On the topic, I can say the following: I am not a super-professional in marine topics, which you are. However, I have a great desire to reconstruct the theory of the most mysterious battleship Navarin. I agree, many took it, but not many succeeded. I can say that I will get to the point where the theory will be as close to the truth as possible. I hope for your understanding and help. Upon completion of this topic, everyone will be rewarded.
I didn’t use the Retrofleet theory. And I didn’t even take it as a basis. I developed a model based on sections of decks, sections of the bow and stern towers, pieces of sections of the hull from the book by A.A. Garmashev, photographs of the Navarin model from the Central Military Museum (kindly provided by Dmitry, for which special thanks to him., photographs of the battleship Navarin, photographs battleship Nikolai 1.)
The theory has been developed for more than 1.5 years. Only a few touches remain.
But when creating the model, I was guided by all the information, and mainly by the model from the CVMM. It was in my program as a background. If you fully comply with the section according to Arbuzov, then the smoothness of the lines and the transitions of shadows that are on the model in the CVMM will not be observed. I'll still try to play around with it. The destruction of the deck will definitely occur. Just to create 3models on at this stage I didn't draw her. It was important for me to create the most accurate volume possible.
Main line to Navarino. However, somehow they don’t answer there... I’m turning here because there are professionals here too.

Below I give a preliminary theoretical justification for the reconstruction of Navarin's theory. The theory is still in progress.
And also sections and sections of what we have now.
Squadron battleship NAVARIN.

Introduction: this work outlines the reconstruction project appearance and drawings of the most mysterious and at the same time the most famous ship in the Russian fleet, the ship that became the starting point for all subsequent ships -
"squadron battleship NAVARIN".
Special conditions:
1. this work was not created based on processing or redrawing of construction and reporting drawings.
2. This work was developed based on the analysis of all currently available information (sketches, text sources, reporting model and photographs of the battleship itself).
3. This work is for reference only and in some way reflects my subjective opinion.
4. I do not claim 100% compliance of the materials and drawings presented in this work with the construction and reporting drawings.

When reconstructing the drawing of the battleship Navarin, for the starting point as such I took it as a rule:
1. The bow perpendicular must ultimately lie in the plane of the zero frame and coincide with the bow end of the overhead line.
2. The stern perpendicular passes through the steering axis.
3. The frame is in the middle of the line between the perpendiculars - the midship frame.
4. Longitudinal section drawings, sections of 67, 29 frames and sections of decks, truly reflect the design drawings of the battleship.
5. The “length” of the battleship is 107 m. The only correct and indisputable fact. I do not give an exact definition of exactly what length is indicated: according to the vertical line, between perpendiculars, the greatest. This value is indicated on the board next to the reporting model of the battleship and, in my opinion, is the most correct.

History of creation and service.
STILL IN PROGRESS….

2. RECONSTRUCTION.
The reconstruction of the building was carried out using the 3D modeling program RINOSEROS.

B). Frame.
The reconstruction of the hull was based on the drawings of a longitudinal section of the battleship on pp. 54-55 of Arbuzov’s monograph and Fig. 27 of the book “Squadron battleships Gangut and Navarin” (Garmashev A.A., Bogdanov M.A.). These drawings were taken as the BASIS because they have frame marks, a scale bar, and allow the approximate external contours and linear dimensions of the battleship to be drawn as accurately as possible. In addition, when obtaining approximate linear dimensions, possible errors were missed, since the exact linear dimensions will be derived in the process based on all available data transmitting information about the armadillo. The waterline from the given figures was taken as the waterline.
When converting these drawings to 200 scale, the approximate linear dimensions of the armadillo turned out to be as follows:
1. Length along the “waterline” - 107.002 m.
2. The width of the battleship in the area of ​​the midship frame along the overhead line is 20.244 m.
3. The length of the battleship from the beginning of the ram to the edge of the stern is 110.616 m.
Including:
2.1. The length of the protruding part of the ram is 3.104 m.
2.2. The distance from frame 93 to the edge of the stern is 3,910 m.
2.3. The length between perpendiculars is 103.216 m.
3. Armadillo draft – 7.74m
4. Freeboard height – 3.762 m.
5. The diameter of the main building towers is 7.688 m.
6. The distance between the axis of rotation of the bow tower and the zero perpendicular is 30.2 m.
7. The distance between the axes of rotation of the towers is 45.44 m.
7.1. The distance between the outer edges of the towers is 37.738 m.
7.2. The height of the tower from the edge of the deck to the bottom edge is 3.026 m.
7.3. The height of the tower from the edge of the deck to the upper (protruding) edge is 3,188 m.
8. Pipe dimensions:
8.1. The height of the pipes from the top edge to the “waterline” is 16.832 m.
8.2. The height of the pipe from the top edge to the bottom edge is 15.674 m.
8.2. The height of the pipes from the top edge to the edge of the battery deck is 13.122 m.
8.3. The height of the pipe from the top edge to the edge of the upper deck is 7.964 m.
8.3. The distance between the axis of the front pipe and the bow zero frame is 41.110 m.
8.4. The distance between the axis of the rear pipe and the zero frame is 53.3 m
8.5. The distance between the axes of the pipes is 12,190 m.
8.6. The width of the upper part of the pipe is 3.006 m.
8.7. The width of the pipe base is 3.748 m.
8.8. The width of the canopy at the bottom is 4,380 m.

In addition to the obtained dimensions, the following textual information on the main dimensions of the battleship was known:
NOTE: The data below reflects the dimensions of the battleship at the time of laying and is reflected in the specifications.
A. Arbuzov V.V.
1.1. The greatest length is 107m.
1.2. The length between perpendiculars is 105.9 m.
1.3. Width – 20.42 m.
1.4. Design draft – 7.62 m. bow and 8.4 stern.
1.5. The number of frames is 93. The length of the spacing is 1.2 m.
1.6. Displacement coefficient of completeness is 0.58.
1.7. Design displacement – ​​9476t.
1.8. Actual displacement – ​​10107.38 tu
2.1. The outer diameter of the main building towers is 7.6 m.
2.2. The largest diameter with armor is 77.1 m. There is probably an error and should read 7.71m.
2.3. The height from the lower base to the roof is 5.49 m.
A.A.Garmashev, M.A.Bogdanov. MTK specification.
1.1. The length between perpendiculars is 103.02 m.
1.2. The greatest width is 20.42 m.
1.3. Even keel draft is 7.62 m.
1.4. Hull set 96 frames.
3. Watercraft:
3.1. 2 50-foot mine boats.
3.2. 2 -34 foot steam launches.
3.3. 2 20-oar longboats.
3.4. 2 14-oar light boats.
3.5. 2 6-oar whaleboats.
3.6. 2 6-oar yawls.
3.7. 1 16-oar work boat.
Explanatory table for the reporting model of the battleship Navarin from the RGAVMF fund
1. The length of the ship is 107m.
2. Width – 20.4
3. Recess – 8.4

In addition to the data presented, all information conveying data on the linear dimensions of the battleship Navarin was collected and tabulated.
Table No. 1 Summary of information on the linear dimensions of the battleship Navarin.

