In the first months of the Second World War, one English journalist decided to sail on a minesweeper in order to give his newspaper a good essay about the ship’s combat work.

When he arrived at the minesweeper, the first thing that surprised and somewhat alarmed him was the large number of life belts hanging along the sides.

The junior officer accompanying the journalist noticed the guest’s slight confusion and winked at him encouragingly, then said: “When we run into something unpleasant, don’t hesitate. Grab the first belt that comes to hand and don’t let go. The advantage of this ship is that you don't have to waste time jumping overboard. The deck will disappear from under your feet and you will be in the water in less than a minute.”

It is unlikely that such “consolation” really cheered up the journalist, but... the truth spoke through the officer’s lips.

When volleys of artillery guns and shell explosions roar on the sea, when shells and aerial bombs falling into the water raise huge fountains of water, when the smoke of fires on ships obscures the sky and on one or the other of them sheaves of dark purple flame burst upward, when all this the roar of engines of airplanes circling madly over the sea and the howl of bombs rushing down are burning - then the picture of a naval battle is complete and clear. But when you can’t even hear single shots in the air, when almost peaceful-looking ships seem to be calmly and confidently following the chosen course, when the enemy is not visible, and the whole situation looks peaceful and serene, it’s hard to believe that what’s going on is deadly, to the extreme. an intense struggle with a powerful enemy hiding under water - a mine. The enemy's secrecy, sometimes revealed at the last moment before a strike, is his additional formidable strength. It takes a lot of selfless courage, modest, unnoticed heroism and subtle skill, the ability to fight an invisible enemy, in order to win victories in this struggle.

For sailors who fight mines, the fight against the enemy is everyday life, continuous painstaking and precise work, and the mortal danger that threatens them with every cable they pass is just as continuous. Their work is struggle, and struggle is work, and at every moment of it, courage and determination, composure and calculation, devotion to duty and high skill and, finally, boundless love for the fatherland - all these qualities, especially distinguishing Soviet sailors, are united into one great a force that confidently overcomes even an invisible enemy.

The ships of the fleet - minesweepers, fighting against enemy mines, and their personnel are entrusted with the daily combat mission - to clear the mines of our warships from mines in advance, during a campaign, and sometimes in battle - to go ahead and remove deadly traps set by the enemy from the road.

This is how these ships - Soviet minesweepers - carried out their combat missions when the left flank of the great front of the Patriotic War still rested on the Black Sea, when our armies and navy expelled the Nazi invaders from its shores, they also acted heroically in the Baltic, in the Barents Sea, near coast of liberated Norway, protecting, together with other ships of the fleet, the flanks of the advancing Red Army, clearing mines and helping to conquer more and more sea spaces, more and more sections of the coast from the enemy.

But even after the victorious end of the war, the battle suffering for minesweepers will continue for some time. Indeed, during the war, the waters of the seas, oceans, many rivers and lakes “were densely littered with mines. Peaceful life on the seas, oceans, rivers and lakes, safe cargo and passenger shipping, will be impossible until all coastal waters, fairways and suspicious areas are thoroughly and reliably cleared of mines. That is why, even in peacetime, post-war times, minesweepers will still have a lot of responsible, dangerous, but very honorable combat work, which is why they deserve the honorary name of brave sea workers. This is what Fleet Admiral I. S. Isakov called the sailors from Soviet minesweepers in his book “The Soviet Navy in the Patriotic War.”

Minesweepers have their main weapons - trawls. How did this weapon originate and develop?

This was at the height of the war between the northern and southern states of America. The southerners had already often and successfully used mines, stationary (bottom), anchored and floating, against the ships of the northerners. The new weapon instilled more and more fear in the opponents, but there was still no protection against it. Neither side has yet managed to solve the problem of how to protect ships from deadly underwater attacks.

At the beginning of 1863, a squadron of northerners anchored at the mouth of the James River. Large ships crowded together in a small expanse of water made good targets for floating mines. The southerners took this into account. They launched eighty floating mines down the river and anticipated the joy of victory and the destruction of large enemy warships.

But the southerners did not know that as soon as the ships of the northerners chose a parking place, two longboats with people and cargo and with small boats in tow were launched from one of them. The longboats went several cables up the river and anchored. The people on the longboats began to lower their cargo overboard. These were ordinary in appearance, only very large nets, similar to fishing nets, but with huge meshes and made of thick hemp rope. The nets were installed on floats and anchors in several rows across the river flow. Then the longboats went a little further up the river and moored to the shore. The sailors got into boats, armed themselves with “cats” - small four-legged anchors - and hooks, then rowed them out into the middle of the river. Keeping the boats in the middle current, they vigilantly peered into the water, as if lying in wait, looking out for “surprises” of the southerners floating down the river.

The day passed without worries. The mine hunters carefully changed every few hours, but could not boast of any catch. But the next day, when it was already getting dark, the sharp-sighted sentries noticed the approach of dark objects almost completely submerged in water. One, two, here are already several such items. The people on the boats strained their eyes and the muscles of their arms, armed with crampons and hooks. The command rang out.

The flames of lit torches illuminated the slightly rippling surface of the river. The oars of the rowers sank into the water, and the boats moved up the river towards the approaching objects.

The sailors, armed with cats, got ready. Sticking their cats forward, they guard the moment convenient for catching. And when this moment comes, the teeth of the cats carefully grab the floating objects and the boats take them to the shore. The “hunters” work energetically and quickly. And yet, no, no, some floating “goodies” slip past and float further down the river. But there they are delayed by the network. Collisions with the net do not trigger mine strikers; they are designed to hit the massive hull of the ship. And all eighty floating mines were caught.

This was the first time nets were used to catch mines. This was the first experience in dealing with an underwater attack.

The ships of the northerners not only blocked the ocean shores adjacent to the territories of the southerners.

An even greater danger threatened the southerners from ships penetrating the rivers and rising along them to the depths of their location.

The powerful artillery of these ships strengthened the advancing armies of the northerners. To prevent enemy ships from penetrating into river mouths, the southerners blocked passages under water with barriers - they sank old ships or beams fastened with chains - and installed minefields consisting of anchor or bottom station mines, exploded from the shore.

How to overcome these obstacles?

This question was answered by the talented shipbuilder and inventor of those times, engineer John Erickson. He attached a special device to the first battleship he designed and built with a rotating gun turret (“Monitor”) and called it “Erickson’s torpedo.” It was a strong wooden raft. Its rear edge was designed so that the raft could be precisely driven to the stem of the protected ship. A gunpowder charge weighing 700 pounds was attached to the front edge of the raft under water on a device extended forward. The torpedo was designed in such a way that during the explosion, the entire force of the powder gases rushed forward, and the raft remained unharmed.

We already know that in those days the word “Torpedo” served as a general name for underwater explosive shells intended to strike the underwater part of an enemy ship. Torpedo Erickson was given a different task. The new underwater projectile directed its attacks not against enemy ships, but in defense of its own ship, to the stem of which it was attached. Erickson's torpedo served his ship as a combat reconnaissance aircraft, which walked ahead, probed for an obstacle or mine with a charge and exploded. The explosion destroyed the obstacle and cleared the way for the ship. But, besides this, the same explosion caused all the mines to explode if they were located nearby on anchors or on the bottom within a radius of several tens of meters. It turned out that Erickson’s torpedo was directed against mines and therefore it should have been called not a torpedo, but a counter-torpedo or counter-mine.

And this countermine served as a guard for the ship, it was its “guardian.” The disadvantage of this guard was that it greatly slowed down the ship, reducing its speed to three and a half knots. And, besides, Erickson’s torpedo did not protect against floating mines; these mines could sail past the ship's stem and hit its side.

Therefore, around the same years, an attempt was made to protect the ship from floating mines: an anti-mine net was put on poles extended forward and to the sides, “spirons”. A mine entangled in this net either did not explode at all or exploded at some distance from the side of the ship, and this greatly reduced the damage caused. There were still bottom station mines left. They could not be found with a countermine or caught in a net - they were hiding at the very bottom of the river bed or coastal sea waters. In these cases, miners - mine hunters - came to the rescue. Boats with sailors armed with cats were sent ahead of the ships. Each boat dragged two “dreks” along the bottom. Cats and dreks grabbed the conductors with their paws (with which the mines were connected to the coastal control station), tore them and neutralized the mines.

This is how a comprehensive fight against underwater attacks and mines began back in the last century.

Some successes were achieved in this struggle only on the rivers. Nets, cats, and Erikson’s Torpedo were all suitable here. But at sea all this was of little use. The sea (even narrow passages) could not be blocked by mine nets.

The nets that encircled the ship sank under water only in dangerous waters, but they significantly reduced the speed of travel and maneuvering. They could only be used in parking lots. Therefore, there was no other protection from floating mines scattered along the sea routes except the sailors’ own vigilance.

There was no reliable means of protection against anchor and bottom mines. According to Erickson's idea, countermines began to be used against such mines. This means that where the area of ​​​​the sea blocked by mines was small, if we were talking about a certain fairway, in this area, before the passage of ships, mines with a charge of 200–250 kilograms of pyroxylin exploded under water.

The explosion of such a countermine caused all enemy mines hidden under water at a distance of about 40 meters to explode. This remedy worked for sure, but... it turned out to have its own, very big drawbacks. First of all, it was necessary that the enemy not interfere with the work of the mine-demolition workers, and this did not happen often. Then it was spent great amount explosives. So, for example, to clear a passage just one mile long and only 65 meters wide, it would take about seven tons explosive, but the fairways had to be cleared almost continuously. A fully equipped countermine with a charge of 250 kilograms weighed slightly less than a ton and was quite cumbersome. It took a lot of time and effort to wield such a bulky weight. And very often all this mass of explosives and valuable materials from which the countermines were made was wasted in vain. After all, it was impossible to know in advance exactly and for sure whether the entire passage was blocked by mines or only part of it. Still, I had to check all suspicious areas. And therefore, inventors were given a new task - to find more advanced means of combating mines, means that would first feel, detect a mine and then destroy it or help destroy it. Inventors proposed many interesting devices. Russian miners were especially distinguished in this field. Thus, Lieutenant Emelyanov in 1883 proposed using giant underwater scissors against mines, which captured and cut the mine ropes of anchor mines or the cables of bottom mines. This mine action was adopted by the navy. But it also turned out to be of little effect. Very soon, another officer of the Russian fleet proposed a new means of combating mines - a trawl, which captures and either pulls to the surface or completely “cuts off” mines. And before that, the inventors combined into one whole almost all the engaging, cutting and blasting devices already tested up to that time, but still did not receive good results. The trawl turned out to be the most practical means of combating anchor mines.

Gradually, one by one, its shortcomings were eliminated. While there were no particularly large clashes at sea, the improvement of trawls and the whole business of fighting mines - trawling - proceeded slowly. But the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. and especially the first World War The trawling business has moved forward. Nowadays they use different kinds trawls for combating anchor mines.

