduced.

A prototype of the SB-RK (still with the old nose section, similar to the SB) was tested in the spring of 1940. In the second half of August 1940, a series of 3 SB-RK aircraft with a new nose fuselage was produced, and from the third quarter of 1940. At Moscow plant No. 22, serial production of aircraft began, designated Ar-2 from December 1940. Production continued until mid-1941; according to various sources, 190-200 aircraft were manufactured.

The main modification of the Ar-2 dive bomber

Ar-2 - M-105R engines (1100 hp). Small arms - 3 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns (1 each in the bow mount, upper turret and lower mount). The maximum bomb load weight is 1600 kg (including 600 kg in the bomb bay and 1000 kg on four nodes under the center section). Crew - 3 people.

Technical characteristics of the Ar-2 aircraft

Engines: M-105R
power, hp: 1100
Wingspan, m.: 18.00
Aircraft length, m: 12.50
Aircraft height, m: 3.56
Wing area, sq. m.: 48.20
Weight, kg:
empty aircraft: 4516
normal takeoff: 6660
maximum takeoff: 8150
Maximum speed, km/h: 443
Rate of climb, m/s: 12.75
Practical ceiling, m: 10500
Flight range, km: 1500

Combat use of Ar-2

Deliveries of the Ar-2 to the unit were carried out in parallel with the SB. At the same time, not a single regiment was completely re-equipped with the Ar-2 - they had 1-2 squadrons of dive bombers, and sometimes only a few vehicles of this type.

By the time of Germany’s attack on the USSR, Ar-2s were available in the 2nd SBAP of the Leningrad District, the 46th and 54th SBAP in the Baltic States, the 13th SBAP in Ukraine, as well as the 73rd BAP of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. In addition, one squadron of the 27th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Moscow District flew the Ar-2. Like other bomber units, most of these regiments suffered heavy losses in the very first days of the war - for example, the 13th SBAP lost all its aircraft before the beginning of July 1941. 2nd AE 27th IAP, armed with Ar-2, June 23 arrived at the front in Belarus. The planes attacked concentrations of German troops, but after completing 89 sorties, the squadron was left without vehicles. For longer - until October 1941 - the Ar-2 was operated by the naval 73rd BAP. On June 30, his planes bombed German troops near Daugavpils, in July they attacked enemy ships and vessels in the Baltic, and bombed Pärnu and Riga. Most of the Ar-2s at the front were knocked out by November 1941, but the 33rd SBAP, which fought on the Southwestern Front, had 2 such aircraft back in May 1942.

The Ar-2 was a very good aircraft, and the decision to discontinue it in favor of the Pe-2 looks dubious. After all, although somewhat inferior to the Pe-2 in speed, the Arkhangelsky dive-bomber was significantly superior to it in terms of combat load, had excellent takeoff and landing characteristics, and was more accessible to mastering by inexperienced pilots.

Production of Ar-2 aircraft (1940 - 1941)


Factory	1940	1941
№22	71	196

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