Sources
Dimensional characteristics Book Emperor Alex.2 Suliga
Armor noses RYAV ModelistConstructor Retro fleet Arbuzov Internet
Warships of the world Internet bark and armor carriers Internet
Encyclopedia of ships Internet
Unknown drawing
Full length 107.02 112.3 107.0 107.0 109.02
GVL length 105.9 105.9 105.9 105.9 105.9
Length between perpendiculars 103.02 103.0 105.9
Maximum width 20.42 20.4 20.4 20.42 20.42 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.42
Draft 8 8.0
even keel
design 7.62 7.7 7.62 7.62 nose 7.6 7.6
actual 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 stern 8.0 8.0
And there are about 5 more sources in which the information is similar and does not provide new values ​​​​about linear dimensions.
As mentioned above, one value “Length 107m” was known. When analyzing the information tables of other models in the TsVMM, it was concluded that this value reflects the actual length of the battleship along the waterline at the time the ship was launched. This value was taken as the basis for the subsequent reconstruction of the theoretical drawing.
When reconstructing the hull, the foot system was converted to a meter system. At the same time, in numerical indicators, due to the peculiarities of the Rinoceros program, only hundredths were taken.
1. The distance between the frames was measured in mm.
The results are given as the arithmetic mean.
From 0 to 20 frames - 4.78 or in the original 0.952 m.
From 20 to 76 frames - 6.05 or in the original 1,210 m.
From 76 to 93 frames - 4.69 or in the original 0.938 m.
At the time of the laying of the battleship and subsequently, the imperial fleet used the foot measurement system, which in our case, theoretically, when converted to the metric system, gives the following data:
1. The distance between the spacing from 0 to 20 frames is 3 feet = 0.9144 m.
2. The distance between frames from 20 to 76 is 4 feet = 1.2192 m.
3. The distance between the spacing from frames 76 to 93 is 3 feet = 0.9144 m.
Also, different distances in the indicated ranges are confirmed visually.
It is also noticeable that the axis of the zero frame does not lie in the area of ​​the bow perpendicular, which does not correspond to the rule adopted above, according to which the axis of the bow perpendicular in any case lies in the plane of the zero frame and coincides with the bow end of the waterline.
NOTE:
In light of what I have said, an experiment was conducted. The CVL axis was raised to the actual draft height of the battleship - 8.4 m. In this case, the axis of the zero frame coincided with the axis of the bow perpendicular. The error in the 200 scale was 0.14mm or 2.8cm in the original dimensions. The length along the vertical line was 106.896 m.
Next, a grid of frames with the appropriate spacing was laid out on the vertical line:
4.57mm. = 3 feet at 200 scale.
6.09mm = 4 feet at 200 scale.
The distance between frames 0 and 93 was:
4.57*20 = 91.4 = 18.280m
6.09*56 = 341.04 = 68.208m
4.57* 17 = 77.69 = 15.538m
18.280+68.208+15.538 = 102.026 m.
At the same time, when recalculated in original dimensions, the distance between 0 and 93 frames will be - 102.108
As you can see, the error was 0.082 = (0.082*200) = 16.4 mm. This error is caused by the fact that the Rinoceros program does not accept 3rd order values ​​and it is possible to put only 2 digits after the decimal point on the grid.
Also, as can be seen from the above figure, the ram protrudes noticeably from the plane of the zero frame. When plotting 3-foot sections in this figure, it was found that the ram protrudes from the plane of the zero frame by 3.5 3-foot sections - 10.5 feet.
When the corresponding sections of 3 feet were placed towards the stern, it was found that the edge of the stern lies at the 4th section from the plane 93 of the frame, the axis of the rudder lies at a distance of 1 section from the plane 93 of the frame.
After this, according to our rule, the distance between the perpendiculars was calculated, namely between the 0 frame and the steering axis: This distance was:
1. Option: 102.026+0.9144 = 102.9404
2. Option: 102.108 + 0.9144 = 103.0224 (At a draft of 8.4 m.)
When calculating the distance between the spacings, the following length was set:
Spacing between spacings
From 0 to 20 – 3 feet (0.9144 m.)
from 20 to 76 – 4 feet (1.2192m)
from 76 to 93 – 3 feet (0.9144m)
from frame 93 to the center of rotation of the rudder - 3 feet (0.9144 m).
from the center of rotation of the rudder to the edge of the stern - 12 feet (3.6576 m).
from the zero perpendicular to the edge of the ram - 11 feet (3.3528 m).
The calculation was based on drawings with projections of frames 29, 76. These are the only frames with a scale grid.
The calculations are also confirmed by longitudinal section drawings. When zooming in, you can see that the distance between the frames is different, in the order described above.
We calculate the length between perpendiculars:
18.288+68.2752+15.5448+0.9144=103.0224m.
Version 1. Calculation according to the spacing step: length between perpendiculars 102.106 m.
It does not answer the truth, since 2 out of 9 sources say that the length between perpendiculars is 103.02 m.
Version 2.
If we add a distance between frames of 3 feet (0.9144 m) to frame 93, then we get the required distance between perpendiculars of 103.022 m. Thus, it was experimentally established that the hull set did not consist of 93 but of a larger number of frames. This version is confirmed by graphic drawings. On which the application of both 94 and 95 twines is clearly visible.

Squadron battleship "Navarin". (Longitudinal section of the aft tower, shell and charging magazines)

At the end of the summer of 1895, to test the ships under construction: the battleship Navarin, the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov, the armored cruiser Rurik and destroyers No. 119 and No. 120, under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral B.K. De-Livron (shortly before this he managed to serve as commander of the Navarino) was formed special commission. The flagship of the newly formed detachment was the Admiral Ushakov. On it the admiral raised his flag on August 15. About a month later, on September 12, Navarin also began the campaign. Basically, only the main and auxiliary mechanisms were tested, since the artillery on the ship was installed only in the summer and it had many deficiencies.

On September 23, "Navarin" went to the factory testing of machines and determining deviations. The machines were mainly maintained by factory workers. They managed to increase the steam pressure to 130 pounds, and the machines developed 90 revolutions. But, despite the fact that the cars “worked smoothly and did not get hot,” the battleship reached a speed of just over 15 knots.

The next trip to sea took place on September 29. Together with representatives of the Franco-Russian plant, they conducted six-hour tests. Having a displacement of 10,107 tons, the battleship reached a speed of 16.3 knots. The overload amounted to 631.4 tons or 6.6% of the design (9437 tons) displacement. With more accurate calculations, the overload of the hull was determined to be 274 tons, mechanisms 308 tons, armor 12 tons, artillery 30 tons and supplies 7 tons. On November 10, official tests were carried out. This time with a power of 9194 hp. (pressure 135 pounds and 94 revolutions of the propeller), the average speed on the test was only 15.85 knots (however, on one of the runs they reached 16.14 knots).