It was impossible to use any means of preliminary cleaning of the water area against bottom, stationary, and anchor mines placed by the enemy near its shores. The enemy vigilantly guarded these barriers. In addition, usually anchor mines remained in some cases even after trawling the area. And sometimes the enemy managed to unnoticed again block the mines cleared area. Along the way, ships always had to expect dangerous “surprises” and be on guard. Therefore, the trawl was adapted for the direct protection of the ship, the trawl was made an accessory to its own mine protection, its guardian. This is the active defense of the ship. And large warships (battleships, heavy cruisers) began to be built with so-called mine protection and thickenings (they are also called “boules” or “blisters”). This is a passive protection for the ship, which only moves the center of the explosion away from vital parts of the ship. In addition, these ships are still protected in their parking lots by nets lowered under the water. And finally, special trawls were invented against magnetic and acoustic mines that appeared at the end of the First World War and especially proved themselves in the Second World War. These are special devices that either completely prevent the explosion of a magnetic mine, or force it (or an acoustic mine) to explode prematurely far from the ship.

All these anti-mine agents, their structure and application are described below.

Tens and hundreds of thousands of mines in coastal waters, in narrow places, on the routes of combat and merchant ships - this means tens and hundreds of thousands of mines stretching from the bottom of the sea almost to the surface of the sea. How to deal with them?

By the beginning of the First World War, miners had learned the art of fighting an invisible enemy hiding under water.

How does a modern trawl work?

Its trawling part is a thick steel cable, very long, sometimes up to 200 meters in length. This cable must be made to move underwater at such a depth that it captures the mines of all the mines that come across the path, below the mine itself. How is this done?

Two thick hemp cables are each attached to one end of the steel cable. When the trawl is lowered into the water, it must move at a certain depth. But its own weight can carry it as low as possible, as long as the length of the hemp cables allows. To prevent this from happening, a steel cable is suspended, as it were, from the surface of the sea - tropics are tied to it along its entire length, they are called “depth guys”. The upper ends of the guy ropes are tied to buoys that do not sink and support the main steel cable. Very close to the lower end of the guy ropes, weights are attached that prevent the cable from rising above a given depth. Between the loads, crampons - four-legged anchors - are put on a steel cable. Their purpose is to make the trawl tenacious and help capture mines.

While the trawl is on the ship, there are no buoys or weights on it. The entire trawling part is wound on the winding drum of the winch.

Ships that tow a trawl behind them are called minesweepers. There are two such ships for each trawl.

The winch with the trawl is located on one of them. The ships approach each other, and then from the minesweeper where the trawl is located, one “throwing end”, one of the hemp cables, which is tied to the end of the minesweeper part, is transferred to the second minesweeper. After this, the ships disperse along the entire length of the trawling part. While this lasts, the trawl slowly unwinds, and the sailors from the first minesweeper put crampons on the cable, and buoys and weights on the depth guys. The trawl is immersed in the water already equipped. When the entire trawling part is lowered into the water, the minesweepers simultaneously move forward in parallel courses, dragging the trawl already ready for action. And as soon as he hooks a mine, the minesweepers will immediately know about it. Some of the buoys in this part of the trawl come closer together, and one of them even dives into the water, like a fishing rod float when a fish bites. This means that the trawl caught a mine - a weight hanging on the trawling part. The minesweepers still continue to move forward and drag the mine along with its anchor behind them. For what? To answer this question, let's follow the minesweepers.

So they trawled the mine and pulled it to a shallow place. And suddenly a large metal ball seemed to emerge from the water - the same mine that the minesweepers had trawled. Why did the mine float to the surface?

We already know that anchor mines are automatically installed at a given depth. This means that a certain length of the mine is automatically measured, just such that the mine is at a predetermined level under water, not higher and not lower. Therefore, when minesweepers pull a mine into a shallow place, its body rises closer and closer to the surface of the water - after all, the depth of the sea becomes shallower, but the mine remains the same length. And finally, the mine appears on the surface. A discovered and visible enemy is no longer scary. The sailors from the minesweeper shoot it or destroy it with special explosive cartridges. In both cases, holes are punched in the body of the mine, water penetrates them, and the mine sinks. We said “minesweepers pull the mine behind them,” but at sea they say they don’t pull, but tow. Therefore, the type of trawl that has already been described is called towing. And we are talking about it primarily because the towing trawl is the most common and reliable. When such a trawl passes through its area, it almost never leaves behind hidden, unnoticed mines. But for such a trawl to work reliably, minesweepers have to move at low speed, only 6–7 knots. And this, of course, is a drawback of the towing trawl.

But there are also trawls that do not need to tow a mine to a shallow place at all. As soon as such a trawl sweeps a mine and captures its mine, it immediately hooks it and interrupts it. A mine freed from its anchor floats to the surface and is shot or detonated.

How do they manage to break under water the rather thick steel cable from which the minrep is made? There are several such methods; used in different devices and different ways. There are trawls equipped with “cutters”, special steel knives mounted on the trawling part. The mine's minesweeper slides along the minesweeper until it comes into contact with the cutter and is cut there. There are also trawls in which the trawling part itself serves as the cutter. At full speed of the minesweepers, the cable of the minesweeper crosses the minerep and breaks it. How can it happen that one cable cuts another if they are made of the same material? But we forgot about speed. After all, speed always gives a moving body a new quality - it seems to become harder and sharper.

It is known that a cardboard circle rotating at a very high speed is capable of crashing into a tree and sawing it. And if you stretch a thin thread between two support points and cross it with a fast-moving tension of the same, but thicker thread, the second will cut the first. This is the basis of the trawl design, in which the trawling part serves as the cutter. There are also trawls in which a blasting cartridge works instead of a cutter. Several cartridges are placed on the trawling part at certain intervals along its length. When a mine is being trawled, its mine rope, when the trawl moves forward, will inevitably slide along the trawling part, come into contact with the cartridge, the explosion will break the mine rope, the mine will float to the surface, and this is what the miners need.

It also happens that for some reason there are no minesweeper guides ahead of the warships.

After all, minesweepers engaged in mine sweeping cannot develop high speed. Even a high-speed minesweeper cannot make more than 15 knots during trawling. This means that the ships that follow the minesweepers have to moderate their speed and slow it down. It happens that this cannot be done and that, on the contrary, the situation requires warships to highest speed. In such cases, warships have to clear their own path. That's why warships have their own special trawl that guards their ship.

A long metal cable is attached to the keel of the ship at the bow. Like a long mustache, this cable diverges on both sides of the ship, approximately 30–35 meters. In total, the whiskers cover a strip of 60–70 meters.

The cable does not sink - a special mechanism is attached to the end of each mustache - a paravane, which spreads the cable to the sides. Inside the paravane there is a device - a hydrostat. As in mines, the device holds the entire paravane mechanism and cable at a certain depth. In addition, a cutter is also strengthened near the paravan. The ship tows this entire device behind it.

Water resists the movement of the cable - the trawling part of the paravane. Therefore, the mustache bends slightly back and forms angles with the longitudinal axis of the ship.

Paravan guards his ship from anchor mines. The trawling part - the "whiskers" of the paravan - seems to knock down the mine's surface. Then the minrep slides along the trawling part and approaches the cutter. Here the mine is crossed, its lower part falls to the bottom, and the upper part, together with the knocked down mine, floats to the surface of the sea quite far from the ship’s hull - 20–25 meters. She is immediately shot by naval artillery.

What kind of ships are waging a “quiet” war against enemy mines? For now we only know them common name- minesweepers. But this name unites different ships, differing in type, size, and combat purpose.

Minesweepers cannot choose the weather for their work; they are not given time for this. They are almost always at sea, often in bad weather. Therefore, they must have good seaworthiness. A minesweeper is a ship with a shallow draft and must pass over mines. He doesn't need big sizes. On the contrary, the smaller the ship, the easier it is to control it, the more difficult it is for the enemy to hit it with artillery fire. Therefore, the minesweeper should be as small a ship as possible.

But this ship has to drag behind itself the entire weight of equipped trawls with mines swept and maintain a given speed, without reducing it. This means that the minesweeper needs powerful machines.

What ships belong to the class of minesweepers? First of all, ships are guides for large ships of the fleet during combat operations. They are called squadron minesweepers. Just like the large ships they guard, they are not afraid of bad weather and are not particularly slow in their speed. And at the same time, their displacement is no more than 400–500 tons. These small vessels are armed with rapid-fire cannons, automatic anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. In terms of their combat qualities, displacement, and speed, these ships are very similar to small destroyers. Therefore, often such destroyers, outdated and no longer suitable for their main purpose, are turned into squadron minesweepers.

It happens that minesweepers have to search for minefields, survey the fairway, or mine in areas remote from their bases. In such cases, these ships need to be on guard, the enemy can detect them and destroy them. You need to quickly do your job and leave just as quickly, especially if an enemy ship appears on the horizon. Such operations are performed by another category of sapper ships, they are called “high-speed minesweepers.” But even though they are called high-speed, their speed is still less than that of squadron minesweepers.

But the minesweepers are given a task - they need to clear the area close to their shores from mines, clear the discovered mines, or guide the ships through the minefield. There is no need for great speed here: during “work” you still cannot go at high speed, but after completing the operation you can go to the base not far away, even at low speed. Therefore, low-speed minesweepers are used for this purpose; they are also called basic minesweepers. Such ships no longer have to be specially built. During war, small merchant ships with a displacement of 150 to 400 tons serve as basic minesweepers. Their speed is no more than 12 knots, and their weapons, although weak, are still designed to clash with equally small enemy ships and even to fight single aircraft.

Minefields are also placed against the minesweepers themselves at shallow depths. To mine such an obstacle, you need a minesweeper with a very shallow draft, almost gliding through the water. Such minesweepers exist - these are motor boats that work with a special “boat” cutting trawl.

Now we have become acquainted with the main ships - participants in the mine war at sea, with minesweepers. How do these ships fight, how do they defeat their enemy - the mine?

Small ships confidently and busily move forward one after another. There are several of them - this is a division of minesweepers. On the vast sea road there are no milestones or signs showing the way. But minesweepers know well the “address” of the place where they should arrive. Somewhere close to that area of ​​the sea, that section of the path of warships, where enemy mines were hiding, or rather, not hiding, but could have been hiding. It is not yet certain that this area is barred with mines, but... there is reason to suspect that this is the case, that the enemy managed to mine these waters.

Their warships must take this route to the operation. The enemy was waiting for this. This means that it was beneficial for him to place deadly “surprises” hidden under the water here. But this also means that before the passage of your ships it is necessary to examine this area, to find out for sure whether an invisible enemy is hiding under the water - a mine. And we must somehow secure the path of our warships, make sure that they can quickly, boldly, confidently follow the intended path and successfully complete the task assigned to them.

So the minesweepers are heading to the suspicious area - so far they only know the general symbols this area on the navigator's map. And on the approach to the border of the suspicious area, the minesweepers line up in pairs, set up their trawls and begin to plow the sea with them. So they examine, they ask the sea to see if there are mines hiding under the water.