The commission is chaired by the chief mechanical inspector, mechanical engineer. N.G. Nozikova testified that “the steam held easily, and the mechanism operated at a constant speed, very calmly and without heating up.”

The tests were over, and "Navarin" left for Revel. There they were to begin testing torpedo tubes. Having fired several shots from each apparatus, the battleship returned to Kronstadt, and on December 14 the pennant was lowered on it. The three-month campaign is over.

Tactical and technical data of battleships launched in the period from 1887 to 1896.

After the tests, workers from the Franco-Russian plant arrived on the ship, and construction continued. Work was in full swing on all decks. A little later, "Navarin" was placed in the large Konstantinovsky dock and painting of the bottom began.

In the dock next to the bulk of its hull stood the coastal defense battleship Admiral Lazarev, which seemed so small even with its spars, and the corvette Minneapolis, which had remained in Russia for the winter - a ship of a friendly country - from the distant North American United States. At the dock on the bridge in front of the light signal mast, a charthouse was installed (its metal frame was sheathed with one-inch steel sheets).

In the winter from 1895 to 1896. The conning tower armor was installed on the ship (the conning tower frame itself was assembled only in November during testing), shots and rigging for anti-torpedo nets, platforms for searchlights and armor plates on the tower frames. An innovation in the fleet was the artillery control system installed on the battleship using combat indicators designed by Lieutenant Stepanov. In February, four 37-mm Hotchkiss guns were removed from the ship, and two Baranovsky landing guns were removed from the deck pedestals, replacing them with six 47-mm single-barrel ones.

Before the start of the campaign, the Metal Plant handed over artillery to the treasury, and the Kronstadt port installed poles and panels of anti-torpedo nets that had been removed during the winter. At the same time, the ship was equipped with a rudder position indicator for the system of Lieutenant Kolbasiev, which appeared in the fleet, two electric winches and electric lights for signaling the system of Lieutenant Colonel Tabulevich.

The new battleship was undoubtedly the strongest ship of the Russian Imperial Navy. But it should be taken into account that seven years passed from the start of design to its entry into operation. During this time, the Navarin and its prototype, the battleship Nile (which was also in the English fleet for seven years), became obsolete types.

In England, by that time, the fleet had included eight of the newest Royal Sovereign-class ships, and the first of nine similar Majestic-class battleships had already begun to leave the stocks. In addition, British shipyards began building another series of six Canopus-class ships. Germany also began construction of a new series of five battleships, the lead of which was the Kaiser Friedrich III.

All new battleships had higher sides and a larger number of medium-caliber guns, which gave them an incomparable advantage in an artillery duel.

Having begun the construction of the Navarina in the Baltic and the similar type of Three Saints in the Black Sea, Russia also moved away from the concept of low-sided turret battleships. In 1895, when the "Navarin" entered service, the "Sisoy the Great", "Petropavlovsk" and "Poltava" - representatives of another type of high-sided ship with new, more powerful 305 m 40-caliber guns installed in towers, with the center of gravity passing through the axis of rotation.

At the end of April 1904, at a Special Meeting chaired by Emperor Nicholas II, it was decided to include the battleship Navarin, which was undergoing repairs and partial modernization in Kronstadt, into the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Due to the forced reduction in the time allotted for the implementation of the planned measures, some of the previously planned work had to be canceled, and already from June 1904, the ship, along with the battleship Sisa the Great and the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which had also undergone repairs, stood in the Great Kronstadt roadstead.

By order of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky dated June 23, 1904 (hereinafter all dates are given in the old style), “Navarin”, together with “Oslyabya”, “Sisoy the Great” and “Admiral Nakhimov” was enrolled in the 2nd armored detachment, headed by Rear Admiral D. G. Felkersam, who raised his flag on the battleship Oslyabya.

With the transfer of the squadron to Revel (Tallinn) on August 30, 1904, a period of combat training began: for a month, ships of the 1st and 2nd ranks practiced squadron evolutions, conducted barrel and caliber training exercises, and destroyers practiced launching torpedoes. While developing a coal loading schedule for the upcoming passage, the ships in Reval were urgently loaded with coal three times, however, the loading speed, due to the insufficient attention of the ship's management to the organization of work, was relatively low. Thus, at Navarina it was possible to receive from 11.4 to 23.9 tons of coal per hour; at the same time, on the Japanese battleship Fuji, for example, on April 24, 1905, the corresponding figure was one hundred and three tons in 27 minutes.

On September 28, 1904, the squadron left the port of Emperor Alexander III, arriving the next day in Libau (Liepaja). Having replenished coal reserves, the main forces of the 2nd Pacific Squadron left Libau on October 2, 1904. At Cape Skagen (Skagen Odde), the squadron was divided into six detachments (Nos. 1-6), four of which, including the 5th (battleships) "Oslyabya", "Sisoy the Great", "Navarin", the armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", the transports "Meteor" and "Malaya") were to proceed to Tangier (Morocco).

On the night of October 8-9, 1904, in the Dogger Bank area, the so-called “Hull Incident” occurred (with a high degree of probability, provoked by the British government), during which Russian ships fired at the English fishing flotilla and their cruiser “ Aurora". This led to a further deterioration in relations between London and St. Petersburg, as well as the forced delay of the 1st armored detachment in the Spanish port of Vigo until the conflict was resolved.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Tangier in parts, the first to arrive on October 16 was Detachment No. 5 (the flag of Rear Admiral Felkersam), the last, five days later, was Detachment No. 1 (the flag of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky). On the same day, the squadron commander, due to the unreliability of the Navarina refrigerators and the Sisoy the Great boilers, gave the order to these two battleships along with three cruisers (Svetlana, Zhemchug, Almaz), which were later joined by 9 destroyers and 9 transports, follow the Suez Canal to the island of Madagascar (rendezvous place for the entire squadron). The flagship of the Separate detachment of ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was the battleship "Sisoy the Great", to which Rear Admiral Felkerzam transferred his flag from the "Oslyabi". During the transition from the island of Crete to Port Said (Egypt), both battleships for the first time, after leaving Russia, conducted training firing on shields, showing satisfactory results. Having safely passed the Suez Canal on November 12-13, 1904, Felkerzam’s detachment, observing along the way the security measures developed taking into account the “Gullah Incident”, with a call to receive water and coal at Port Said (Egypt) and Djibouti (French Somalia), 15 December 1904 approached the entrance to Nossi Be Bay (Madagascar). Without resorting to the services of pilots, the ships of the detachment independently proceeded to the bay, which turned out to be so spacious that it could later accommodate the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Battleships in Nossi-Be, far right - "Navarin"

During the stay of the Second Pacific Squadron in one of the bays of the island of Nossi-Bé Island, the Navarin, which, together with the Oslyabya, was one of the two most accurate-shooting battleships, took part in training caliber shooting four times (14, January 18, 21 and 25, 1905), during which the battleship fired 40 12" and 120 6" shells.