If there are a lot of minesweepers or they have enough time for a thorough inspection, then “the parallel furrows “lie” densely, closely, completely, which is why such a trawling inspection is called “continuous”. But it may happen that the suspicious area is too large, and there are few minesweepers and their deadline is short. Then larger or smaller gaps are left between the furrows. On the navigator's map, the suspicious area has its own outlines, which form a certain geometric figure - a square, triangle or polygon. Minesweepers in the sea follow the sides of this figure and gradually, as it were, cut it off, reducing its area. And suddenly... the trawl buoys “became agitated”, first one, then the other plunged into the water - mines were discovered and knocked down, one, two, three. Now there is no longer any doubt - the area is mined and dangerous for ships. But it is not enough to know only this. How far and in what direction does this dangerous area stretch? After all, if you do not know this, then minesweepers cannot clear it so thoroughly that there is complete confidence in the safety of passage, and warships cannot bypass the dangerous place.

This means that only the beginning of the work has been completed. Now we need to begin the second part - we need to find the boundaries of a dangerous place, the boundaries of a minefield. And here the sailors turn to geometry for help. The navigators of minesweepers “paint” invisible lines of geometric shapes onto the expanses of water and solve this problem by “construction”. How it's done?

The place where the first mine was trawled is taken as the center of the dangerous polygon. This polygon is constructed as follows. The location of the mine is accurately marked on the map. From this point a circle is described with a radius (on a scale) of three miles. It is generally accepted that the boundaries of a minefield cannot in any way extend beyond the line of this “circle of death.” Now we just need to find the true boundaries of the fence inside this circle.

A polygon in the broad sense of the word is described around a circle. It can be a triangle, a rectangle, or a pentagon.

The commander of a minesweeper formation himself decides which figure is more profitable for him to choose for a more successful and faster minesweeping. For now, all this is done only on the map. But now the polygon figure is selected and plotted on the map. Then the minesweepers begin to move. They set up their trawls and begin to “cut off” the invisible boundaries of the figure parallel to one of its sides. Sailors call this “laying the sweep tacks.” Not a single mine has been cleared yet. Gradually the minesweepers are approaching the center of the figure.

But on one of the tacks the first mine was knocked down. Immediately, trawling on that side of the polygon stops. The location of the mine is marked on the map and marked on the sea with a floating pole, and the minesweepers transfer their work to the other, next side of the polygon. Here the cutting of the figure towards its center is repeated again until a mine is trawled on one of the tacks.

So the minesweepers go around all sides of the figure. And when this work - reconnaissance of the barrier - is completed, the boundaries of the dangerous place are clearly delineated on the map and at sea. A new figure has emerged, it is smaller than the first and, perhaps, not so correct, but now the invisible enemy has been identified, it is known exactly where he is hiding in his underwater ambush.

All this very dangerous work was carried out by high-speed minesweepers. In most cases, this is where their role ends. Of course, these ships could, if necessary, carry out the third or last, most dangerous part of the work - the destruction of the minefield. But low-speed minesweepers are better suited for this work. Although slowly, they carefully comb the entire outlined area of ​​the dangerous place, remove all the mines to the surface of the sea and destroy them.

So, the high-speed minesweepers have left, and in their place, low-speed minesweepers are approaching the boundaries of the minefield.

The command is transmitted from the lead ship by a conventional signal: “Get ready to set the trawl!”

Life is boiling on minesweepers. The order is carried out quickly and clearly. A few more minutes, and a new signal flies up and silently conveys to the end minesweepers: “Set the trawl!”

Following this signal, ships move more slowly and more carefully. So steel cables, equipped with depth guys, buoys, and weights, connected the ships into trawling pairs.

Another signal, and the minesweepers line up in their own special battle formation - this means that each minesweeper pair, like one combat unit, follows the other, but not exactly “to the back of the head,” but somewhat to the side. After all, the first trawling pair will clear the entire strip covered by the length of the trawl. This means that if the second pair of minesweepers goes exactly after the first so that each ship of the pair follows the stream of the corresponding ship of the first pair, then there will be no work left for it: its trawl will not knock down a single mine. Therefore, the second pair of minesweepers, walking behind, moves to the side just the length of their trawl. This means that the right ship of the second pair is barely to the right of the jet of the left ship of the first pair. All subsequent pairs are shifted in the same way. Now there will be a job for each pair, and the mine “harvesters” will immediately pass through a large area of ​​the dangerous place. And at the same time, there will not be a single “unmown” strip left in this area. This formation is the battle formation of minesweepers when they are preparing to move towards a minefield. The “offensive” begins, the entire division with trawls installed at low speed (6-7 knots) begins to cut off on one side the outline of the figure, inside which the mines are hidden.

The minesweepers lay down the first tack, then turn on the opposite course, cutting off the next part of the figure's contour. When they reach the edge, they go back on course. They will scurry around like this until they cut off the entire area of ​​the figure. It’s like a calm, smooth work that doesn’t hide any danger or romance.

But it only seems so. And very soon this apparent calm is disturbed.

Suddenly the alarming and melancholy howl of a siren is heard. On the first pair of minesweepers, flag signals and the silent words of the ships flutter upward. They signal to the other minesweepers that their trawl has hit a mine and broken its mine.

Behind the trawl, a large metal ball has floated to the surface and is swaying on the waves. This is a mine, it was discovered and forced to surface, but it still needs to be destroyed. This work is performed by a special minesweeper - its place is behind the division. And when behind the trawls, here and there, more and more formidable sources of underwater strikes emerge, this ship approaches and shoots the mine or sends demolition men to destroy it with a demolition cartridge.

This happens when trawls hit mines. But very often minesweepers operate with towing trawls. Then the trawls capture one, two, three, many mines on their way. Trawl buoys often dive under the water or quickly approach each other, the siren almost continuously emits its drawn-out moan.

All this means that the trawls have already captured many mines - it is already difficult for minesweepers to drag them along. You have to temporarily stop trawling, leave the mined area to a shallower place and clear the trawls of caught mines. The minesweepers slowly move into the shallow area. The ships of each pair go their separate ways different sides and at the same time they stretch and straighten the trawl arc. All mines captured by the minesweeping part are freed from the tenacious embrace of the underwater harvester. Now their minereps turn out to be too long - nothing keeps the steel balls from floating to the surface. The surface of the sea is immediately covered with them. The minesweepers go back to the blocked area, to the same place from which they left, and continue their work.

And where the caught mines are “brought to light”, reprisals take place and they are destroyed. This is how minesweepers fight their formidable and very dangerous, merciless enemy. If the barrier is large, this struggle lasts for a long time, not hours, but days. And all this time, the tension of the sailors on the minesweepers does not subside, the mortal danger to which they are exposed at truly every “step” of their ship does not decrease, does not go away. Complete victory - the destruction of the barrier without losses - is achieved with difficulty. It requires high combat skills and dedication.

It happens that the silence of the sea is broken not by the victorious sounds of sirens, but by the roar of an explosion. A waterspout takes off above the ship, a powerful underwater blow hits its hull - the minesweeper quickly goes to the bottom.

And just as in a battle on land, the ranks of fighters close to fill the place of comrades torn out of action by a bullet or shells, and people again go forward to attack - so here other ships take the place of the dead. The attack on the minefield continues until victory is won, until not a single mine remains inside the outlined figure and the invisible polygon ceases to be dangerous.

It also happens that there is an explosion, but... without fatal consequences for the minesweeper. This is a mine exploding, knocked down by a trawl. How could this happen? It turns out that already in last years the miners came up with the idea of ​​constructing mines in such a way that when the minesweeper comes into contact with the mine, the mine explodes; it turns out that a mine can be dangerous not only for the ships against which it is placed, but also for the trawl with which it was hooked.

The explosion of a mine in a trawl destroys its entire structure, breaks the trawling part, and disarms the ship.

It happens that a destructive explosion suddenly occurs when a guardian paravan is pulled out of the water. It turned out that what was brought on board was not a paravan, but... a mine. How did this happen? While trawling, the paravan hit a mine, but immediately, in turn, a special anti-sweeping device of the mine was activated, which broke the rope of the paravan, and the mine “clung” to the trawl.

In addition to anti-sweeping devices on the mines themselves, on their mines, the work of minesweepers is also hampered by special “mine protectors”. The defender is placed on a given recess. It is held underwater by a buoy rope and an anchor. Anti-mine cutters are hung on the buoyep at some distance from each other. When the trawl blade slides onto the cutter, it is immediately cut and the trawl is disarmed. Mine defenders are placed in front of the minefield, as its guard, or between the lines of mines.

It may happen that there is no way to quickly secure a mine polygon, and ships need to pass through a mined area, there is no time to wait until it is cleared. Then the ships bypass the minefield. After all, now its borders are precisely known and clearly marked. Ships are allowed to pass at a distance of at least three miles from the boundaries of the barrier. This three-mile strip is considered a dangerous swimming zone.

Mine warfare requires not only skill, courage, and careful precision in work, but also military cunning. The enemy is monitoring the actions of the minesweepers and trying in every possible way to interfere with them. If this fails, the enemy tries to nullify the work of naval sappers and again lay mines in the newly cleared area.

This wary, acute struggle is illustrated very well by one of the episodes of the First World War.

The Germans carefully and heavily mined the coast of Sunderland. The British needed to clear this area for the passage of their ships. The English minesweepers carried out trawling during the day, conscientiously clearing the entire suspicious area, but... their work was observed by invisible scouts - German submarines- minelayers. As soon as the minesweepers left, the submarines again mined the area, and the next day the British ships hit the mines, as if the minesweepers had not been working the day before. All this was repeated several times, and the British were unable to put an end to the dangerous barrier. What should I do?

And then the English miners resorted to military stratagem.

The day came when English minesweepers again went to the shores of Sunderland to mine German mines.

Lined up in a column of ships moving in pairs, the minesweepers threw out their trawls and launched an attack on the German mines. On ships, people fussed around the winches and performed all the manipulations that accompany trawling work. But... all this was just a disguise. The minesweepers pretended that they were actually trawling. In fact, the British did not destroy a single mine; they all remained in place.

When this false trawling ended, the British minesweepers left. The German submarine watching them did not notice the deception. As soon as the British began to leave, her commander ordered to move forward to the supposedly cleared area and set up a new barrier. The submarine boldly followed the English minesweepers and suddenly... a powerful explosion seemed to tear apart the submarine and send it to the seabed. So the British surpassed the Germans in military cunning, so much so that the rescued submarine commander did not even suspect any military cunning. He decided that the English sailors were simply trawling disgracefully. Therefore, when he was taken to the deck of one of the minesweepers, the German almost pounced on his saviors and mercilessly scolded them for their poor work.

But it also happens that the path of ships is not only not cleared of mines, but has not even been explored yet, the obstacle has not been discovered, its borders have not been found. The ships urgently need to launch an operation along this route at any cost, and at the same time there is information that the fairway is blocked by mines. What should I do? You still have to walk through mines hiding under the water, but minesweepers go ahead of the ships and clear the path as they go. And the ships that are guided through the barrier also do not sleep, they install their own guard trawls - these are theirs additional protection from mines that may still remain behind minesweepers.