For comparison, the battleships of the 1st combat detachment of the United Fleet ("Mikasa", "Shikishima", "Fuji" and "Asahi") at the only spring caliber firing of 1905, held on April 12, 1905, fired a total of 32 12 "shell, sixteen of which hit the target. At the same time, the battleship "Prince Suvorov", which fired on January 19, 1905 in much less favorable conditions (a shield as a target instead of a small island for the Japanese, and also much larger than for the Japanese , distance), fired six shells from the main caliber bow turret and achieved five hits.

After an almost three-month stay, the squadron left Madagascar on March 3, 1905, then making an unprecedented crossing of the Indian Ocean in 28 days. On April 26, 1905, the 2nd and 3rd squadrons met off the coast of Vietnam in Van Phong Bay, and the main forces of the 2nd Pacific Squadron began to consist of 8 squadron battleships, three coastal defense battleships, six rank I cruisers and three II cruisers rank.

The last loading of coal on the Navarino took place on May 10, 1905 near Shanghai, during which the fuel supply on board was brought to more than 1,200 tons. All the bunkers were filled with coal, the living and battery decks, as well as the poop and forecastle of the ship were covered. On the same day, the 2nd armored detachment was left without a commander, after a long illness, Rear Admiral D. G. Felkerzam (who left behind prophetic letters about the fate of Russia) died after a long illness, and the commander of the squadron battleship Oslyabya took over as temporary commander of the detachment "Captain 1st Rank V.I. Behr 1st.

By the morning of May 14, 1905, the amount of fuel reserves on the Navarin had decreased, according to the official report, to 751 tons (the normal supply is from 700 to 730 tons), and the battleship entered the battle, having coal only in the coal pits and the fire compartment ( The battleship, which had effective desalination plants, did not have excess reserves of fresh water), which in terms of operational overload compared favorably with the already mentioned Japanese battleship Fuji, for example. The latter, according to the English observer Captain T. Jackson, Royal Navy, on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima had from 1,163 to 1,300 tons of coal (the normal supply is 700 tons).

The day before, in preparation for the battle, all the “excess” wood on the Navarino was thrown overboard, with the exception of the boards in the rostra intended for loading coal. The boats were one-third filled with water and wrapped in anti-mine nets, the conning tower was wrapped in perlinas, and improvised traverses were made from bags of coal and sand on the decks. At 16:30 the signal “Prepare for battle” was transmitted to the squadron, and at 18:00 - “Tomorrow by dawn have pairs for full speed.”

In pursuance of the misinterpreted combat order of the squadron commander, “Course north-east 23°. Hit the lead" (intended only for the 1st armored detachment), "Navarin" from the bow turret of the main caliber opened fire on the Japanese flagship, the remaining guns were silent until the death of the battleship "Oslyabya".

During the day's battle, the Navarino's smokestacks and boats were damaged, and one 47 mm gun was disabled. Two medium-caliber shells caused small fires in the wardroom and forecastle, which were later successfully extinguished. The side 6" armor of the casemate of medium-caliber guns received several hits from shells of unknown caliber.

In the area of ​​the waterline, the battleship received seven hits (including one large-caliber projectile, presumably 12" caliber, in the stern and bow), of which four were in the aft compartment, which resulted in flooding in the stern, and three in the bow, where the water that penetrated into the torpedo tube compartment made the bow somewhat heavier, but the ship continued to maintain a squadron speed of 8-10 knots.

The ship's medium artillery, firing primarily with high-explosive shells, used up less than half of its ammunition in the Battle of Tsushima.

At 20:10 (hereinafter Japanese time), the remnants of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were attacked for the first time (in total, 21 fighters and 37 destroyers were approaching Nebogatov’s detachment, which was trying to hide from the Japanese by false turns, from three sides). Looking ahead, we note that this night for the Japanese was more effective than the night after the battle at Cape Shantung, when 18 of their fighters and 31 destroyers, which fired 74 torpedoes (32 and 42, respectively) at the ships of the Port Arthur squadron, achieved only one hit (the torpedo did not explode upon impact) into the battleship Poltava.

The detachment led by Nebogatov, initially consisting of nine ships (seven battleships and two cruisers), disintegrated with the onset of darkness. Unable to maintain a speed of about 12 knots, the Admiral Ushakov, Navarin, Sisoy the Great and the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov gradually fell behind.

At about 21:00, Navarin was attacked by the 4th Fighter Detachment of the 2nd Fleet (the pennant of Captain 2nd Rank Kantarō Suzuki) consisting of the Asagiri (朝霧) and Murasame (村雨) fighters. ) ("Harusame" type, assembled in Japan), as well as "Asashio" (朝潮) and "Shirakumo" (白雲) ("Shirakumo" type, built by the English company Thornycroft), and one of the one or two torpedoes they fired ( probably "Otsu" type, warhead - 52 kg of shimosa) at 21:05 exploded in the area of ​​the right aft 6" magazine.

Asashio fighter

Electric lighting was lost in the battery deck, and in the left bow fire compartment, steam was cut off in three bow boilers due to a burst steam pipe. After repairing the pipes in the bow boilers, steam began to be created, but the boilers were no longer put into operation. Even in the daytime battle, the living deck of the Navarin, which had noticeably sank with its stern, separated by watertight bulkheads only to a height of 0.91 m from the waterline (at normal displacement), quickly found itself flooded with water, rushing into the ship through the hole formed after the explosion.

As a result of the extensive flooding that followed, the stern further subsided so much that the water, covering the quarterdeck, approached the stern tower.

The water alarm was sounded, the cellar was battened down and the plaster began to be applied; but, since the ends touched the kingston pipes, all efforts were in vain. After several people were washed overboard by the water from the poop deck, attempts to get the patch on were stopped and the battleship set sail; There was a rumor among the crew that the Navarin was moving at a four-knot speed to the nearest (obviously Korean) coast. To pump water out of the flooded aft compartment, bow and stern pumps were used, and buckets were also used.

While repelling subsequent torpedo attacks, the battleship, without opening the searchlight, fired segmented shells. As a result of several successful hits, one of the Japanese 2nd class destroyers of the “No. 22” type (No. 34 or No. 35) was so damaged that it subsequently sank.

Destroyer type "No. 22"

The Navarin was last attacked at about 02:00, 27 miles northeast of Cape Karasaki, when the battleship was discovered a second time by the 4th Fighter Squadron. Taking the lead at a speed increased to 15 knots, three fighters remaining unnoticed (Murasame, due to a strong leak from a six-inch shell received in the day's battle, headed for Takeshiki) at a distance of about 2,000 meters after overtaking the Navarina, they noticed another Russian ship. After a successful torpedo attack by the latter, the returning Japanese were met by fire from 47 mm and 37 mm Navarina guns, and despite this, they managed to drop six bunches of mines across the battleship’s course (type “Gō kirai 1”, adopted for service in October 1904. ), each of which consisted of four mines connected by a cable, held at a depth of six meters by means of floats.