In such cases, they say that ships are guided behind trawls. In front of a column of ships there are usually two or more pairs of minesweepers - these are the conductors of the column. Behind, at a distance of about 6-10 cables, escorted ships follow. They accurately maintain the course, so as not to end up on the side of the trawled strip, because this threatens the death of the ship. And the sailors are closely watching the surface of the sea to see if floating mines appear, against which the installed trawls are powerless. To fight off mines, you need the calm, confident courage of warriors who never get lost.

In the deep autumn of 1941 in the Baltic, German invaders had already occupied both the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Finland. Only certain sections of its banks were still occupied by Soviet units. And yet, deep behind enemy lines, one of our bases was still fighting and holding the Soviet banner high.

The Soviet destroyer received a difficult and dangerous mission - to go to this base. There was stormy autumn weather at sea, the path ran past enemy shores. The enemy strangled the heroic base in the blockade loop and took all measures to prevent Soviet ships from passing to the aid of the besieged sailors. The path was blocked by minefields and strewn with floating mines. All this was well known, but it was necessary to go through and at the same time the operation had to be performed quickly, without the slightest delay. In such a situation there could be no question of inspecting the route and trawling. We had to go through all the dangers, through the mines. To accomplish such a task, courage, courage, desire and readiness to accomplish a feat are not enough. It is not only a matter of going to death without hesitation for the sake of one’s homeland; we must defeat this death, go through it, do everything not to die, but to win and reach the goal.

And for this you also need the ability to fight, careful, thoughtful preparation for the operation, and a sober consideration of all the obstacles along the way.

The commander of the Soviet destroyer, captain 3rd rank Osadchiy, understood his task precisely in this way. All “combat parts of the ship quickly and thoroughly prepared. The ship had to sail at night, in a storm, and there was no way to rely on lighthouses. This means that the navigational unit had to work clearly and accurately so as not to deviate from the given course, in order to know at every moment where the ship was. It was necessary to ensure high mobility of the ship, so that if necessary, it was possible to quickly maneuver away from the floating mine, leave it somewhere to the side or behind.

We had to follow the minesweepers, but also with our own paravane trawl. This means that both the minesweepers and the destroyer had to prepare spare parts for the trawls in case of an urgent need for replacement. And finally, again and again I had to think about floating mines.

At the appointed hour, all ships participating in the operation set off.

Transitions were made at night, in the dark. During one of these transitions, at 23 hours 48 minutes, the first floating mine appeared on the left of the destroyer at a distance of 50 meters. It's not scary. The destroyer accurately maintains its course and is not dangerous from a mine at such a distance. But the people on the ship are tense. They know: “trouble has begun,” and they are waiting for new mines. After 15 minutes, a floating mine was spotted right on the bow. This is already dangerous. They are monitoring the mines and preparing to meet them, but this time everything goes well - the mine passes by, just 5 meters on the left side of the destroyer. Another 12 minutes. An explosion was heard in the right side of the trawl paravane; it was a trenched mine that exploded and, of course, disfigured the right paravane. A column of water that flies up hits the bow of the ship.

The whole destroyer shakes as if in a convulsion, but again everything ends well, the main mechanisms are in order and we can move on.

But the right paravan needs to be replaced quickly. It’s good that everything needed for this was prepared in advance and carefully. Therefore, the replacement of the paravan is carried out so quickly that the destroyer is almost never left without its direct guardian.

A few more minutes and again floating mines appear, first on the right, then on the left. Now they swim almost in a continuous line with intervals of 10–15 meters. The ship has to dodge and at the same time be wary, so as not to go beyond the strip minesweepers are sweeping. After all, beyond these limits there is a minefield. Everyone on the destroyer is tense, everyone is aware of the danger of the moment. Death and destruction indeed await sailors at every step in the impenetrable darkness of the night sea. And all this to the accompaniment of new explosions in the trawls of the leading ships. Suddenly the lead ship stopped, and at the same moment the observers noticed a floating mine on the left, just five meters away. What to do? The situation is the same as in the epic about Ilya Muromets: to move forward from the mine - the path is blocked by the leading ship; If you stay in place or move to the left, you will die from a collision with the same floating mine; Move to the right - there is an unswept minefield. So, there is only one way - back.

You need to make a decision many times faster than writing these lines. Death is stingy with time and releases only moments. But the thought of an experienced commander overtakes the moment - so quickly the command is heard: “All the way back!” The destroyer shudders and stops, then slowly backs up. Just a second before this, the mine was inexorably approaching “the left side of the ship. Now it's a slow race. Who is more likely to hit a ship with a mine or a destroyer to elude it? In these moments, time is counted by the beating of the hearts of people facing death. And the struggle is essentially not between the ship and the mine, but between these people and death. The people are winning - lazily rocking on the waves, the mine passes just one and a half meters from the side, almost goes around the bow of the ship and goes to the starboard side. There, to the right, both the wind and the sea waves are driving her, now she is no longer afraid and goes further and further into the darkness.

Now we would go forward again, but it turns out that this cannot be done: when the ship stopped and went back, it entangled the paravans, made them useless, and left the destroyer without mine protection. The ship is drifting - this means that the wind and waves (the machines don’t work) force the ship to move, blowing it off the course line. If the drift is not stopped, the destroyer may end up in a minefield. A decision is made: to anchor and put the tangled paravanes in order. This decision is very, very difficult to carry out. Floating mines are approaching the ship again. One after another, observers report more and more mines drifting towards the destroyer. Now there is only one means of struggle left - to push away, to divert the mines from the sides. And officers, Red Navy men, and all the crew members who have their hands free line up along the sides. And the mines have almost surrounded the ship, besieged it from the sides and are about to destroy it. But people greet them with poles, carefully push them away, guide them along the sides and send them astern. Some people do this work with their hands. One of the advancing mines seemed to go unnoticed. Another moment and disaster is inevitable. Then officer Novikov climbs overboard, goes down to the left side, secures himself with his feet, hangs down to the water, stops the mine with his hands and pushes it away from the destroyer. Man grappled with death and defeated it. And such victories were won that night by many sailors, officers and Red Navy men of the glorious Soviet destroyer.

And while this fight between people and mines lasted, the miners fought to restore the paravans. It was impossible to untangle the trawls; There was only one thing left to do - cut them off and install new ones. A Red Navy man goes overboard into the darkness and storm. His dexterous, experienced and strong hands quickly cope with the maze of tangled parts of the trawl. Now you can install new paravanes. But then it turns out that there are no more right paravans left on the destroyer. It is necessary to immediately, for the first time in the ship’s practice, organize and carry out the conversion of the left paravanes to the right ones.

And this difficulty is being overcome. The destroyer is again armed against mines, its guard is again protecting it, the ship can continue on its way. And it's time! The sea was illuminated by the moon, and the enemy shores were very close. Any minute now, observers of enemy batteries will notice a stationary ship and open fire.

We set off again. A little more and the minefield will be left behind. But... one more salvo from the shore. The ship is spotted, the enemy opens fire, one shell falls into the water very close to the stern. Something happened to the steering, the steering wheel froze in one position, and the ship began to “describe circulation.” And the shells are falling closer and closer. At any cost we must get away from this dangerous neighborhood. But the ship has no control, how can you make it move in a given direction, perform certain maneuvers in order to evade shells, mines, in order to get closer to the target?

The steering needs to be fixed. But even if you manage to do this on the go, it will take a lot of time, and you need to leave immediately. Then the commander finds a way out of the situation. He switches the ship's machines to work in "disorder" - this means that the machines work in both reverse and forward motion. If the ratio between reverse and forward motion is correctly chosen, the ship goes on a “direct course.”

This measure was a success. Slowly but surely the destroyer moves forward along a given course. All this in the presence of strong winds, large waves and incessant shelling from the shore. Meanwhile, the ship's men are working hard and inventively to fix the steering. They drag on like an eternity, and yet the hours of this struggle pass. If you manage to at least free the rudder and not even control it, but only put it in the “neutral” position (the rudder will be straight), the speed of the ship will increase. Finally, after 4 hours it succeeds.

The destroyer moves forward faster. Now the enemy battery is left behind, the commander breathes more freely, but this happiness is short-lived. Half an hour later, an avalanche of fire from another enemy battery hits the ship. But the destroyer is still half-shackled, still controlled only by machines. It is difficult for him to maneuver and avoid projectiles. And on top of all this, the ship again finds itself in a minefield and again floating mines come from everywhere. The destruction and death that had been left behind again overtook the ship and its sailors.

They report to the commander: “There is a floating mine on the left bow!” You need to rush past, precisely maintain the course so that the mine passes on the left past the ship. This succeeds, this time death occurs only 7-10 meters from the side. But then again “there’s a mine right on the nose.” What should I do? After all, the ship has no steering. He cannot dodge or bypass the mine blocking his path. “Tear apart” again, and the mine disappears astern. And while this struggle with death continues, the struggle continues on the ship for the active life of the destroyer, for the restoration of steering control. People work inhumanely. Without rest or fear, tens of hours of persistent, exhausting work, not paying attention to enemy shells, inventing new solutions to the problem as they went, the sailors of the destroyer again won. The steering started working, the ship firmly set its course, emerged from the minefield, from under fire, and headed towards the base at full speed.

This is how Soviet sailors and their ships passed through minefields, through floating mines, through the fire of enemy batteries, through a storm in the night, through death.

The calm courage of the officers and Red Navy men, excellent knowledge of their military affairs and indomitable strong-willed desire for victory in the name of the homeland helped them overcome all obstacles on the way to the goal specified by the command.

Minesweepers cope well with anchor mines. But they are powerless against bottom mines, magnetic, acoustic and magnetic-acoustic. After all, these mines do not have mines, there is nothing to grab them and pull them out or hook them. They lie at the bottom and lie in wait for their future targets there. But the point is not only that there is nothing to grab them by. A minesweeper ship, just like any other, would itself cause an explosion of a magnetic or acoustic mine as soon as it approached it or passed over it.

There was no way to protect bottom mines by ordinary trawling; here it was necessary to somehow get especially clever, to come up with something more cunning.

The question “what to do” has acquired special significance this time. A lot depended on the correct answer to this question: the security of maritime communications between the USA and England, the entire supply of the population and troops of Great Britain.

The inventors' thoughts began to work feverishly. One after another, more and more new solutions to the problem were proposed - how to defeat the mine danger. First of all, the sailors took up arms against magnetic mines; It was these mines that had some success in the first period of the Second World War and caused a lot of noise.

All inventors followed the same path - they proposed to fight magnetic mines with their own weapons. What kind of weapon is this?