The photograph shows crew members with a fragment of the skin pierced by a Russian shell.

Longitudinal section of a mine

Two of these mines almost simultaneously hit the Navarin, the first in the area of ​​the fire compartment in the middle of the starboard side, and the second in the midships of the port side. The entire engine crew was killed, soon the command “Save” was sounded, the battleship began to list to starboard and after 7-10 minutes disappeared under water.

In response to the question of British observers why the destroyers did not rescue several hundred Russian sailors who were caught in the water, the Japanese spoke about their fears of being blown up by their own mines.

Of the entire crew of the Navarino, on May 14-15, 1905, 26 officers, one priest, 11 conductors and 643 lower ranks died and drowned; only three Navarinians managed to survive. After a day's stay in the water, they were picked up by an English commercial steamer (in the photo from left to right) Porfiry Tarasovich Derkach - fireman of the 2nd article, Knight of St. George and Stepan Dmitrievich Kuzmin - gunner, Knight of St. George.

The third survivor, signalman Ivan Andrianovich Sedov, was picked up in an unconscious state by a Japanese fighter Fubuki (吹雪) fourteen hours after the death of the ship.

List of used literature
1. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905. Book six. Campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East.
2. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905. Fleet actions. Documentation. Reports and descriptions of participants in the battle.
3. Description of military operations at sea in 37-28 Meiji (1904-1905)
4. Top secret Russian-Japanese war at sea in 37-38. Meiji.
5. Other sources.

Squadron battleship "Navarin"- Russian battleship, built as part of the 1881 program in the image of the British ships of the Trafalgar class. The first full-fledged domestic squadron battleship, which had “classic” weapons, powerful armor and a long cruising range. He was part of the Second Pacific Squadron and took part in the Battle of Tsushima. On the night of May 28, 1905, she received three torpedo hits and quickly sank. Despite the high design characteristics, the battleship quickly became outdated due to the rapid progress of science at the end of the 19th century. Built in a single copy.

Tactical and technical characteristics.

Displacement: 10,147 t.

Length: 105.9 m.

Width: 20.4 m.

Travel speed: 15.85 knots.

Cruising range: 3,050 miles at 10 knots.

Armament:

• 4 guns of 305 mm caliber;
• 8 guns of 152 mm caliber;
• 18 guns of 47 mm caliber;
• 12 guns of 37 mm caliber;
• 2 Baranovsky landing guns of 63.5 mm caliber;
• 6 torpedo tubes (381 mm).

Reservations: up to 406 mm.

Crew: 622 people, of which 26 are officers.

Commissioned: 1896

Design and construction.

Design.

After the construction of the first ironclads under the 1881 program ("Twenty Year Program"), naval officials began to think about developing more large ships, capable of operating on the open sea for a long time and making long journeys.

This was facilitated by both the aggravation of the situation in Far East, and the composition of the fleets of European powers, while the battleships previously built in Russia were ships of relatively small displacement and were intended for operations near their shores.

A direct order to start designing a new large battleship came to the Marine Technical Committee in 1888. The ship was supposed to have a displacement of more than 8,000 tons and be armed with 305 mm guns. Soon the Franco-Russian plant introduced preliminary design, developed on the basis of the English battleship Trafalgar, with a reservation scheme similar to the prototype and similar hull lines.

The MTK demanded to strengthen artillery protection, increase coal reserves, make a number of changes to the hull structure, and also increase the speed to at least 16 knots. The project was quickly finalized and at the beginning of 1889 an official contract for construction was signed. In its final form, the battleship was supposed to have a displacement of 9,476 tons.

Construction and testing.

On May 21, 1889, the Navarin was officially laid down on Galerny Island. At first, construction proceeded very quickly, despite regular changes to the project. In particular, the Naval Technical Committee abandoned underwater torpedo tubes, demanded an increase in the firing sector of 152-mm guns, a change in the shape of the upper casemate, and the installation of more modern 12-inch main caliber guns.

However, the Navarina hull was launched in October 1891, which was a good result for domestic shipbuilding. The main problems began during the completion of the battleship: related enterprises missed the delivery deadlines for practically everything that was possible: from armor plates and torpedo tubes, to gun turrets and elements of the power plant.

The unfinished "Navarin" was brought out for the first tests only in the spring of 1894, i.e. five years from the start of construction. Sea trials revealed a lot of problems, including insufficient boiler power, which did not allow the design speed to be achieved. To eliminate this shortcoming, additional fans were installed, after which the Navarin exceeded the mark of 16 knots, although the average speed was about 15.8 knots. Completion, testing and elimination of numerous shortcomings of the new battleship continued for another two years, and only in the middle of 1896 did the Navarin enter service.

Description of the design.

The squadron battleship Navarin, with an actual displacement of more than 10,000 tons, was a very interesting design: a low side, more typical of coastal defense battleships, four pipes arranged in pairs and a large box-shaped superstructure carrying auxiliary artillery.

With all this, the dimensions of the ship were small: the length was about 105.9 m, the width was 20.4, the draft was 8.4 m. The hull with a double bottom was divided into waterproof compartments by 9 transverse and 2 longitudinal bulkheads with a main drainage system.

It quickly became clear that the hull design was unsuccessful: due to the low height of the bulkheads and the equally low hull, the flooding of even one compartment led to water entering the living deck, and this led to the inevitable death of the battleship. "Navarin" did not shine with seaworthiness either, all because of the same low side. If for coastal battleships such shortcomings (more precisely, features) could be considered tolerable, then for a ship intended for operations on the high seas, such design miscalculations were unpleasant.

At the same time, the design had undoubted advantages: the low side and short hull reduced the Navarin’s vulnerability to enemy shells, and good armor protection made it possible to hope that it would not have to test its unsinkability in practice.

Reservation.

The ship's armor consisted of a main armor belt 406 mm thick in the central part. Towards the extremities the belt thinned to 305 mm and ended with armored traverses of the same thickness.

The ends of the "Navarin" were not covered with an armored belt; their protection was provided by the bevels (up to 76 mm) of the carapace armored deck. Above the citadel, the deck was flat and 50.8 mm thick. Above the main armor belt along the waterline there was an upper armor belt up to 305 mm thick, closed by 152 mm traverses.

Even higher, in the superstructure, there was a well-armored casemate (the thickness of the sides was up to 127 mm), which housed 6-inch artillery, separated by partitions. The conning tower was covered with 254 mm armor, and the towers and barbettes were protected by 305 mm plates. The main part of the armor was steel-iron, but in some areas (including on the towers) steel-nickel armor was used, which was about 10% stronger.

In general, the reservation of the Navarin was unprecedented: the ship had practically no unprotected areas, the vertical side had solid armor, which was also of extraordinary thickness. The only weak point was the extremities, but this was not considered to be of significant importance. Alas, such a view becomes obviously erroneous when we remember the shortcomings of the hull design: flooding of the ends could easily lead to the death of the entire ship, even if there was no other damage.

Power plant and driving performance.