We already know that the steel mass of the ship is also a magnet, which creates its own magnetic field and therefore affects the magnetic needle of the mine contactor. Would, say, a wooden ship, which for some reason “had no steel objects at all,” explode on such a mine? No, it would not have exploded, because the mass of such a ship would not have affected the mine’s instruments. A ship made of duralumin (a non-magnetic metal) would also not explode. But these days, almost all ships are built from steel. This means that it was necessary to ensure that the steel of the ship did not affect the magnetic mine; it was necessary to demagnetize the steel mass of the ship. And how to do it? In response to this question, the miners placed a winding of cable along the hull of the ship and passed a current through it. At the same time, the ship was also magnetized and a new magnetic field was created, which was equal to the initial magnetic field, but in the opposite direction. Such two fields destroy each other or reduce each other so much that there will be no effect on the magnetic mine devices. Demagnetized ships freely pass over the magnetic mines waiting for them and deceive them; the mines remain at the bottom alone, as if enemy ships had not passed over them. Instead of a winding, in some cases they carry a cable around the ship’s hull and also pass an electric current through it. In this case, the cable is raised and lowered, as if “rubbing” the ship’s hull with it. This is how miners learned to deceive magnetic mines.

It should also be added that these funds also turned out to be good protection against torpedoes. The fact is that in some torpedoes the fuses are designed in such a way that they are triggered by the magnetic field of the ship, but a demagnetized ship is not afraid of this danger.

Are these means of protection against magnetic mines reliable? When the British evacuated their troops from France in 1940, the Germans frantically littered the waters of the English Channel with magnetic mines in the hope that transports with troops would sink in batches. Imagine their disappointment when it turned out that not a single English ship (all of them were equipped with demagnetizing devices) was damaged by mines; the transports freely passed over the German traps hidden at the bottom and arrived safely at their ports. But still such protection is not enough. It happens that the demagnetizing effect is disrupted for some reason. In addition, demagnetization does not protect against acoustic mines. The miners tried their best to find a way to trawl bottom mines, destroy them in advance, and clear the fairways of them. It seemed that this was impossible, and yet today minesweepers are armed with special anti-magnetic and anti-acoustic trawls.

These trawls do not mow down or trip bottom mines, because “there is nothing to hook them on, and you cannot get close to them. New trawls do not touch bottom mines at all. They operate at a distance - these are non-contact trawls that fight proximity mines. So it turns out that proximity mines are again being fought with their own weapons.

How do the new trawls work? Their device, of course, is kept secret, but you can still imagine how they operate.

Let's imagine that a minesweeper ship far ahead of itself sent a special floating device that emits very strong magnetic pulses and sound waves. Such a device should act from afar on the arrow of a magnetic mine contactor or on the fuse of an acoustic mine and detonate them at a distance. According to information leaked to the press, such trawls explode proximity mines at a distance of 90-150 meters in front of them. Where for some reason it is impossible or difficult to use minesweepers (in harbors, at docks and berths), the same devices are sent from the shore. Once again, the sailors deceive the bottom mines, forcing them to act on the absent enemy.

When the Germans learned that their magnetic and acoustic mines were being successfully destroyed by the Allies, they decided to outwit their opponents and ensure that the new trawls did not detect bottom mines. For this purpose, the Germans came up with two new devices, which they attached to the fuses of magnetic and acoustic mines. One of these devices is called an "urgency device." This is a clock mechanism, included in the contactor circuit and wound up for a certain period of time - from 15 minutes to several days. Until this time expires, the mine is not dangerous, it will not explode, even if ships constantly scurry over it. But as soon as the specified period expires, the very first ship that passes over the mine will receive a crushing underwater strike. What did the Germans want to achieve with this? They hoped that the enemy, seeing that the ships were passing unhindered through the sea, would begin to think that there were no mines in this area at all, would become careless, and then he would be hit by sudden attacks. But above all, they wanted to prevent the minesweeping of proximity mines. In fact, no matter how much you iron the sea, even with a super-powerful trawl, mines with emergency devices will not explode and will not give themselves away. And if the enemy does not make a sufficient number of tacks and stops trawling, confident that there are no mines in this place, he will be punished.

The second device is called a “multiplicity device”. If a mine (magnetic or acoustic) is ready for action, it will explode as soon as the first ship passes over it or the trawl first impacts it. But if there is a multiplicity device in the mine, this will not happen. This device can be “instructed” to detonate a mine not under the first ship (or trawl), but under a certain number, for example, under the fifth or tenth.

The Allies quickly figured out these “secrets” of the Germans and learned to fight them.

How are mines that contain urgency and frequency devices trawled?

First, the sea is ironed with a trawl continuously for several days. When the maximum possible endurance of the urgency device expires, then additional trawl tacks are laid in order to “wear out” the multiplicity device. Such additional tacks are made so much that their number is not less than the number of the largest instrument setting (up to 15). Only after such careful and lengthy treatment can the fairway be considered safe from mines.

How will the sea sappers know that in such and such a place the sea area has become suspicious, that its waters are strewn with bottom mines?

Special observation posts carefully monitor the protected sea area. Observers report where and how many mines enemy planes dropped. And then it is the turn of the sea sappers to discover and destroy these mines.

There is also an aerial electromagnetic trawl, which is operated not from a ship or from the shore, but from an airplane.

A large plane flies low over the water, low-level flight at an altitude of just a few meters. There is a huge metal ring attached under the fuselage and wings of the plane. This is the difference between the aircraft that catches the eye and seems incomprehensible to the uninitiated observer. But then the plane flew over the water again and again, and suddenly from behind, behind its tail, with a dull noise, a powerful column of water flew up into the sky, then another, several more. These are magnetic mines discovered by an air minesweeper exploding. How does an air trawl work?

The aircraft has an internal combustion engine; A DC generator operates from the engine and powers a wire winding placed inside the ring. The result is a powerful electromagnet that creates a magnetic field that acts on the magnetic mine devices. Air minesweepers, like surface mines, usually work not alone, but as a whole formation, also moving in a ledge formation.

The high speed of air minesweepers is their important advantage over ships. They quickly arrive even in a very remote trawling area. In addition, air minesweepers quickly recover from the tricks of the multiplicity device - it costs them nothing to make a large number of tacks in a short time. And, finally, air minesweepers are good minesweepers; they quickly fly around a huge area and, if a fountain shoots up somewhere behind them, they mark the spot and report to the minesweeper base that a blocked area has been discovered. It is the air minesweepers who will have to carry out particularly large reconnaissance and minesweepers work after the end of the war, when they will need to quickly detect and destroy all the mines that litter the coastal waters and ship routes.

Mine-sweeping forces of the domestic fleet... Usually created according to a specific template. A certain class of ships is taken, the composition and capabilities of those representatives of this class that are currently in the Russian Navy are studied, and their decommissioning is predicted. And then the capabilities and number of new ships of the same class that the Russian Federation is building or is planning to lay down in the near future are studied. All this is compared, after which a conclusion is made about the sufficiency or insufficiency of our forces for the next 10-15 years.

In the case of domestic mine-sweeping forces, this scheme does not work. No, of course, the Russian Navy has both sea and base and raid minesweepers, and in quite noticeable numbers. The problem is that despite the presence of ships, as such, there are no mine-sweeping forces capable of combating any modern threat in the Russian Federation.

Why did this happen?

It is no secret that today the combat effectiveness of the fleet is still based on ships laid down and built under the Soviet Union. SSBN? They are still based on the “Dolphins” of Project 667BDRM, made in the USSR. Multipurpose nuclear submarines? "Pike-B", made in the USSR. Submarine missile carriers? Project 949A “Antey”, made in the USSR. Missile cruisers? Large anti-submarine ships? Diesel submarines? Our only aircraft carrier? Made in USSR.

But with minesweepers, alas, the USSR made a mistake. And by 1991, we had, although numerous, an already outdated minesweeper fleet, which even then was not capable of solving the tasks facing it. Of course, the USSR worked to overcome this backlog, but did not have time, and “bequeathed” it to the Russian Federation, but with us...

However, first things first.

From the very moment of the birth of mine-sweeping forces and until about the 70s of the last century, the main method of destroying mines was trawls towed by specialized ships - minesweepers. At first, the trawls were contact (their principle was based on cutting the minerep - the cable connecting the mine to the anchor), then - non-contact, capable of simulating physical fields in such a way as to force bottom mines to detonate. However, minecraft was continuously improved, and a moment came when this scheme became outdated.

In the 70s of the twentieth century, a mine-sweeping revolution took place in the West: trawling (that is, towing a trawl through a minefield) was replaced by methods of searching and destroying mines ahead of the minesweeper, with specialized hydroacoustic stations (GAS) doing the searching, and destruction – uninhabited underwater vehicles.

At first, everything was not so bad - in the early 70s, the USSR Navy received the KIU-1 complex mine detector-destroyer. It consisted of the MG-79 hydroacoustic station and STIUM-1 (self-propelled remote-controlled mine finder-destroyer). KIU-1 is a first generation complex, in its own way technical specifications was quite at the level of imported analogues.

However, then something strange began to happen. Firstly, the fleet reluctantly accepted the innovation, preferring the usual towed trawls. Secondly, the development of the next generation of mine action systems was transferred from Leningrad to Uralsk (Kazakh SSR) - and there it was started practically from scratch. As a result, before the collapse of the USSR in 1991, it was possible to create the second generation STIUM “Ketmen”, as far as one can judge - a powerful large unit, but alas, with a high level of physical fields, which is not at all good for combating the mine threat. "Ketmen" became an integral part of the KIU-2 complex.

Apparently, the USSR is already lagging behind naval forces NATO bloc. Work also began on the 3rd generation STIUM “Route”, which was supposed to provide the USSR with parity as mine-sweeping tools. However, the development of the “Route” could not be completed until 1991, and then...

Then there was a failure in almost a decade, and only at the end of the 90s was the corresponding order issued to the state research and production enterprise (SNPP) Region, which had significant experience in creating uninhabited underwater vehicles and marine underwater weapons. New complex should have included:

1. Automated system mine action (APCS) “Diez”;
2. Mine-detecting sonar with under-the-knee antenna “Livadia”;
3. Mine detection system on a self-propelled remote-controlled underwater vehicle “Livadia STPA”;
4. STIUM for destroying Mayevka mines.

Two "Mayevka" and "Livadia"

Unfortunately, it seems that difficulties have arisen with the Livadia STPA; a towed side-scan sonar has been created instead. Everything would be fine, but with such a GAS, the minesweeper loses the ability to conduct mine reconnaissance along the ship's course. According to other sources, Livadia STPA eventually worked as it should, but the author, unfortunately, does not have exact data on this matter.

Now let’s briefly interrupt the description of the ups and downs of domestic mine action systems and list the minesweepers in the Russian Navy. In total, our fleet includes three types of minesweepers:

1. Marine- the largest, capable of performing minesweeping work at a great distance from their native shores, including accompanying fleet ships on long voyages.

2. Basic– for operations in closed seas, ensuring the safety of approaches to fleet bases.

3. Raid– for action within the waters of ports, on roadsteads, in rivers.

Let's start from the end. As of December 1, 2015, the Russian Navy had 31 raid minesweepers (RTShch), including: RTShch project 697TB (2 pcs.), RTShch project 13000 (4 pcs.), RTShch project 12592 (4 pcs.), RT- 168 project 1253 (1 piece), RTShch-343 project 1225.5 (1 piece), RTShch project 1258 (10 pieces) and RTShch project 10750 (9 pieces). All these ships have from 61.5 to 135 tons of displacement, a speed from 9 to 12.5 knots, artillery weapons in the form of one installation of a 30-mm or 25-mm machine gun or a 12.7-mm Utes machine gun, on some Of these, the deployment of MANPADS is provided.

As an exotic item, two RTShch project 697TB, created on the basis of small fishing trawlers, are of some interest.

And, perhaps, four minesweepers of Project 13000, which are radio-controlled unmanned boats that break through minefields.

But alas, with the exception of nine ships of Project 10750, all ships of this subclass can only use towed trawls, which means they are completely outdated. In essence, it no longer matters when they were created and how long they can remain in service - the only important thing is that they are not able to fight not even the modern mine threat, but even the mines of the 80s of the last century.

Things are a little better with minesweepers of project 10750.

They were initially built taking into account the use of the KIU-1 or KIU-2M “Anaconda” mine action complex (the latter using the “Ketmen” STIUM).

There were 22 basic minesweepers in the Russian fleet, including 19 of Project 12650 and 3 of Project 12655, however, these projects do not have any fundamental differences among themselves.

The ships' standard displacement is 390 tons, speed is 14 knots, and their cruising range is up to 1,700 miles. Initially, they were armed with one twin 30-mm artillery mount in the bow and one 25-mm artillery mount in the stern; later, they began to install 30-mm AK-630 six-barreled guns instead. The “highlight” of the project was the wooden body - fiberglass at that time had not yet been sufficiently developed by the industry.

As mine countermeasures, BTSh can carry either KIU-1 or towed trawls of various types. Due to the reduced level of physical fields (wood!) and the newest for the 70s (and that’s when the construction of minesweepers began of this project) mine warfare systems, which KIU-1 was then, could be considered one of the best minesweepers in the world. All 22 ships of this type entered service in the 80s and early 90s of the last century, and only Magomed Gadzhiev - in 1997.

And finally, sea minesweepers. As of December 1, 2015, we had 13 units, including:

MTSH project 1332– 1 unit.

A former fishing trawler, it was refitted in Arkhangelsk in 1984-85. Standard displacement is 1,290 tons, speed is 13.3 knots, armament is 2 double-barreled 25-mm machine guns, two MRG-1 grenade launchers.

MTSH project 266M– 8 units.

Standard displacement - 745 tons, speed - 17 knots, range - 3000 miles, armament - two 30-mm AK-630 “metal cutters”, two 25-mm machine guns, 2 RBU-1200, Igla-1 MANPADS. Of all the Project 266M MTSH ships in the Russian Navy, only 2 ships of this type entered service in 1989, the rest back in the 70s of the 20th century. For their time they were very good, they could use KIU-1, today six ships of this type have been in service for 40 years or more, and the two youngest - 29 years.

MTSH project 12660– 2 units.

Standard displacement is 1070 tons, speed is 15.7 knots, range is 1500 miles, armament is one 76-mm AK-176 and AK-630M gun mount, 2*4 Strela-3 MANPADS launchers. Anti-mine – KIU-2 with STIUM “Ketmen”

MTSH project 266ME– 1 unit. "Valentin Pikul." Similar in performance characteristics to the Project 266M ships, perhaps intended for more modern mine-sweeping weapons (KIU-2?), entered the fleet in 2001.

MTSH project 02668– 1 unit. "Vice Admiral Zakharyin."

Standard displacement 791 tons, speed 17 knots, one 30 mm AK-306, two 14.5 mm machine guns, Igla-1 MANPADS. It is a Project 266ME MTSH adapted for the new mine action complex with STIUM "Mayevka". Commissioned in 2009

So what do we have? Formally, we have as many as 56 minesweepers of different types, but if you look a little closer, it turns out that one of them modern methods trawling, that is, only 34 ships can use uninhabited underwater vehicles. It seems that it’s also not bad - but if you forget that 21 of the ships listed above can only use KIU-1, that is, equipment from the 70s. But only 13 ships are capable of fighting the same “Captors” (at least theoretically), of which 9 are raid minesweepers with a displacement of 135 tons, i.e. they are completely unseaworthy.

However, if you listen to the words of people directly involved in the mine business, the picture emerges much darker. The fact is that, for some reason, the Navy leadership underestimated modern means of searching and destroying mines, and, despite the appearance of the newest mines, preferred to use the good old, time-tested trawls. The KIU (integrated mine seeker-destroyer) in the navy was used almost on an initiative basis by individual enthusiastic officers, and all official tasks were set and solved by towed trawls - in other words, the USSR Navy, despite the presence of remote-controlled underwater vehicles, never acquired how many - rich experience in combating mine danger through mine control.

In the Russian Federation, these trends have only intensified. And therefore, despite the presence of ships that could theoretically use the KIU, in practice only two minesweepers used them - “Valentin Pikul” and “Vice Admiral Zakharyin”. At the first, the container version of the new KIU with STIUM (self-propelled remote-controlled mine finder-destroyer) "Mayevka" was tested, at the second - the ship version.

Container version of "Mayevka" on "Valentin Pikul"

The first is interesting in that it can be installed on almost any ship, even one that is not a minesweeper, but, as far as the author knows, this copy was removed from the Valentin Pikul after testing, and on the Vice Admiral Zakharyin the operation encountered either technical or technical problems. or with some other problems.

In other words, as of December 1, 2015, the Russian Navy had ONE minesweeper with some modern mine action weapons. Or perhaps there was none.

What does this mean? For example, the impossibility in combat conditions of removing missile missiles from bases submarine cruisers strategic purpose, because no one is stopping American nuclear submarines from laying mines during a threatened period.

Here, however, the question arises - how could this happen in the first place? And here we return to the description of the misadventures of domestic credit institutions.

The fact is that by about 2009 we had a relatively modern 3rd generation CIU - a combination of “Diez”, “Livadia” and “Mayevka”, which was developed instead of the “Route” created in Kazakhstan. Judging by the table below, among its foreign “classmates,” “Mayevka” did not shine with “unparalleled indicators in the world.”

And so, as far as one can assume from information from open sources, there was a clash of interests of three groups.

First group- these are the creators of "Mayevka" - naturally, they advocated for their system, which, by the way, passed all the required state tests and was adopted for service, to go into mass production.

Second group- these are the designers of a new complex for combating mine threats, called “Alexandrite-ISPUM”. This system is the next, 4th generation, which was supposed to reach the world level in its functionality.

Third group - which saw no point in tinkering with domestic developments, but preferred to purchase self-propelled guided underwater vehicles in France.

As a result, it turned out that by the GPV 2011-2020 we had, albeit not the best in the world, but still a fully functional Diez/Livadiya/Mayevka complex, which had passed state tests and was ready for mass production. Perhaps this complex had some problems, but again, judging by the information in the open press, there was nothing that could not be corrected during operation. In other words, we had a mine-sweeping force of about six dozen minesweepers, “stuck” in their combat qualities somewhere in the 60s and completely unable to fight not only a modern, but even a mine threat of level 90 -s of the last century. And a relatively modern mine countermeasures complex, which, perhaps, did not capture the stars from the sky, but was still quite functional - but which our minesweepers did not have.

So, we could choose “bird in hand” - simply put, to modernize our least old sea, base and raid minesweepers by replacing the equipment (or using the place where it should have been) KIU-1 and 2 with Diez, Mayevka and "Livadia". We could, in addition to the existing old ships, build a small series of cheap basic minesweepers based on the same project 12650, with its wooden hull. Thus, today we would have received, albeit not the best in the world, but still more or less adequate mine-sweeping forces, capable with a high degree of probability of ensuring the entry and exit of our surface and submarine forces from naval bases.

But instead, we preferred “pie in the sky” - giving up on Mayevka, we continued the development of Alexandrite-ISPUM, and developed a new type of minesweepers under Project 12700 Alexandrite. At the same time, at a minimum, the lead ships of the series should have received French systems for searching and destroying mines until the Alexandrite-ISPUM is ready, and when it is ready... Well, it could have turned out in any way, because under the minister defense Serdyukov, the rejection of domestic developments in favor of imported supplies was, as they say now, the most fashionable trend in our country.

To be fair, it should be noted that supporters of the “French roll” also had logical justifications for their position. The thing is that remote-controlled vehicles in combination with GAS for searching for mines turned out to be quite effective anti-mine weapons. Accordingly, mines received technology that prevents this method of minesweeping. It looked like this - when laying a minefield, most of the mines were placed in anticipation of enemy surface and submarine ships, but a certain number of them were supposed to play the role of “mine defenders” - they exploded when underwater vehicles approached them for mine clearance.

Of course, such an approach complicated trawling, but still did not make it impossible. For example, one could use surface unmanned vehicles to initiate explosions of “mine defenders”, and then, when the “defenders” are neutralized, carry out minesweeping in the usual ways. Or it was possible to create kamikaze underwater vehicles, which, at the cost of their death, would cause the explosion of mine defenders, after which nothing would threaten the “real” underwater remote-controlled vehicles. Perhaps there were also other options for dealing with “mine defenders,” but we had none of that.

Our fleet’s preoccupation with old, towed trawls did not allow us to gain much-needed experience in operating remote-controlled underwater vehicles; accordingly, with the appearance of “mine defenders”, there was a feeling that even promising domestic STIUMs were outdated, and we had no fundamentally new means of combating the new threat not even in development. At the same time, foreign military thought followed the “kamikaze” path, creating disposable mine destroyers. Their advantage was that with the help of such a “kamikaze” the mine was destroyed quickly and very reliably, the disadvantage was that the device was much more expensive than any mine.

Therefore, the position of the supporters of the “French” option: “Let’s buy foreign super-equipment, and not wait until our military-industrial complex creates another “neither a mouse nor a frog, but an unknown little animal” still had a basis, albeit perverted, but logic. Indeed, unlike the Alexandrite-ISPUM, foreign underwater vehicles have actually proven their worth. Therefore, if the idea was to purchase several sets of imported equipment in order to gain experience working with them and understand their capabilities, on the basis of which we could improve our own developments, then this would be a very reasonable decision. True, as far as the author could understand, supporters of the acquisition of French equipment were talking about something completely different - about the complete replacement of domestic developments with imports.

In general, we tried to purchase the entire range of required equipment in France - judging by the kind of weapons offered for export for Project 12700 minesweepers, each minesweeper had to receive:

1. Two autonomous mine-resistant underwater vehicles of the Alister 9 type with a working depth of up to 100 meters;

2. Two remote-controlled uninhabited underwater vehicles of the K-Ster Inspector type with a working depth of up to 300 meters;

3. Ten disposable remote-controlled underwater mine destroyers of the K-Ster Mine Killer type.

The lead minesweeper of Project 12700, "Alexander Obukhov", was laid down on September 22, 2011, was launched in June 2014, and entered service only in 2016.

But he did not receive any French equipment - due to sanctions, it was prohibited to supply modern trawling systems to the Russian Federation.

Thus, we received a new, very large (total displacement - 800 tons) and unique minesweeper in the world. Don’t laugh, it really has no analogues - its hull was formed using the vacuum infusion method, and a world record was set, since its length was 62 meters and the Alexander Obukhov became the largest ship in the world made using this technology.