The power plant consisted of two three-cylinder triple expansion steam engines and twelve fire tube cylindrical boilers. A similar design was traditional for Russian ships developed in the 80s of the 19th century and everywhere demonstrated good reliability with acceptable power.

The speed reached 16 knots, and the cruising range at economic speed was 3,050 miles.

Armament.

The Navarin's armament included 4 305 mm guns in two turrets. The guns themselves were not bad, but the same cannot be said about their mechanisms: outdated hydraulic drives and imperfect projectile supply systems, coupled with a fixed loading angle, did not allow firing more than once every 2.5 minutes.

Another problem was that the center of gravity of the 35-caliber guns was very far from the axis of rotation of the turret platform. Because of this, additional loads were created on both the trunks and the lifting mechanisms. During the design process, the option of equipping the Navarin with guns with a 30-caliber barrel length was seriously considered, but this was ultimately abandoned.

The second caliber consisted of 8 Brink system guns with a caliber of 152 mm. The guns were located in the upper casemate and, if necessary, were completely retracted inside the hull. The number of guns was clearly insufficient for a ship of such displacement; in addition, the guns, like the main caliber, did not have a high rate of fire.

The anti-mine caliber consisted of 18 47 mm Hotchkiss guns and 12 37 mm cannons. These guns were located on the upper deck, bridges and battle top. The armament complex was completed by six surface torpedo tubes (381 mm).

Equipment and auxiliary systems.

"Navarin" was well electrified: in addition to lighting, there was an electrical indication for fire control and telephone communications with electric bells. At the same time, the service conditions on the battleship left much to be desired: the size of the ship simply did not allow creating comfortable conditions a habitat.

Service.

Before the Russo-Japanese War.

The Navarina's first long-distance voyage began in 1896 almost immediately after its entry into service: together with four other ships, it headed to the Mediterranean Sea, where it visited a number of foreign ports.

Here the battleship faced its first serious test: on the way to Piraeus, the Navarin was caught in a seven-force storm. Although all the design flaws were fully revealed, the ship received minimal damage and did without flooding, proving its ability to operate in difficult weather conditions.

At the beginning of 1897, "Navarin" consisting of international forces participated in the blockade of Crete, and then returned to the Baltic. In 1898, the battleship departed for the Far East and, having covered a gigantic distance, arrived in Port Arthur four months from the start of the voyage.

Like other Russian ships in the Far East, Navarin took part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, transporting landing units. Before leaving for the European part of Russia, the battleship repeatedly visited Vladivostok and Nagasaki, participated in numerous maneuvers, including jointly with British and German ships. "Navarin" returned to Libau in April 1902, after which it became part of the artillery training detachment.

Russo-Japanese War.

By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the battleship required thorough repairs: the boilers and engines were badly worn out. In addition, the ship itself was noticeably outdated by this time and was no longer the indestructible armored vehicle it had been when it entered service eight years ago.

Unfortunately, due to numerous failures of the Russian troops and navy, Navarin ended up as part of the doomed Second Pacific Squadron. At the same time, the battleship did not have time to undergo repairs.

The daytime battle in the Korea Strait was relatively successful for the Navarin: the Japanese fire was concentrated on more modern ships. But there was some damage: heavy shells destroyed the poorly protected stern, destroying the wardroom and causing the influx of sea water.

Later, one of the pipes was hit by shells, which reduced the already low speed of the battleship, and the ship’s commander, Baron Bruno Alexandrovich von Fittinghof, was seriously wounded by shrapnel. Fortunately, the holes were repaired and the resulting fire was extinguished, which allowed the Navarin to remain in service.

At night, the battleship sailed alongside the forces of Admiral Nebogatov, but due to a burst steam line and the continued (albeit controlled) flow of sea water, it fell behind the rest. Japanese destroyers discovered the Navarin at about 10 p.m. The first torpedo hit the already badly damaged stern, increasing its destruction and leading to severe flooding.

Essentially, the fate of the battleship was sealed - the ship sank and water began to flood the living deck, without any obstacles in front of it. The Navarin remained afloat for about four hours, trying to reach the shore, but two more Japanese torpedoes that hit the battleship prevented this from happening. According to another version, the Navarin was blown up by mines that Japanese destroyers laid along its course. One way or another, after the third explosion, the ship sank almost instantly; only three crew members were able to escape.

The water flows that penetrated inside the ship, without meeting any obstacles on the living deck, gradually filled more and more new rooms. The signal for rescue sounded on the battleship. Boats and boats began to be lowered. Now the moment of reckoning has come for the criminal attitude in the Navy Ministry towards the issues of unsinkability, which were repeatedly raised by S.O. Makarov in that distant and serene time when Navarin came into operation. But hardly anyone in this terrible turmoil could remember and know about it.

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On the morning of August 29, 1904, the squadron left Kronstadt and headed for Revel. They had to stay in Revel for about another month. After holding a farewell royal review, the ships stopped for several days to load coal in Lyubava and on October 2 left the shores of Russia forever.

The Navarin made its entire long journey to the Tsushima Strait in the second armored detachment. Behind the flagship, the battleship Oslyabya, came the Sisoy the Great, followed by the Navarin, and the column was completed by the oldest armored cruiser in the detachment, Admiral Nakhimov. So, for seven long months, "Navarin" walked in the wake of "Sisoy the Great" towards its death. The "Navarin" was commanded by Baron Captain 1st Rank Bruno Alexandrovich von Fitinghof 1st. In the same formation, the detachment entered the waters of the Tsushima Strait on the morning of May 14, 1905.

On the flagship of the Oslyabya detachment, as before, the admiral's flag fluttered. But the detachment of Rear Admiral D.G. Felkersam was no longer in command. He died shortly before this fateful day. The detachment was now headed by the Oslyabi commander, Captain 1st Rank V. Behr. However, the squadron did not know this.

At about seven o'clock in the morning it appeared on the starboard side light cruiser"Izumi." For some time he walked on a parallel course. Then at 9 o'clock. 45 min. on the left along the course of the flagship of the squadron, the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in room 60-70. silhouettes of veterans of the Japanese fleet, the battleship Chin-Yen and three Matsushima-class cruisers, appeared.

After some time, they set off on a parallel course and then disappeared into the morning haze. At 11 o'clock the silhouettes of four light cruisers appeared on the left. They were easily identified as the detachment of Rear Admiral Dev. A quarter of an hour later, a shot suddenly rang out from the Eagle. The gunner, who had been watching the Japanese ship in the crosshairs for a long time, lost his nerves. This was taken as a signal for the start of the battle by the ships of the third armored detachment. Several salvos were fired at the cruisers, which showed good results.

Then Oslyabya started shooting. The Japanese ships also fired several salvos. All this lasted ten minutes. Turning "all of a sudden" to the left, the Japanese cruisers suddenly disappeared. The main enemy forces appeared only at 13:00. 30 min. on the bow heading angles of the Suvorov. And two minutes later, a signal came from the Suvorov to reform into one common wake column. Then the signal “1” flashed on the flagship’s mast, which meant an order to begin firing at the lead Japanese ship. The Battle of Tsushima began. Fifteen minutes later, the Suvorov, already surrounded by Japanese ships from its bow angles, withstood their intense fire.