The fiberglass hull gives the minesweeper advantages by significantly reducing the level of its physical fields. Even taking into account the fact that a modern ship of this class should not enter a minefield on its own, this is an extremely useful bonus, because anything can happen at sea and additional protection for a minesweeper will never be superfluous.

However, its main anti-mine weapon remains the same towed trawls, conceptually outdated in the 70s of the last century. However, this is not an entirely correct statement, because unmanned boats also entered service with the Alexander Obukhov.

They don't allow you to buy abroad mine action systems? Let's buy an uncrewed boat, since for some reason the sanctions restrictions did not apply to it. Moreover, the French “device” turned out to be quite interesting: it has two GAS, one of which is designed to detect mines at a depth of up to 10 m (old anchor mines), and the other at a depth of up to 100 m, including bottom mines , and can operate at a distance of 10 km from the carrier ship! In addition, the “Inspector” is capable of “controlling” (more precisely, relaying control from the minesweeper) to underwater mine-destroying vehicles of the K-Ster Mine Killer type.

True, the K-Ster Mine Killers themselves were never sold to us. The reasons why the French Navy was not at all interested in the brainchild of the “gloomy French genius” called Inspector-MK2 were never announced. At the time of the transaction, the manufacturing company had not sold a single “Inspector” to any country in the world. Against this informational background, questions about whether a competition was held among foreign manufacturers of such equipment, whether the optimal offer was selected, and whether Inspector-MK2 passed state tests in the Russian Federation, clearly become rhetorical.

In the end, we should have bought at least something from the French, because funds were allocated for this! And so, in 2015, the Prominvest company, part of the Rostec corporation, entered into a contract for the supply of 4 “Inspectors”. Two of them were delivered to our fleet right in 2015, but it’s unclear about the second pair; perhaps they were never delivered to the fleet (did the French remember the sanctions?).

But, be that as it may, a couple of “Inspectors” have joined our fleet. Does this mean that the lead ship of the Project 12700 series of minesweepers still received modern mine-anti-mine weapons? Unfortunately no.

The problem is that buyers somehow did not pay attention to the geometric dimensions of the “Frenchman”. And they, unfortunately, do not allow Inspector-MK2 to be lifted on board a Project 12700 minesweeper.

As a result, "Alexander Obukhov", of course, can take out the "Inspectors" in tow... or put a crew there (there is such a possibility), so that they take the French boats to the desired area, and then, before trawling, remove people from there. The main thing is that there is no excitement, because in this case, transferring from a 9-meter boat will become another problem...

There is one more “funny” nuance. Someone might say that we bought Inspector-MK2 in order to get acquainted with the best foreign technologies, see what they are doing abroad and adjust our own developments. But the problem is that the French “Inspector” is optimized for searching for mines at shallow depths (up to 100 m), that is, it does not cover the entire range of mine defense tasks (today some mines can be placed at a depth of 400 meters). Accordingly, its acquisition (followed by... uhm... replication) could solve only the particular problems of trawling the waters of naval bases and approaches to them (where the depth is appropriate). But these boats were purchased for a very large sea minesweeper, for which work at shallow and ultra-shallow depths is completely contraindicated!

Today we are designing unmanned Typhoon boats, which should surpass the French Inspectors in their capabilities, but... let's start with the fact that the construction technologies of Project 12700 minesweepers, which have no analogues in the world, for all their advantages, have one disadvantage - they are simply expensive. The cost of “Alexander Obukhov” is not reliably known, but the bmpd blog provides information about his insurance contract. So, the insurance cost of the lead minesweeper of Project 12700 is “from the moment of testing until the delivery of the vessel to the Customer” 5,475,211,968 rubles. Most likely, this is the cost of the newest minesweeper, but it is possible that this insurance contract only includes compensation for the costs of its construction, i.e. the cost of this ship is higher by the sum of the manufacturer’s profit and VAT.

But even if 5.5 billion rubles. - this is the price of a completely finished ship, and without its main weapon, the mine warfare complex (which could only be partially taken into account in the cost of the minesweeper, since apart from the gas minesweeper, upon delivery, the minesweeper was not equipped with anything), then the ships of Project 12700 truly became for us "golden". And this is exactly what, apparently, they want to make the “Typhoons” for them, which already cost 350 million rubles in the basic configuration.

But what is 350 million? Nonsense. Therefore, the manufacturer proposes to equip an unmanned boat with strike modules (!) and/or unmanned aircraft"Orlan" (!!!). No, don’t think anything bad, the UAV performs an “archivally important” function - if without it the control range of the Typhoon from a minesweeper reaches 20 km (which is clearly more than enough), then with a UAV it is as much as 300 km! This can be used directly from the St. Petersburg Admiralty to drive radio-controlled boats! And if they are also equipped with combat modules, then “ sea ​​battle"At the meeting, arrange...

We can only be glad that there are no proposals to equip the Typhoon with launchers for Caliber and a landing deck for a promising fighter vertical take-off and landings (although... the author of this article will not be surprised by anything). As a matter of fact, the conscientiousness of the developers is perfectly characterized by the above advertising poster. As follows from the “header” of the table, they compare their “Typhoon” with the Inspector-MK2... but in the table itself, “for some reason,” the performance characteristics of the previous modification of the Inspector-MK1 are given

And here's the sad result

Today we are building “golden” minesweepers of Project 12700 - one has been put into operation, four more are in various stages of construction, expected until 2020. In December 2016, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Vladimir Korolev announced that 3 more minesweepers were “contracted”, but They still haven’t gotten onto the slipway. In addition to them, we create no less “golden” unmanned boats of the “Typhoon” type.

In the depths of the research institute, the “gloomy domestic genius” is in full swing designing the latest and state-of-the-art system mine action "Alexandrite-ISPUM", which, of course, will be the best in the world, but someday later, but for now we need to remember to timely transfer funding for the next stage of the development work... And, by the way, to open new research. Because, due to incomprehensible negligence, “Alexandrite-ISPUM” is being developed exclusively in the ship version, but not in the container version, therefore, for example, it cannot be installed on our sub-corvette patrol ships of Project 22160.

And at this time, our only operational complex “Diez” / “Livadiya” / “Mayevka” is already on one minesweeper; its container modification, tested on the “Valentin Pikul”, according to some reports, was taken somewhere near Moscow.

Well, what if there is war? Well, we'll have to learn from the experience of the Royal Navy. One of the key tasks of Rear Admiral Woodward, who commanded the British carrier group in the Falklands in 1982, was to ensure an amphibious landing - and, if possible, a bloodless one. Everything would be fine, but the approaches to the landing site could be mined, and Woodward’s formation did not have a single minesweeper. New ships of this type were just being tested, and they were not sent to recapture the original British Falklands from the Argentines.

But how to deal with the mine danger? The rear admiral had no choice - he was forced to send one of his frigates, Alakriti, so that with its own bottom it would check for the presence of mines in the landing zone. In his memoirs, Woodward wrote:

« Now I had a difficult mission to call Captain 2nd Rank Christopher Craig and say: “I would like you to go and see if you can drown by hitting a mine in the Falkland Strait this evening.”»…

The admiral risked a small frigate with a crew of 175 so as not to endanger landing ships packed with Marines. It is in this way that, if something happens, we will have to take the SSBNs out to sea - by launching a multi-purpose nuclear submarine in front of them, because the Russian Navy has no other way to protect missile submarines from modern mines. There is just one nuance - when a British ship died in battle, its commander or senior officer, according to tradition, uttered the phrase: “The King has a lot.” And even during the Falklands, despite the fact that the Royal Navy in 1982 was only a shadow former greatness, in relation to “Alacriti” this phrase would still be fair - the Crown still had quite a lot of small frigates.

Alas, the same cannot be said about our multi-purpose nuclear submarines.

Landing and mine-sweeping ships Part 2 Apalkov Yuri Valentinovich

Sea minesweepers pr. 266 - 41 units

Basic tactical and technical elements

Displacement, t:

Standard 519

Full 560

Main dimensions, m:

Largest (according to KBJI) 52.1 (49.0)

Maximum body width (according to design height) 9.4 (9.4)

Average draft 2.65

Crew, people (including officers) 56 (5)

Autonomy in terms of provisions, 7 days

Main power plant:

Type diesel

Quantity x DC type - total power, l. with 2 x M-503 - 5000

Number x type of propulsors 2 x crankshaft propellers

Quantity x type - power

EPS current sources, kW 2 x DG - 200 each + 1 DG - 100

Travel speed, knots:

Largest 16

Economic 12

Cruising range 12 knots, miles: 1500

Weapons:

Mine protection:

Number x type of contact trawls 1 x BKT or PST-1 or MT-1D

Quantity x type of acoustic trawls 1 x AT-3

Quantity x type of electromagnetic trawls 1 x TEM-2

Micron trawl control equipment

Cord charges ShZ-1 or ShZ-2 (length up to 2200 m)

Anti-submarine:

Number of stern bomb releasers 2

Number of standard trolleys 6

Ammunition 36 GB BGB

Number of min 9

Artillery complex:

Number of guns x barrels (type guns) 2x2-30 mm (AK-230)

Ammunition 4200 rounds

SUAO "Lynx" (MR-104)

Number of AU x barrels (AU type) 2x2-25 mm (2M-ZM)

Anti-aircraft missile system:

Name "Strela-3"

Number of PU x guides (PU type) 1x2 (MANPADS)

Ammunition 20 ZR

Radioelectronic:

Mine detection sonar "Lan" (MG-69)

GAS ZPS MG-25

Navigation radar "Neptune" or "Don-M"*

Identification station "Nichrome"

RTR station "Bizan-4B"

Active jamming station "Tulip"

* After modernization.

Morskoy TSCHK pr. 266

Marine TSCHK pr. 266 (MT-62). summer 1987

The sea minesweeper pr. 266 was designed by TsKB-363 (Western Design Bureau) under the leadership of N.P. Pegova. TTZ for the development of the ship was issued in 1956. Preliminary design developed in 1957, and the technical design was approved in 1957.

The ship's hull, with an elongated forecastle and a double bottom throughout, was divided by watertight bulkheads into nine compartments. In order to reduce the magnetic field, it was made of low-magnetic steel* and had a demagnetizing device (both with general ship windings and local ones, compensating the magnetic fields of the largest mechanisms and equipment elements) with an automatic current control system and an attachment for compensating eddy currents arising when pitching. To reduce the acoustic field on the ship, sound insulation of noisy equipment, vibration-damping coatings for the foundations of noisy mechanisms, soundproofing inserts in pipes and shaft lines, as well as air shielding of low-noise large-diameter propellers that had a relatively low rotation speed were provided. Protection of ships from non-contact mines with electrical channels of contactors was ensured mainly through the application of a dielectric coating on the surfaces of all parts in contact with sea water, as well as electrical insulation of bottom-outboard equipment, shafting, trawl mechanisms and trawl parts from the ship's hull. Compared to its predecessors - TSchK pr. 254 and pr. 264 - the magnetic field of the ship pr. 266 was reduced by more than 40 times, and the acoustic field by almost half.