The Japanese skillfully concentrated the fire of their entire fleet on the flagships - Suvorov and Oslyab, and fifteen minutes later both ships received terrible damage.

From the "Navarin" it was clearly visible how the "Oslyabya", having a large trim on the bow and a list of 12°, went out to the right and, going with its bow into the water, fell onto the left side and after ten minutes disappeared under the water. "Navarin", following the orders of the flagship, fired at the leading Japanese battleships, although this did almost no harm to the enemy. The rate of fire of the bow turret was low. Constantly after each shot we had to wait for the huge clouds of black smoke to dissipate - a consequence of the use of black powder. The six-inch guns could not fire at the indicated Japanese ships at all - they were not included in their firing range.

During this period of the battle, "Navarin" received its first damage - a shell hit the left side, almost at the waterline, in the area of ​​the bow torpedo tube.

Gradually, the Japanese shooting began to affect the Sisoe the Great ahead. After some time, a fire broke out on the rostra and bridge, and he turned to the right and left the column. "Navarii" entered the wake of "Eagle".

After the failure of the Suvorov, the Borodino became the lead. "Suvorov", controlled only by machines, cut through the column of ships between "Navarin" and "Nakhimov", almost colliding with one of them. From the Navarin, it was first mistaken for an enemy battleship, but only then was it difficult to recognize its flagship in its contours. Without masts and pipes, the Suvorov, completely engulfed in flames, presented a terrifying sight. Some of our ships even fired several shots at him by mistake.

At the same time, the Navarin was hit in the stern area by two large shells, one from the starboard side and the other from the left side. The Japanese armored cruisers of Admiral Uriu were firing. These hits completely destroyed the wardroom. A fire started, which was soon put out. Two holes in the side near the waterline also turned out to be dangerous. Streams of water rushed inside the battleship from the oncoming waves. After some time, both holes were sealed with bags of cement, boards and plaster. The water supply has noticeably decreased.

There was minor damage to the superstructures. They came from fragments of large Japanese shells exploding near the side. One shell, apparently intended for the Eagle, hit the fore-mars. Its shrapnel seriously wounded the commander of the battleship, and he had to be taken to the operating point. Senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Durkin took command of the battleship. During the day's battle, the Navarino crew suffered little damage. In addition to the commander, there were 20 other people on the ship in the operating room.

At about 5 p.m. the squadron was on the course NO-23° indicated by Z.P. Rozhestveisky. The lead was now "Borodino", followed by "Eagle", "Navarin", "Nakhimov", "Alexander III", "Sisoi the Great", "Nicholas I" and three coastal defense battleships. "Suvorov", noticeably lagging behind, abandoned by the "leader-savior", broken and engulfed in fires, alone fought off the destroyers attacking him.

Around 18 o'clock the battle a short time resumed. Now Borodino took on all the attacks of the Japanese fleet. Other ships also suffered. At 6 p.m. 50 min. The Alexander III, now following the Nakhimov and badly damaged in the day's battle, broke ranks to the left and, engulfed in flames, fell onto the right borg. Twenty minutes later it was Borodino’s turn. Without leaving the column, also engulfed in fire, he fell to the starboard side, and then turned upside down with his keel, and after a few minutes disappeared into the waves. Now “Eagle” turned out to be the lead. At this time, several shells also hit the Navarin. One pipe was knocked down. But the most dangerous thing was the presence of a roll of 5°. Water slowly penetrated into the ship's compartments through leaks in holes sealed in the stern.

A few minutes after sunset everything disappeared into darkness. Several more salvos were heard from the enemy ships. The Japanese fired, guided by the flames of fires on our ships. The cover of the night saved the squadron from the artillery hail, bringing closer another, no less terrible danger - attacks by many destroyers. After the death of Borodino, Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov took command of the squadron, holding his flag on Nicholas I.

Having raised the signal: “Follow me,” the flagship again set out on the assigned course NO-23°, increasing the speed to 13-14 knots. After 22 hours, only one "Navarin" could illuminate the surface of the water with its surviving searchlights, looking for destroyers on it.

This is what battle participant V.P. Kostenko wrote about this phase in his book “On the Eagle” in Tsushima.” “Of our ships marching in a column behind the Nikolai, only one Navarin used a searchlight. It shone in all directions and often illuminated our own ships in front. Sometimes enemy destroyers also fell into its beams. One of them was illuminated by abeam the "Eagle". The destroyer had already released its mines, was hit, stood still and soared strongly. His position was hopeless. In the beam of light, the figure of the commander was clearly visible on the bridge, who, leaning his elbow on his knee, calmly smoked, looking at our people walking around him ships The distance to it was about a cable's length.

A shot rang out from the Senyavin's 10-inch gun from behind. The rupture occurred in the center of the side, the destroyer broke in half, both halves rose up, folded together, and the wreckage was carried to the side of the Navarin. He followed them with the beam of a searchlight, and when the debris disappeared under the water, he closed the lantern, and the whole picture of the death of the enemy was drowned in the darkness of the night."

As the speed increased, water began to flow more and more into the leaky holes sealed at the waterline. At first the entire wardroom was flooded, then the adjacent rooms began to fill. The closed watertight doors no longer helped. More and more water entered the hull. As a result, "Navarin" began to lag behind the squadron. To top it all off, a steam line burst in the bow boiler room, which caused the boilers to go out of action. The speed dropped sharply, and soon the Navarin was left alone. Realizing that the battleship had fallen behind, the destroyers circling around began to act more boldly.

“The enemy destroyers divided into two detachments, came in on both sides of the Navarin and, staying much ahead, directed searchlight beams at it. This maneuver was apparently undertaken in order to confuse the Russians. The goal was achieved. Officers and guns "The servants, concentrating all their attention on the left and right sides, did not notice how one of the destroyers entered from the stern. They saw him only when he was next to the battleship," - this is how A. S. Novikov-Priboy described the last minutes of the ship in the novel "Tsushima".

The first torpedo hit the stern on the starboard side. We had to stop the cars. Fortunately, the steering gear was not damaged. The crew, without prompting, clearly realizing that their salvation was connected with the salvation of the ship, began to place a plaster under the hole. All this happened in the most difficult conditions. After a minute or two, the "Navarin" sank so far with its stern that the waves roamed freely along the upper deck and reached the stern tower. The water flows that penetrated inside the ship, without meeting any obstacles on the living deck, gradually filled more and more new rooms. The signal for rescue sounded on the battleship. Boats and boats began to be lowered.

Now the moment of reckoning has come for the criminal attitude in the Naval Ministry to the issues of unsinkability, which were repeatedly raised by S. O. Makarov in that distant and serene time when the Navarin entered service. But hardly anyone in this terrible turmoil could remember and know about it. And yet, continuing to desperately fire from her guns, the battleship for some time did not allow the destroyers to approach within the range of a torpedo shot.