The main engines were located in echelon and controlled remotely. The search for anchor mines ahead along the ship's course was ensured by the mine detection system, and the detection of floating mines in the daytime and at night was provided by special electronic equipment. For ease of operation of the mine sweeping equipment, it was equipped with hydraulic drives and had automatic remote control. The trawls were serviced at different times or in combinations using two KBG-5 hydraulic crane beams and a winch. They made it possible to sweep modern mines at depths from 25 to 150 m. Mines could be destroyed by cord charges (IU3-1 or ShZ-2 up to 2200 m long). The ships could accept a second set of minesweeping equipment for overload. The minesweepers were adapted to operate in conditions where weapons of mass destruction were used and had a remotely controlled water protection system. In 1963–1971 in Khabarovsk (at the Khabarovsk Shipyard) and in Leningrad (at the Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard) for Soviet fleet 41 TShchK pr. 266 were built. The first two ships of the Khabarovsk Shipyard (MT-86 and MT-53) differed from the serial TShchK by a different superstructure configuration and the presence of a sighting column for fire control of the 30-mm AK-230 AU. In addition, instead of KBG-5 crane beams, they used crane beams with electric drives (similar to those that were available at TSCHK pr. 257D and pr. 257DM).

Until 1968, ships entered service with the PJ1C Neptune navigation system, which was replaced by the Don radar during operation or mid-term repairs. At the same time, all TShchK pr. 266 were armed with two 25-mm 2M-ZM AU. Four ships were built for export on Project 266E. Three of them were transferred to Egypt, and one to Vietnam. Project 266 ships began to be withdrawn from the fleet in the second half of the 80s, and currently (as of January 2007) none of them are in service. The main disadvantage of MTShch pr. 266 was the lack of means of searching and detecting bottom mines, as well as gusty rolling.

Komsomolets of Belarus (serial number 980, until 1976 - MT-217). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:; November 7, 1964 Member of the Baltic Fleet. In 1990, it was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to OFI for disposal.

* According to some data, for the first time in the practice of world shipbuilding.

MT-159(factory no. 981). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 07/04/1964 Member of the Baltic Fleet. In 1990, it was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to OFI for disposal.

MT-62(manager N-982). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 5.11.1964 Part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1989–1991 was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to OFI for disposal.

Marine TSCHK pr. 266 (Alexander Kazarsky), 2002

Longitudinal section of the marine TSCHK pr. 266:

1 - crane beam; 2 - TEM-2 trawl retractor; 3 - winch-view; 4 - trawl view; 5 - 230 mm AU AK-230M; 6 - turret compartment of the 30-mm AU AK-230M; 7 - vestibule (fence of spent cartridges); 8 - corridor; 9 - team canteen (service point medical care); 10 - fan enclosure; 11 - signalmen's cabin; 12 - signal bridge; 13 - AG1 radio direction finder; 14-AP radar "Lynx"; 15-AP station "Nichrome"; 16 - spotlight; 17-AP radar "Neptune"; 18-room of the HF blocks of the “Lynx” and “Neptune” radars (after modernization of the “Don-M” radar); 19 - sighting column of the SUAO; 20 - navigation bridge; 21 - running and navigation room; 22 - spare parts storage rooms; 23 - skipper's and painter's storeroom; 24 - forepeak; 25 - chain box. 26 - bilge compartment; 27 - refrigeration vehicle room; 28 - vestibule; 29 - refrigerated; 30 - dry provisions pantry; 31 - antenna of GAS "Lan" (MG-69); 32 - shaft of the lifting and lowering device (LOD); 33 - sonar compartment; 34 - forward crew cockpit (for 18 people); 35 - gyropost; 36 - diesel fuel tanks; 37 - nasal MO. 38 - diesel oil tanks; 39 - bow post for power generation and control of the power plant; 40 - aft MO; 41 - aft power station and power plant control; 42 - pitch change mechanism compartment (PMC); 43 - aft crew quarters (for 20 people); 44 - boiler water tank; 45 - mine store; 46 - wet provisions pantry; 47 - tiller compartment; 48 - chemical storeroom.

Gaff(factory No. 983, until 1976 - MT-205). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:; 02/11/1965 Member of the Baltic Fleet. On March 1, 1993, the minesweeper was excluded from the fleet lists and put into storage. On May 12, 1994, it sank after a fire. Subsequently, the ship was raised and dismantled for metal in Tallinn.

MT-47(factory no. 984). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 05/30/1965 Member of the Baltic Fleet. In 1992, it was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

MT-63(factory no. 985). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:; 12/20/1965 Member of the KFL. In 1994, the ship was excluded from the list of the fleet and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

Arseny Raskin(factory no. 990). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 1965 Became part of the Northern Fleet. In 1990, it was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

Vice Admiral Kostygov(factory No. 991, until 1976 - MT-73). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:; 12/30/1965 Member of the Baltic Fleet. On March 1, 1993, it was removed from the lists of the fleet and put into storage. In 1994, in Tallinn, the ship was dismantled for metal.

Evgeniy Nikonov(factory No. 992, until 1976 - MT-94). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:; 01/21/1966 Member of the Baltic Fleet. On March 1, 1993, it was removed from the lists of the fleet and put into storage. In 1994, in Tallinn, the ship was dismantled for metal.

MT-6(factory no. 993). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 10/5/1966 Part of the Northern Fleet. In 1992, it was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

Alexander Kazarsky(plant No. 994, project 266). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 08/30/1966 Part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1995, the minesweeper was put into reserve, and in January 1996, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

MT-72(factory no. 995). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 09/30/1966 Part of the Northern Fleet. In 1993, it was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

Photo by S.A. Spirikhina

Marine TSCHK pr. 266 (MT-253), summer 1993

Marine TSCHK. Project 266 (MT-86 and MT-53 after replacing the Neptune radar with the Don radar)

Longitudinal section of the marine TSCHK pr. 266 (MT-86 and MT-53):

1 - crane beam; 2 - TEM-2 trawl retractor; 3 - winch-view; 4 - trawl view; 5 - 230 mm AU AK-230M; 6 - turret compartment of the 30-mm AU AK-230M; 7 - sighting column of the SUAO; 8-tambour; 9-corridor; 10-team canteen (medical aid point); 11 - refrigeration machine room; 12-signal cabin; 13-room of the HF radar units “Lynx” and “Don-M”; 14-AP radio direction finder; 15-AP radar "Lynx"; 16 - spotlight; 17-AP station "Nichrome"; 18-AP radar "Don-M"; 19-way bridge; 20 - spare parts storage room; 21 - periscopic sight; 22 - running and navigation room; 23 - radio communication room; 24 - skipper's and painter's storeroom; 25 - forepeak; 26 - chain box; 27 - storerooms; 28 - bilge compartment; 29 - textile pantry; 30 - hydroacoustic compartment; 31 - GAS MG-35 antenna; 32 - GAS MG-89 antenna; 33 - shaft of the lifting and lowering device (LOD); 34 - forward crew cockpit (for 28 people); 35 - gyropost; 36 - fresh water tanks; 37 - nasal MO; 38 - diesel fuel tanks; 39 - bow post for power generation and control of the power plant; 40 - aft MO; 41 - aft power station and power plant control; 42 - pitch change mechanism compartment (PMC); 43 - aft crew quarters (for 21 people); 44 - boiler water tank; 45 - mine store; 46 - wet provisions pantry; 47 - spare fresh water tank; 48 - tiller compartment; 49 - chemical storeroom.

Boris Safonov(factory no. 996). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 11/15/1966 Part of the Northern Fleet. In 1992, it was expelled from the fleet and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

MT-18(factory no. 997). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 01/07/1967 Member of the KFL. In 1994, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

MT-179(production no. 998). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 01/18/1967 Member of the Baltic Fleet. On March 1, 1993, the minesweeper was excluded from the fleet lists and put into storage. In 1994 in Tallinn it was dismantled for metal.

MT-163(production no. 999). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 02.1967 Part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1989–1991 was removed from the fleet lists and transferred to OFI for disposal.

MT-253(factory no. 970). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 07/31/1967 Part of the Northern Fleet. In 1988, the ship was put into reserve, and in 1994, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

MT-209(factory no. 971). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 08/30/1967 Member of the Baltic Fleet. He was a member of the Baltic Fleet. In 1991, the ship was put into reserve, and in 1994, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

Ivan Maslov(factory no. 972). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 10/7/1967 Part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1995, the minesweeper was excluded from the fleet lists due to the poor technical condition of the hull and mechanisms and transferred to ARVI for disposal.

MT-219(factory no. 973). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 01/05/1968 Part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1988, the ship was put into reserve, and in March 1993, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

Grigory Vakulenchuk(factory no. 974). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 06/12/1968 Part of the Black Sea Fleet. In November 1992, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

Pavel Malkov(factory no. 975). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 12/31/1968 Part of the Northern Fleet. In 1992, the ship was put into reserve, and in March 1993, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

Ivan Sivko(factory no. 976). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 07/09/1969 Part of the Northern Fleet. In November 1991, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to OFI for disposal.

Alexander Sokolov(factory no. 901). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 08/31/1969 Part of the Northern Fleet. In 1993, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

Afanasy Matyushenko(plant No. 902, project 266). Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard:;; 1969 Member of the KFL. In 1996, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

MT-86(factory no. 50). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1963 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1991, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to OFI for disposal.

MT-53(factory no. 51). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 12/31/1964 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in 1990, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to OFI for disposal.

MT-58(factory no. 52). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 08/07/1965 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1990, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and transferred to OFI for disposal.

MT-27(factory no. 53). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 06/30/1966 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and transferred to OFI for disposal.

MT-80(factory no. 54). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 12/12/1966 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In November 1991, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to OFI for disposal.

MT-82(plant No. 55, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 11/12/1967 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1992, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

TSCHK pr. 266 after modernization associated with the replacement of the Neptune radar with the Don radar and the installation of two. 25 mm AU 2M-3M

MT-238(factory no. 56). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1967 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1990, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and transferred to OFI for disposal.

MT-242(factory no. 57). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 09/30/1968 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1990, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and transferred to OFI for disposal.

MT-193(plant No. 58, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1968 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1991, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to OFI for disposal.

MT-200(plant No. 59, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1968 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1992, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

MT-208(plant No. 60, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1969 Became part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1990, the ship was put into reserve, and in April 1994, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

MT-263(plant No. 61, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 06/26/1969 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In March 1993, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

Vice Admiral Sabaneev(factory No. 62, until 1976 - MT-257, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 12/12/1969 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In March 1993, the ship was removed from the lists of the fleet and handed over to ARVI for disposal.

SHT-221(plant No. 63, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1970 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1991, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to OFI for disposal.

Shichman Pavlov(plant No. 64, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 01/01/1970 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1991, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to OFI for disposal.

Tire(plant No. 65, project 266). Khabarovsk Shipyard:;; 1971 Part of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, the ship was put into reserve, and in November 1991, it was removed from the fleet lists and handed over to OFI for disposal.