Only after 15-20 minutes one of them managed to approach the starboard side. The second explosion tore the side amidships. "Navarin" began to slowly fall to starboard. When the list made firing impossible, another destroyer boldly approached the port side and fired a third torpedo. It turned out to be fatal. A minute later, continuing to fall to the starboard side, the battleship (at point 129° 51" Ost and 34° 54" S) went into the water. Some managed to leave the sinking ship, but while remaining in the water, they all died of cold. Their last hours, full of horror and suffering, according to the surviving signalman Ivan Sedov, are described by the most talented Soviet marine painter A.S. Novikov-Priboy in the novel "Tsushima".

So for 681 sailors of the Navarina, the cold waters of the Sea of ​​Japan became their last refuge. Only three managed to escape.

The "Sisoy the Great" was now heading into the wake of the "Borodino" without visible damage, then the "Navarin" with crossed yards and the "Nakhimov" which looked intact. When the Navarin began to pass by us in cable 5, I made a semaphore signal to him with my hands: “Receive the admiral.” "Navarin" seemed to be about to turn half-way, but then passed by and "found" on "Sisoy". Then a destroyer appeared from the bow, they said that “Gromky” was coming. It passed along the side in 3 cables at a rather long speed. I also signaled him with a semaphore. But I don’t know whether the Navarino and the destroyer received my signal.

Damage to the battleship Navarin in the battle did not force it out of action. Fires broke out on it several times, but they were quickly extinguished. But he had to break ranks several times to repel the enemy and fire at a cruiser that was trying to approach our column. The cruiser then retired with a list (but the Navarino believed that it had been sunk).

At 7 o'clock in the evening, the Navarin was still in the battle column, which consisted of 8 battleships firing at the enemy on the starboard side. By that time, only one vehicle was working on the Navarino, the other was shot down in battle.

As it got dark, "Navarin" received a mine hole and immediately went out of order for applying a plaster. While the patch was being delivered, the squadron went far ahead. At about 10 o'clock in the evening, enemy destroyers attacked the Navarin, and by this time there were no more shells on the battleship. Several mines were fired from it at the destroyers, but all this did not help, since they surrounded the ship on all sides. During this period, "Navarin" received three more holes: two on the right in the bow and stern and one on the left in the center. The holes were so large that the battleship immediately began to sink into the water. It was 11 o'clock in the evening on May 14.

The signalman who gave this testimony said that the commander was healthy, gave orders in every possible way and was seen on the bridge.

As soon as the ship began to sink, the signalman grabbed the lifebuoy hanging on the bridge, threw himself overboard and before he could swim to the side, he was pulled deep into the depths, but then thrown to the surface. When he looked around, the Navarino was no longer there. He did not see people swimming, nor did he hear their screams. It was quiet all around, as if nothing had happened. Then he came across a floating wooden hatch, he sat on it and spent the whole night. He did not see the destroyers attacking the battleship.

In the morning he saw some shore, to which he headed, but was picked up by a Japanese destroyer, which landed him on the nearest shore, where the coastal battery and soldiers were located. He spent the whole day on the shore; in the evening he was transferred to the Japanese cruiser Kasuga, which took him to Sasebo.

From 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the battle began, midshipman Shchelkunov was in the right battery. At 4 o'clock he was wounded and was taken to the living deck to be bandaged, then put on the lockers, where he lay. When the Navarin received a hole at 10 pm, all the wounded were moved upstairs. I saw how midshipman Shchelkunov was led to the command bridge. What happened to him then, I don’t know. Captain 2nd Rank Durkin, after the commander was wounded at 6 o’clock in the evening, he began to command the battleship. From that moment on, Durkin was on the bridge and in the conning tower.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening the mine attacks began. At 10 o'clock "Navarin" received the first hole in the stern on the starboard side. Then at 2 o'clock in the morning an enemy destroyer came very close to us. In the darkness, he was first recognized as one of his own. The searchlights were no longer shining, and he came so close to the starboard side and released the mine. The battleship tilted heavily to starboard due to the hole and began to sink. Everyone began to rush into the water.

At this time, I saw Durkin standing on the bridge and shouting: “guys, don’t jump from the bridge, jump onto the tank, and from there into the water.” Our bridge was high, 5 fathoms, and the forecastle was low above the water. These were his last words, and I never saw him again.

Very soon after the start of the battle, the Oslyabya began to sink. Then the Suvorov was badly damaged and caught fire. The upper deck was burning very strongly, but no people were visible on it, and he continued shooting, and then the steering wheel of the Suvorov apparently became damaged, and it began to spin in place. The squadron left the Suvorov and continued the battle until 7 pm. The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" capsized, which we saw with our own eyes. People escaped on the overturned bodies of battleships. The Japanese shot the people who were fleeing.

"Navarin" had seven holes on both sides, but held well on the water. After sunset there was a signal from Admiral Nebogatop to prepare to repel mine attacks. The commander was wounded during the day, and after bandaging him, he was taken to the bridge, and I’m not sure whether he continued to control the ship. When the commander's wounds were bandaged, the senior officer commanded the ship. During the day we saw a Japanese cruiser sink.

When it got dark, the Japanese destroyers attacked us en masse, and at 10 o’clock in the evening the Navarin received one mine hole in the stern on the starboard side in the area of ​​the cartridge magazine. After this, the battleship sank with its stern and received a slight list to starboard. They managed to batten down the cellar in a timely manner. They tried to get a patch, but they couldn’t do it. The squadron continued to move towards Vladivostok at full speed, probably more than 13 knots. Our battleship very slowly sank to the stern. At 2 o'clock in the morning a destroyer jumped out from under the stern of "Nicholas I", which we took for our own and did not shoot at it. He fired a mine at the Navarin from a very close range into the bow on the starboard side. The battleship began to sink. The senior officer ordered from the bridge not to jump into the water, since it was very fresh and people could be smashed against the side by the waves. The battleship soon went into the water, plunging with its starboard stern. There were a lot of people floating on the wreckage. Japanese destroyers fired at them as they passed. In addition, people were overwhelmed by waves.

In the morning, a Japanese counter-destroyer passed us at full speed. Its wave overwhelmed many people. It was just the two of us left, swimming on the board. So we sailed until 2 o'clock in the afternoon on May 15th, until we were rescued by an English steamer passing by.

On the ship they undressed us, gave us something to eat and, covering us with blankets, laid us near the engine hatch. Soon the ship was stopped by a Japanese gunboat, and 6 Japanese with guns and several officers came on board, demanding that we be taken prisoner. But the British did not give us up, and the ship followed the gunboat to Sasebo, where it stayed for several days.

We saw how Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment was brought to Sasebo. The English captain managed to defend us, and the ship brought us to Shanghai, where he handed us over to the Russian consul.

Recorded from the words of the commander of the 9th naval crew, Captain 1st Rank Kosovich.

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